• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.67-74
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• 2010

E-learning technology which effectively supports the learning methodologies between students and professors and which provides location and time benefits to students is being researched now a days. However, E-learning classes produce bad effects comparing with offline classes in learning procedures including scholastic achievements. Bad effects of E-learning system could be proxy attendance, lack of concentration, and bad attitude of students. These environmental problems must be solved first to achieve the advantages of E-learning technology. To get rid of these problems, in this paper, we proposed a mechanism which provides effective learning progress by using face authentication method. This mechanism supervise the student by using real time face recognition which prevents proxy attendance, illegal activities, and student's absences.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.13 no.21
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• pp.1-6
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• 1990

The paper analyzes how an agency problem in one industry affects the nature of equilibrium in another related industry facing potential entry. It is shown that, under certain situation, the incumbent allows for entry and charges a higher price than that without the agency problem. And the incumbent can reap more profits as a result of entry. The socially optimal price may be higher than, equal to or lower than the price the incumbent charges.

• Proceedings of the Korea Multimedia Society Conference
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• 2003.05b
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• pp.219-223
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• 2003

디지털 서명과 암호화를 동시에 수행할 수 있는 Signcryption 방식이 Zheng에 의해 제안되었다[1]. 그 후, 서명과 암호화에 요구되는 작업을 상대적으로 성능이 뛰어난 서버에 의뢰 가능하도록 하는 Proxy-Signcryption을 이동통신 환경에 적합하도록 개선한 방식이 제안되었다[2]. 그러나 개선 방식은 효율성과 forword secrecy는 제공하지만 대리자의 부정은 방지할 수 없어 문제가 발생할 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 대리자가 부정하였을 경우 대리자의 개인키가 노출되도록 한 안전한 Proxy-Signcryption 방식을 제안한다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1893-1900
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• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.933-936
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• 2014

The government has the duty to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. In order to promote competition we have to address the asymmetry in the information as possible and to ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it virtually distort the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by avoiding their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy could be transferred to down the price of cell phone and charges and it would be a benefit to consumers. Separate notice of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a developed policy but it was too late. It, the market price close to that from perfect competition structure, is plausible, ultimately.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.155-171
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• 2016

Separation of management with ownership induces the agency problems between CEO and shareholders of Chinese firms. To solve this problem Chinese government has enforced the "stock incentive management law for stock listed companies" since 2006. However, it has not been clear that this law is beneficial to reduce the agency cost and thus to increase the performance of Chinese firms. This study aims to answer this question. It is specifically designed to explore the effects of CEO's stock incentive on the performance of Chinese firms. It also examines the moderating effects of the characteristics of the board of directors on this relationship. Using a multi-year sample (2008-2014), we found that CEO's stock incentive is positively related to firm's performance. We also found that the equity stakes of board members strengthens the positive relations between CEO's equity incentives and firms' performance. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, the independency of the board of directors does not significantly moderate the relationship between CEO's equity incentives and firms' performance. Based on the findings, this study provides valuable implication for theory and practice.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.1-25
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• 2001

본 연구에서는 우리나라 기업에서 내부현금흐름과 부채가 투자지출과 어떠한 관계에 있는가를 분석함으로서 외부자금조달의 제약 및 대리인 문제가 투자지출에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석의 결과, 전체 기간에 대하여 투자지출은 내부현금흐름과 강한 양(+)의 관계를 나타내어 외부 자금조달의 제한이 투자지출에 큰 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 표본을 분류하여 분석한 결과, 단독기업이 재벌기업에 비해 정보비대칭 문제가 심각하므로 더 큰 외부자금조달의 제한에 직면할 것이라는 증거는 발견되지 않았으며, 주식시장의 장세에 따른 분석결과, 주가 상승기에 투자지출과 부채비율은 두드러진 음(-)의 관계를 형성함으로서 이 시기에는 부채가 투자를 억제하는 요인인 것으로 분석되었다. 또한 IMF 이후 1998년에는 내부현금흐름이 투자지출에 큰 영향을 미치지 않았으며, 투자기회가 적은 기업에서만 부채의 계수가 유의적인 음(-)으로 나타나 IMF 이전과는 다른 양상을 보였다.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.159-165
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• 2020

With respect to the cause of asymmetric cost behavior, there are two streams of the literature. One stream focused on effect of managerial expectation and the other explained using agency system. In this study, we aim to investigate the determinants of asymmetric cost behavior in these streams. We first examine the impact of managerial overconfidence and optimistic bias on asymmetric cost. We also examine ownership ratio as a proxy of the quality of corporate governance effects on asymmetric cost. The results are as follows. First, firms have the anti-sticky asymmetric cost behavior. Second, we find that the firms with managerial optimistic bias mitigate the degree of asymmetric cost. This finding implies that managerial optimism is a factor that alters asymmetric cost behavior. Third, the degree of asymmetric cost is weaker in case of firms with higher manager's ownership. This result provides an important empirical evidence for understanding the role of corporate governance in cost behavior.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.101-108
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• 2013

In this paper, we examine the impact of family ownership mechanism on the firm's debt policy. Our results show that family firms tend to have a lower debt level, compared with non-family firms. Foreign investors are found to lead to a reduction in the firm's debt level through their monitoring incentives for dominating large shareholders. The firm's profitablily is related to a lower level of debt, whereas higher tangible assets and firm size are positively associated with high debt ratios due to the possibility of large collateral assets. Some implications are that foreign investors can reduce the agency costs of dominating large shareholders in family firms through monitoring activities, thus enhancing the efficiency of business decision-makings.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.12 no.8
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• pp.207-214
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• 2021

Existing studies have shown consistent results that a diversification discount phenomenon occurs, which means that the value of the company decreases as the degree of diversification of a company increases. Nevertheless, it is explained by the agency theory as a factor that continues to promote diversification by companies. And in order to solve the agency problem, it is important to form an effective governance structure. In order to solve these problems, this study aims to study how the directors' concurrent information affects the monitoring effect of the board of directors through this affects diversification.To this end, research was conducted on KOSPI companies for 6 years from 2011 to 2016.As a result of the analysis, in the case of the concurrent appointment of the CEO and the inside director, there was a positive (+) effect, but the significance could not be confirmed. In the case of adjunct appointments as outside directors, positive results were confirmed that were significant for diversification.