• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.173-204
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• 2012

This study examines the equilibrium investment on the pollution abatement when firms are facing Cournot competition in the output market while the pollution permit market is perfectly competitive. Unlike standard perfect competition scenario, the abatement investment delivers an indirect effect in which it reduces other firms' equilibrium output. Consequently, compared with the socially optimal level, overinvestment arises. I also overview the potential inefficiencies that imperfect market structure induces under the emission trading scheme, presenting policy implications.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.181-203
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• 1997

본 논문은 미국 다국적 기업의 해외 합작투자 발표가 개별 기업의 주식 가격에 미치는 영향에 관하여 분석하였다. 본 연구에서는 개별 기업의 경영능력 및 대리인 비용의 존재 여부에 따라 기업의 투자의사 결정시 증권시장이 차별적으로 반응한다는 점을 가설화하였으며 이를 실증연구를 통하여 입증하였다. 평균적으로 해외 합작투자 발표 당일에 주가 상승으로 인한 평균초과수익율은 0.4%로 기업 인수 합병에서 인수 기업이 실현하는 수익률에 상응하는 수준이었다. 본 논문의 실증연구 결과는 Jensen(1986)이 제시한 '사내잉여자금-과잉투자'(Free Cash Flow - Overinvestment)가설과 대체로 일치하고 있다. 즉, 기업의 관리능력이 뛰어나고 사내에 축적된 잉여자금의 양이 적은 경우 해외 합작투자 결정은 증권시장의 호의적인 반응을 받은 반면 경영이 부진하고 사내에 유보된 잉여자금의 양이 많은 기업의 경우 투자자의 관심을 끌지 못하였음을 알 수 있다.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.141-166
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• 2005

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the status of youth overeducation and to analyze the impact on the wage system, before and after the financial crisis. In this study, we adapt the following method; first, we investigate the year 1996 (before financial crisis) and year 2000 (after financial crisis) data from "the Survey Report on the Wage structure", based on the data from "the Occupational Dictionary" by occupation group. So we could evaluate the difference between the youth over-educational status, before and after financial crisis. Second, we analyze the reason why the difference occurs, with financial crisis dummy variable and other variables such as sex, occupation, industry. Third, we try to find the difference between the impact of the overeducation on the wage rate, before and after financial crisis. The main findings are as follows; first, the degree of overeducation in year 2000 is more than in year 1996. So the financial crisis plays the important role in deepening the degree of overeducation. Second, the wage rate of the overeducated worker is higher than that of the required-educated worker. Also, the both wage rates are increased after financial crisis. However, the difference of both wage rates' has declined over the financial crisis. Such a finding means that even though the both wage rates of the overeducated and the required-educated worker are increased, the wage rate of the required-educated worker has increased much more than that of overeducated worker, after the financial crisis.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.135-164
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• 2005

We analyze trade and balance records of 10,000 stock investment accounts of individual investors for the period of 1998 to 2003. Individual investors em an annual gross return of 12.3% while the KOSPI and the value weighted composite including KOSDAQ stocks yield 13.6% and 9.7% respectively during the same period. Net return performance is 8.3%, a drop of 5.3% mainly due to heavy trading. Individual investors' annual turnover amounts to over 270 percent. In an analysis of groups formed on the month's end position value, the performance of the top quintile is found comparable to the market while the rest yield significantly lower risk-adjusted returns than the market. We also find evidence rejecting the rational expectation model while supporting the overconfidence hypothesis which states overconfidence leads to a higher level of trading, resulting in poor performance. Individuals tilt their stock investment toward high-beta, small, and value stocks.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.35-61
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• 2009

This paper investigates whether the investment of a chaebol firm depends on financial characteristics such as leverage and growth opportunity. We find that the investment of a chaebol firm increases as its growth opportunity increases. We also find that this positive effect of growth opportunity on the investment is more pronounced in a low-leverage firm than in a high-leverage firm. Unlike chaebol firms, however, the interaction effect between leverage and growth opportunity is not statistically significant for nonchaebol firms.

• Photonics industry news
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• s.6
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• pp.44-47
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• 2001

닷컴기업들의 몰락, 이동 통신 분야의 투자지연,경기 하락 등에서 촉발된 통신기기 산업의 침체는 3세대 서비스 상용화에 의한 신규 투자수요 발생과 통신기기 회사들의 강도 높은 구조 조정에 의한 공급 과잉 문제가 해소된 이우에야 회복이 가능할 것으로 보인다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.3-58
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• 1999

