• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.323-347
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• 2017

In the 1980s, traditional analytic epistemology was abuzz with proposed solutions to the Gettier problem, responses to skepticism, newly minted objections to a variety of internalist and externalist theories of justification, and enthusiastic criticisms of foundationalism and coherentism. Debates over competing analyses of knowledge and justification raged. Since then, virtue epistemology has become a diverse and increasingly well-established field. I think that most researchers in Korea will feel the name "virtue epistemology" itself as strange or unfamiliar. It is primarily because virtue epistemology has a brief history. So, virtue epistemology did not present many opportunities for its introduction to Korean researchers. Another reason is that the name of "virtue epistemology" itself has a strangeness or unfamiliarity. Since the concept of "virtue" has mainly been used in moral or ethical contexts, virtue ethics is very familiar to most people. In contrast, the name of "virtue epistemology", combining "virtue" with "epistemology", is strange to many people. This paper primarily aims to introduce virtue epistemology in our philosophical society. What is it? How is virtue epistemology different from traditional analytic epistemology? What is the nature of virtues in virtue epistemology? What are the advantages, urgent tasks, and prospects of virtue epistemology? Focusing on these questions, I seek to understand the background to the rise of virtue epistemology, the differences and relations between virtue epistemology and traditional epistemology, and the nature of virtue and the main theories in virtue epistemology.