• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.287-305
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• 2016

This study confirms that there is a correlation between managers' incentive-compensation system(introduction of the compensation committee) and corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, proportion of outside directors, debt ratio, competitive strength), and analyzes whether firm value is affected by corporate governance mechanisms. The purpose of this paper are empirically tested using 318 firm-year data listed on the KRX from 2001 to 2010 and 2SLS(two-stage least square method) were used for the analysis of the hypotheses. The results of empirical tests are as follows. Firstly, there is no correlation between introduction of the compensation committee and corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, the results show that there is a causal relationship between some variables. Secondly, results from the analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm value, only introduction of the compensation committee and foreign investors ownership were analyzed as a positive impact on the firm value. This result means that most domestic firm don't actively used for managers' incentive-compensation system as a useful control device for improving corporate governance.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.135-153
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• 2005

자가통제평가(CSA : Control Self Assessment)는 핵심사업 목적을 달성하는데 개입되는 위험 그리고 그러한 사업위험을 관리하기 위하여 설계된 내부통제를 공식적이고 문서화된 협력적 프로세스에 의하여 검토하기 위하여 사용되는 방법론이다. 현재 많은 기업에서 효과적인 조직통제와 비즈니스 프로세스 개선을 위하여 전문 감사인과 경영인들이 기업지배구조 조직의 강력한 위험관리 도구로서 자가통제평가의 필요성을 강조하고 있다. 자가통제평가는 해당 조직의 담당부서나 팀에서 내부통제평가를 통하여 내부통제상의 재무보고, 준법, 사업 및 운영상의 효율성 등을 확보하기 위해서 설치되며, 효과적인 모니터 장치로서 기업지배구조상의 업무 프로세스를 정비하고 업무에서 발생하는 제반 정보의 흐름을 원활하게 해서 조직에게 손해가 발생할 수 있는 여러 가지 위험으로부터 회사를 사전에 차단하는 기능을 한다. 이러한 부분에서 효과적인 자가통제평가 시스템을 구축하는 것이 중요할 것이다. 본 연구에서는 e-Business 관련 기업지배구조의 안전성을 확보하기 위한 자가통제평가 모델에 대한 개발 필요성과 관련 자가통제평가 세가지 기본 모델들을 통하여 장단점을 제시하고, 자가통제평가 모델의 필요성을 논의하였다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.131-177
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• 2006

This paper examines a simultaneous determination of corporate control mechanisms, and its effects on firm performance. The corporate control mechanisms considered include the following; insider shareholding, institutional shareholding, the board of directors, dividend policy, and capital structure. This paper applies a simultaneous equation methodology and investigates the interdependence among the corporate control mechanisms. In the first part, the paper finds that firm-level variations of control mechanisms are large across time although average variations are relatively small. These variations are related to one another, which is confirmed by Granger causality test based on dynamic panel autoregression model. More specifically insider shareholding, institutional shareholding and outside director ratio cause each other. With regard to interdependence among the control mechanisms, 2SLS(two stage least squares) regression results show that insider shareholding and institutional shareholding are substitutes while institutional shareholding acts as complements to the ratio of outside members in the board of directors. Then in the second part, the paper examines the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. Firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q, has a positive association with leverage ratio while that has a negative relation to outside director ratio. This suggests that there may be a room for reforming corporate governance in Korea. Specifically it is necessary to enhance the independence of the outside directors.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.81-94
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• 2019

The corporate social responsibility has become an industry norm, and the majority of companies have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities due to institutional pressure. This paper suggests that chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics and governance mechanisms such as CEOs hubris, outside directors, and foreign ownership can influence a managerial decision of following the norm in adopting CSR. This paper argues that a CEO with hubris carry out CSR considerably less or more than a CEO without hubris because a CEO with hubris are known to have a tendency to refuse to follow the norm from institutional pressure. On the contrary, corporate governance mechanisms can guide a CEO to follow the industrial norm related to CSR because governance mechanisms tend to control CEO to reduce managerial uncertainty. The results show that CEO with hubris has a positive relationship with the degree of CSR deviation while governance mechanisms have a negative relationship. In addition, governance mechanisms negatively moderate the relationship between CEO with hubris and with the degree of CSR deviation.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.11 no.12
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• pp.243-251
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• 2020

The purpose of the study is to explore the relationship between the type of reporting weaknesses in the Internal Accounting Control System and executive compensation, and then analyze whether such relevance varies depending on the characteristics of governance structure. The analysis data used 6,343 KOSPI&KOSDAQ companies excluding the financial industry from 2011 to 2016. As a results of the study, First, executive compensation decreased in companies reporting the weaknesses of CL. Second, this relevance was further strengthened according to the governance structure. This study confirms that information on the operation results of system is an important factor in determining manager compensation. It implies that it is necessary to study reasonable compensation policies and governance structures suitable for companies. If an internal control system that affects executive compensation is added, the basis for stronger support of the research results can be prepared.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.