본고는 위기 이전 우리나라의 상위 재벌기업이 과연 정부의 암묵적 투자손실보전(implicit loss-protection)에 기인하여 위험이 큰 사업에 과다하게 투자하였는가를 실증적으로 규명하여 보고자 하였다. 본고는 먼저 이론적 모형을 통하여 한 경제에 투자손실보전에 대한 기대하에서 투자를 한 기업과 그렇지 않은 기업이 공존할 때, 전자는 후자에 비하여 1) 투자를 많이 하게 될 뿐 아니라, 2) 불확실성의 증가에 대하여 투자를 더욱 늘릴 유인이 존재한다는 것을 보여주었다. 본고는 실증분석에서는 우리나라 상장기업(제조업 및 전산업)의 투자함수를 1992년~97년 기간에 대해 매출액 가속도모형(sales accelerator model)을 이용하여 추정한 결과, 투자손실보전에 대한 기대가 투자결정시 가장 중요하게 작용하였을 것으로 선험적으로 판단되는 5대 재벌기업과 이러한 기대가 가장 작았을 것으로 판단되는 독립기업간에 이론적으로 예상되었던 차이가 관찰되었다. 먼저 전체표본기업에 대한 분석(pooled regressions)에서는 5대 재벌기업은 여타기업에 비하여 매출액의 시차분포와 같은 통상적인 투자의 결정요인으로 설명될 수 없는 높은 투자수준의 차이가 두 그룹간 미래 수익성 전망의 차이, 유동성제약의 정도에 있어서의 차이, 기업규모에서의 차이 등에 기인할 가능성은 작은 것으로 나타났다. 한편 그룹별 분석(regressions by group)에서 5대 재벌기업은 수익률의 불확실성이 증가할 때 오히려 투자를 늘리는 것으로 관찰되었는데, 이는 여타기업에서 불확실성의 계수가 유의하지는 않지만 음수로 추정된 것과는 대조적이었다. 위의 결과는 과거 우리나라의 상위 재벌기업들이 재벌의 부도를 정부가 정치 경제적으로 수용하기 어려울 것이라는 대마불사(大馬不死)의 기대하에 고위험사업에 과다하게 투자하였다는 주장을 뒷받침한다고 판단된다. 향후 유사한 문제의 재발 방지를 위해서는 투자결과에 대한 책임을 투자자인 기업이 져야 함을 철저히 인식하도록 제도 및 관행상 개선노력이 필요하다고 판단되며, 특히 부실기업정리과정에서 부실에 대한 책임을 투자자가 지는 선례(先例)를 확립해 나가는 것이 무엇보다 중요할 것이다.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.12
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• pp.136-144
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• 2020

Previous studies report that labor investment inefficiency occurs as the information asymmetry becomes severe and the agency problem between managers and external investors increases. Therefore, it is highly likely that managers will make opportunistic decisions that can damage corporate value in companies with high labor investment inefficiency. This study examines whether the value relevance of accounting information decreases as labor investment inefficiency increases as it is less likely that investors in the market use the accounting information of companies in which labor investment decisions are made inefficiently. Labor investment efficiency is measured as the difference between the actual level of labor investment and the expected level of optimal labor investment. Larger difference between the actual level of labor investment and the expected level of optimal labor investment is considered as higher inefficiency in labor investment. Using data of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2018, empirical results show that the value relevance of earnings decreases as the inefficiency of labor investment increases. This research provides empirical evidence on whether investment inefficiency in labor, which is an important factor in the competitiveness of a company, reduces the information usefulness of reported earnings.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.31-57
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• 1991

Korean firms of all sizes, from virtually every industry, have used and are using the term "excessive competition" to describe the state of their industry and to call for government interventions. Moreover, the Korean government has frequently responded to such calls in various ways favorable to the firms, such as controlling entry, curbing capacity investments, or allowing collusion. Despite such interventions' impact on the overall efficiency on the Korean economy as well as on the wealth distribution among diverse groups of economic agents, the term "excessive competition", the basis for the interventions, has so far escaped rigorous scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to clarify the notion of "excessive competition" and "over-investment" which usually accompanies "excessive competition", and to examine the circumstances under which they might occur. We first survey the cases where the terms are most widely used and proceed to examine those cases to determine if competition is indeed excessive, and if so, what causes "excessive competition". Our main concern deals with the case in which the firms must make investment decisions that involve large sunk costs while facing uncertain demand. In order to analyze this case, we developed a two period model of capacity precommitment and the ensuing competition. In the first period, oligopolistic firms make capacity investments that are irreversible. Demand is uncertain in period 1 and only the distribution is known. Thus, firms must make investment decisions under uncertainty. In the second period, demand is realized, and the firms compete with quantity under realized demand and capacity constraints. In the above setting, we find that there is "no over-investment," en ante, and there is "no excessive competition," ex post. As measured by the information available in period 1, expected return from investment of a firm is non-negative, overall industry capacity does not exceed the socially optimal level, and competition in the second period yields an outcome that gives each operating firm a non-negative second period profit. Thus, neither "excessive competition" nor "over-investment" is possible. This result will generally hold true if there is no externality and if the industry is not a natural monopoly. We also extend this result by examining a model in which the government is an active participant in the game with a well defined preference. Analysis of this model shows that over-investment arises if the government cannot credibly precommit itself to non-intervention when ex post idle capacity occurs, due to socio-political reasons. Firms invest in capacities that exceed socially optimal levels in this case because they correctly expect that the government will find it optimal for itself to intervene once over-investment and ensuing financial problems for the firms occur. Such planned over-investment and ensuing government intervention are the generic problems under the current system. These problems are expected to be repeated in many industries in years to come, causing a significant loss of welfare in the long run. As a remedy to this problem, we recommend a non-intervention policy by the government which creates and utilizes uncertainty. Based upon an argument which is essentially the same as that of Kreps and Wilson in the context of a chain-store game, we show that maintaining a consistent non-intervention policy will deter a planned over-investment by firms in the long run. We believe that the results obtained in this paper has a direct bearing on the public policies relating to many industries including the petrochemical industry that is currently in the center of heated debates.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.207-215
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• 2018

In this study, targeting KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies, the relationship between the abnormal investment of companies and analyst earnings forecasts was empirically analyzed. The analysis period of this study spanned from 2003 to 2015 (with that of dependent variables spanning from 2004 to 2016) based on the variables of interest, and among the companies whose earnings per share forecasts were announced by financial analysts, the final sample of 4,917 companies/year that meets the research condition was selected as the target analysis. The results of the empirical analysis are as follows. First, it turned out that the more total abnormal investment, abnormal R&D and abnormal CAPEX investment, the more accurate were analyst earnings forecasts. Second, the more total abnormal investment, abnormal R&D, abnormal CAPEX investment, the more pessimistic analyst earnings forecasts tended to be. Further analysis has shown that these results came more from over investment groups than under investment groups. The results of this study are expected to make additional contributions to the existing studies in that the abnormal investment is considered as a determinant of analyst earnings forecasts.