• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.47
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• pp.5-22
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• 2009

This study analysed the complicated introduction process of IPTV in Korea, based on the rent seeking theory which is one of an useful economic theory for explaining the dynamic interaction between government and entrepreneurs. Rent seeking theory describes the possibility of lobbying for economic regulations or regulatory capture which refers to collusion between firms and the government agencies assigned to regulate them. The introduction of IPTV(Internet Protocol TV) in Korea was the most controversial policy issue since the beginning of new media business of cable TV in 1995. In addition to the ordinary conflict between the old and new entrepreneurs, IPTV caused the bureaucratic conflicts between the Ministry of Information and Communication and the Korean Broadcasting Commission (Two regulation agencies were merged into KCC(Korean Communications Commission) in 2008). Through the process all related policy players, including the government, pursued their own rent, and it caused vicious circle of continuous rent seeking and mutual distrust among players. Finally, all-directional lobby of pre-IPTV companies brought about the successful entrance to IPTV market and the enactment of IPTV special law which includes deregulation compared to the existing Broadcast Act. Considering the convergence trend of media related laws it means going against the times. Until now, the conflict phenomena occurring in broadcast industry were mostly explained based on the sociological conflict theory. However, the result of this study shows the usefulness and necessity of rent seeking theory because it gives an economic explanation of conflict behavior.