• Korean Journal of Remote Sensing
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• v.38 no.3
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• pp.311-326
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• 2022

The Compact Advanced Satellite 500-4 (CAS500-4) is under development to efficiently manage and monitor forests in Korea and is scheduled to launch in 2025. The National Institute of Forest Science is developing 36 types of forestry applications to utilize the CAS500-4 efficiently. The products derived using the remote sensing method require validation with ground reference data, and the quality monitoring results for the products must be continuously reported. Due to it being the first time developing the national forestry satellite, there is no official calibration and validation site for forestry products in Korea. Accordingly, the author designed a calibration and validation site for the forestry products following international standards. In addition, to install calibration and validation sites nationwide, the authors selected appropriate sensors and evaluated the applicability of the sensors. As a result, the difference between the ground observation data and the Sentinel-2 image was observed to be within ±5%, confirming that the sensor could be used for nationwide expansion.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aeronautical & Space Sciences
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• v.50 no.4
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• pp.287-295
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• 2022

As low altitude long-range artillery threat has been strengthened, the development of anti-artillery interception system to protect assets against its attacks will be kicked off. We view the defense of long-range artillery attacks as a typical dynamic weapon target assignment (DWTA) problem. DWTA is a sequential decision process in which decision making under future uncertain attacks affects the subsequent decision processes and its results. These are typical characteristics of Markov decision process (MDP) model. We formulate the problem as a MDP model to examine the assignment policy for the defender. The proximity of the capital of South Korea to North Korea border limits the computation time for its solution to a few second. Within the allowed time interval, it is impossible to compute the exact optimal solution. We apply approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to check if ADP approach solve the MDP model within processing time limit. We employ Shoot-Shoot-Look policy as a baseline strategy and compare it with ADP approach for three scenarios. Simulation results show that ADP approach provide better solution than the baseline strategy.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• Korean Journal of Remote Sensing
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.455-464
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• 2014

After launching the Geostationary Ocean Color Imager (GOCI) on June 2010, field campaigns were performed routinely around Korean peninsula to collect in-situ data for calibration and validation. Key measurements in the campaigns are radiometric ones with field radiometers such as Analytical Spectral Devices FieldSpec3 or TriOS RAMSES. The field radiometers must be regularly calibrated. We, in the paper, introduce the optical laboratory built in KOSC and the relative calibration method for in-situ measurement spectroradiometer. The laboratory is equipped with a 20-inch integrating sphere (USS-2000S, LabSphere) in 98% uniformity, a reference spectrometer (MCPD9800, Photal) covering wavelengths from 360 nm to 1100 nm with 1.6 nm spectral resolution, and an optical table ($3600{\times}1500{\times}800mm^3$) having a flatness of ${\pm}0.1mm$. Under constant temperature and humidity maintainance in the room, the reference spectrometer and the in-situ measurement instrument are checked with the same light source in the same distance. From the test of FieldSpec3, we figured out a slight difference among in-situ instruments in blue band range, and also confirmed the sensor spectral performance was changed about 4.41% during 1 year. These results show that the regular calibrations are needed to maintain the field measurement accuracy and thus GOCI data reliability.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-181
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• 2024

The U.N. Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee estimated that the amount of North Korea's cyberattacks on virtual asset-related companies from 2017 to 2023 was about 4 trillion won. North Korea's cyberattacks have secured funds through cryptocurrency hacking as it has been restricted from securing foreign currency due to economic sanctions by the international community, and it also shows the form of technology theft against defense companies, and illegal assets are being used to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and develop nuclear and missile development. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, and declared the completion of its national nuclear armament following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29 of the same year, the U.N. imposed sanctions on North Korea, which are considered the strongest economic sanctions in history. In these difficult economic situations, North Korea tried to overcome the crisis through cyberattacks, but as a result of analyzing the changes through the North's cyber attack cases, the strategic goal from the first period from 2009 to 2016 was to verify and show off North Korea's cyber capabilities through the neutralization of the national network and the takeover of information, and was seen as an intention to create social chaos in South Korea. When foreign currency earnings were limited due to sanctions against North Korea in 2016, the second stage seized virtual currency and secured funds to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and advance nuclear and missile development. The third stage is a technology hacking of domestic and foreign defense companies, focusing on taking over key technologies to achieve the five strategic weapons tasks proposed by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At the national level, security measures for private companies as well as state agencies should be established against North Korea's cyberattacks, and measures for legal systems, technical problems, and budgets related to science are urgently needed. It is also necessary to establish a system and manpower to respond to the ever-developing cyberattacks by focusing on cultivating and securing professional manpower such as white hackers.