• 발명특허
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• v.31 no.2 s.356
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• pp.38-41
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• 2006

이동통신 서비스 초기 음성위주의 서비스가 활발한 움직임을 보였지만, 현재 이동통신의 발달에 힘입어 좀더 다양한 형태의 서비스가 제공되고 있는 실정이다. 예를 들면 컨텐츠 서비스나 커머스 등이 바로 그것이다. 이들은 현재 지속적으로 개선되어 가고 있는 상태이다. 하지만 이러한 서비스가 활성화되기 시작하면서 문제가 발생하였다. 바로 무선인터넷 서비스의 과금 방법이다. 컨텐츠 서비스가 활발해졌다는 것은 컨텐츠를 제공하는 업체 또한 많아졌음을 의미한다. 이들 컨텐츠 제공 업체들은 이동통신사의 무선망을 이용한 무선인터넷 서비스에 필요한 컨텐츠를 제공하고 있다. 바로 여기서 문제가 발생한다.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.85-108
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• 2007

Currently, most of big IT companies attempt to penetrate into Internet portal industry aggressively in order to expand their channels(sale, distribution, marketing, R&D, and so on) and to acquire competitive advantages. Existing Internet portals also have become larger and more complex with continuous developments. Therefore, it is necessary to acquire competitive contents to survive the extreme competition and to satisfy diverse needs of customers. In this paper, we have done qualitative analyses on the cases of domestic and foreign major Internet portals which have acquired contents through of M&A and strategic alliances. In our analyses, we identify five factors crucial to the successes and failures of Internet portals. From the analyses, we find that the acquisition of UCC based contents and subscribers over the critical mass point are the two most important factors that should be simultaneously satisfied for the successful M&As. Additional analyses suggest how to acquire synergy effects from successful M&As.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.48 no.3
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• pp.177-197
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• 2023

The rent seeking behavior of monopolistic online platform enterprises against digital contents suppliers is similar to the importing countries transfers the monopoly profit acquired by exporting companies in the imperfectly competitive market through optimal tariffs. If such an optimal tariffs imposing mechanism of importing countries, according to so-called strategic trade policy theories, is applied to the rent-seeking behavior of online platform companies, important insights can be obtained in discussions on regulatory reform. In other words, if an online platform enterprises impose a differentiated fee on each contents-suppliers in a monopolistically competitive markets that pursues contents differentiation through R&D investment, it would reduce the innovation investment by contents suppliers. Nevertheless, profit-maximizing online platform enterprises would not voluntarily give up the discriminatory fee system. Therefore, we would like to propose the introduction of a regulation that can force the introduction of an non-discriminatory fee system for all the contents suppliers.