• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.67 no.4
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• pp.79-101
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• 2015

What is the role of welfare discourse? Michel Foucault suggests the power and knowledge relation that power in a particular society and period controls the society and members by creating knowledge affecting the formation of cognitive and normative systems. Having the formation of exclusions(constraint of cognition), and materiality and reality(normative system) as an analytical framework, this article attempts the exploration of welfare discourse analyses with public statements relating to welfare subjects of the four former Korean presidents. As a result, It is found that dominant epistemic system is formed by balancing welfare and growth and regarding jobs as the best welfare(the linkage of welfare-growth-employment), emphasizing individual economic responsibility and self-reliance, pursuing welfare selectivism, and excluding comprehensive welfare provisions. At the same time, it is observed that power is not always formulating systematic knowledge and that there is a gap between cognition and norm. While the Foucauldian discourse analysis provides a causal inference about low social welfare expenditure, excessive focus on the role of power as knowledge generator and infuser causes a question of how to accommodate contemporary changes into knowledge system.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.