• Cross-Cultural Studies
• /
• v.52
• /
• pp.133-164
• /
• 2018

This purpose of this paper is to focus on anti-Japanese literature and pro-Japanese literature skills among Korean literary history written in Japan, and to observe the differences between Korean and Japanese perception surrounding anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese literature. Analyzed texts are "Taste Korean Literature" by Saegusa Dosikatsu and "The Footsteps of Modern Literature of Chosun" by Shirakawa Yutaka, the earnest modern Korean literary historians written from the perspective of Japanese writers, and though there's no overall written history of literature, they were seen through with the perspective of Omura Masuo, at the forefront of Japanese researchers in modern and contemporary Korean literature. The main results of the review are as follow: First, In Korean literary history by Japan, the frame "pro-Japanese literature" is clearly embedded. It is clearly distinctive from the aspect of China or North Korea, and though it follows the narration system of South Korean literature, it also forms the breaking (turning) point of anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese literature relative to anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese literature. Second, even if it follows the narration system of South Korean literature, that question was constantly raised on existing Korean academic evaluation of anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese literature, and different interpretations of reading were practiced. For example, Korean academic circles highly regard literature of writers such as Kim, Jong han or Lee, Seok hoon, while Korean academics do not place much importance on Lee, Gwang Soo's pro-Japanese elements that are important. The third point is that generous marks are credited to writers with outstanding Japanese or to Japanese creative writing. As a result, they dissolve internal logic in different pro-Japanese collaborators such as Chang, Hyuk Ju, Kim, Sa Ryang, Lee, Seok hoon, or Kim, Yong Jae by melting the same "Japanese literature" in a cage. The last point is reading different inner thoughts of Kim, Jong-han or Lee, Seok-hoon unlike outspoken pro-Japanese collaborators such as Lee, Gwang soo, Jang, Hyuk Joo or Kim, Yong je. These points require more in-depth analysis, and will be continued in follow-up tasks.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.7 no.1
• /
• pp.446-453
• /
• 2021

This paper deals with two methods regarding fact and value. One is the method of H. Putnam, which is to break the boundary between fact and value and to make a world where the two have an inherent connection. The other is the method of J. Habermas, which regards fact and value as the product of an intersubjective agreement based on argumentation. Putnam, through his position of internal realism, moves from realism to pragmatism, especially by combining the rationalist tradition of Kant and Dewey's pragmatic views. Habermas also stands in the tradition of rationalism and universalism in Kant, at the same time emphasizing the practicability of truth in Hegel's tradition of historical reason. The significance of the strategy of Putnam and Habermas is that they have attempted to revive the realm of value against the strict dichotomy of facts and values and the subsequent devaluation of rationality in the realm of value. The starting point of this attempt is that the practical foundation of rationality is laid on life and practice. This could provide the room for escaping from rationality, which prioritizes only truths that reveal facts, that is, instrument-reduced rationality, the room for the revival of practical rationality through reflection on what is the purpose of life, and, in turn, the room for resisting to pass the realm of values and norms to the logic of habitual routines or customs. However, despite such common goal, there are clear limitations to Putnam's approach due to the differences in the strategies taken on facts and values. Putnam's method can demolish the whole universal framework that is the foundation where pragmatic pluralism will be fostered, eliminating the difference between the specificity of values and the universality of norms and shaking up the status of universal ethics. Therefore, Habermas' ethical theory is proposed as an alternative to establish a basis for universal ethics by relying on communication rationality and to secure the coercion of norms and blossom cultural pluralism as a diverse lifestyle based on this coercion.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
• /
• v.28
• /
• pp.133-163
• /
• 2017

It is the aim of this paper to elucidate the meaning of 'Sangsaeng' in Daesoon Thought on the basis of its relation to Life and Spirit in the philosophy of Hegel. To achieve this aim, this article compares three important concepts from Daesoon Thought, namely the 'gods of heaven and earth,' 'Haewon', and 'Sangsaeng' with Hegel's 'Life,' 'Spirit,' and the 'struggle for recognition.' This paper will clarify the commonalities as well as the differences between Daesoon Thought and Hegelian philosophy. The comparison between Hegel's concept of 'life' and the 'gods of heaven and earth' shows a specific relationship between a life and a soul which is characterized by duality. The point of similarity is that the two thoughts regards the soul as the basis of all things in nature including the life itself and spirit. This is the duality of the soul in nature and spirit as the truth of nature. But the difference is that Hegel does not reduce all things in nature including life itself to the soul as the truth of nature. This paper will argue that Hegel's idea of spirit returning from nature to itself has a similarity with the essence of Haewon in Haewon-sangsaeng. Hegel insists that spirit submerges initially in nature just as human beings in Daesoon Thought have inherent Won. The realization of the spirit in the Subjective Spirit shows that the spirit sublimates this initial submergence in nature und reveals itself in corporeality. This study will suggest that this realization of spirit including the struggle for recognition may be interpreted as the meaning of Sangsaeng.

• Journal of Popular Narrative
• /
• v.25 no.1
• /
• pp.349-392
• /
• 2019

In the 1960s of Korea, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan led to a sense of a vigorous anxiety and fear that "Japan will once again come to the Korean peninsula". As a reaction to this, the discourse on the criticism of 'Japanese Style' strongly emerged. If the prior discourse of criticism was to express the national antipathy toward the colonial remnants that had not yet been disposed of, the critical discourse of the 1960s was the wariness of the newly created 'Japanese Style' in popular culture, and to grasp it as a symptomatic phenomenon that 'evil-minded Japan' was revealed. Thus, this new logic of criticism of the 'Japanese Style' had a qualitative difference from the existing ones. It was accompanied by a willingness to inspect and censor the 'masses' that grew up as consumers of transnational 'mass culture' that flowed and chained in the geopolitical order under the Cold War system. Therefore, the topology of 'popular things=Japanese things=consuming things' reveals the paradox of moral demands that existed within Korean society in the 1960s. This was to solidify the divisive circulation structure that caused them to avoid direct contact with the other called 'Japan', but at the same time, get as close to it as ever. It is a repetitive obsession that pushes the other to another side through the moral segregation that strictly draws a line of demarcation between oneself and the other, but on the other hand is attracted to the object and pulls it back to its side. This paper intends to listen to the different voices that have arisen in the repetitive obsession to understand the significance of the dissonance that has been repeated in the contemporary era. This will be an examination of the paradoxical object of Japan that has been repeatedly asked to build the internal control principle of Korean society, or to hide the oppressive and violent side of the power, and that can neither be accepted nor destroyed completely as part of oneself.