• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.5-58
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• 2019

The purpose of this article is to bring about 10.26 accident by providing a fuse for the overthrow of the Park Chung-hee administration in the 10.18 Buma uprising. So, first of all, this article has a main purpose in analyzing the comparison between Masan's 3.15 uprising and 10.18 Buma uprising. The purpose of the study is to compare the 3.15 democratic movement in Masan with the 10.18 Buma uprising, given that the incident laid the foundation for the dictator to be overthrown in the event of an anti-dictatorial movement in Masan. The research method of this article is intended to be used as a research method in the 3.15 and 10.18 protests, given that if a person in power conducts election fraud or suppresses anti-government movements in order to maintain the system, it could lead to the destruction of those in power. In the end, the Masan 3.15 uprising and 10.18 uprising failed to reach a direct attempt to overthrow the regime due to unfinished democratic movements, but with the revolution of 4.19 and the massive political transformation of 10.26 Accident, he achieved the leading role theory that allowed the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee administrations. In eradicating authoritarian regimes, however, the historic significance of the democratization movement was that the authoritarian regime eventually brought about the collapse of the regime by making a hard-line stance on election schemes or popular protests over the trap of power boomerang, which causes the regime to collapse.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.241-261
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• 2015

The current study investigated whether in-group bias affects 5- to 6-year-old children's resource-allocation decisions. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to allocate 10 stickers between a friend (an in-group member) and a stranger (an out-group member). Children allocated significantly more stickers to friends than to strangers, suggesting that they made distributive decisions in favor of their in-group members, when they were not the beneficiary of a resource-allocation. In Experiment 2, we examined whether being one of the recipients in the resource-allocation game would affect children's decisions. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 except that participants were asked to allocate stickers between themselves and a friend or a stranger. The children showed selfish distributions regardless of recipients. These results indicate that when children become one of the recipients in a resource-allocation, their self-interests override their preference for in-group members.