• Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.63-72
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• 2010

This study aims to make a decision about the rational option for a multipurpose dams development of the Tumen river basin so that the adjoining countries will effectively deal with the chronic problems and fully satisfy the fast growing demand of water and power. It has been thus far investigated that the interests between North Korea and China closely depend on the selected option, and they are not well compatible with each other. These situations are defined in terms of the cooperative two-person nonzero-sum game. The Nash bargaining model is then applied to contemplate the rational option, considering two scenarios of economic growth of the North Korea. After analyzing the model, it was expected that 1) two multipurpose dams must be cooperatively developed, and 2) their benefits should be allocated according to demand of each country. The authors finally suggest that a cooperative organisation be established to effectively manage the dams beyond the border of the countries.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.700-721
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• 2012

This paper deals with methods for determining the reasonable royalty rates in the valuation of patents. To calculate the reliable reasonable royalty rate of a patent, we review pros and cons of the 25% rule royalty calculating method and the recent trend of this method. We also review the game theory of Nash Bargaining equation and review the Investment of Rate of Return Method according to the financial analysis. Next, we refer to the reasonable royalty damage cases among the recent patent infringement cases in USA and analyze the corresponding patents. We extract the patent indicators from the patent bibliographic information. Finally, we obtain a regression model for calculating a reasonable royalty rate using the patent indicators and the reasonable royalty rates in the recent patent infringement cases.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

Traditionally, tariffs have been used to protect domestic industries. In particular, a country with more bargaining power makes a punitive threat to maintain a certain level of market share in the market of other country. In this paper, we study the effect of punitive tariffs on an irrelevant industry. In particular, when a country tries to achieve a market share or quantity target in an industry, we examine the effect of threats to impose tariffs on the major export of another industries which are irrelevant to the targeted industry. Using a simple duopoly model, we show that there is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which supports that a country has an incentive to resolve a trade dispute voluntarily to protect its major export industry under the credible treat of punitive tariffs. This result is mainly due to the fact that the trade policy of a country concerns the aggregate benefits from trade over all its export industries. To obtain this result, this paper employs the linkage between the targeted and irrelevant industries by using the lobby of the irrelevant industry to curb the targeted industry. A lot of recent bilateral trade agreements can be applied to our results.