• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.103-127
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• 2007

This study presents the political economics models to explore the political landscape of special interest groups influencing the government's decision making process for implementing international environmental standard. Starting with the popular menu-auction types of lobbying frameworks in the literature, the study extends its scope of research to multi-principal and multi-agency based international interest group politics and its hybrid case in order to bring the interaction of the relevant interest politics to the fore. Within a specific factor model of international trade between 2 small open economies, we compare the political equilibrium environmental standards in different institutional frameworks which can be feasible in the sense of recently growing role of environmental interest group. Although the conventional finding suggests that cooperative bargaining between the two countries can attain the globally optimal level of the standard, the paper rather explains that the cooperation between the national interest groups and the hybrid case also generate the stricter standard then national interest politics usually do.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.57-81
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• 2010

Recently, labor unions' active participation in social issues is drawing people's attention as their concerns are expanding from the conventional wage raise and employment to others such as the environment and poverty eradication. This derives from the notion that a trade union with bargaining power is also an economic agent responsible and able to take a positive role in social issues. This paper explains through a micro economic analysis model that labor union movements can also contribute to social issues such as the global environment. Based on the international oligopoly trade theory, the study analyzes the principal-agent model whereby firms and labor unions pursue their strategic choices based on their interest and influence the implementation of regulatory policies on pollution emission. The analysis confirmed that labor unions' bargaining power and international cooperation are influential in alleviating global pollution emission and in improving social welfare. This conclusion could be presented as a basis for arguing for and requesting the participation and cooperation of labor unions to solve environmental problems discussed at WILL 2006.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.3-11
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• 2013

The changes in construction business have impact on overall operation of construction companies. Poor business of construction companies following a s low industrial cycle could have broader implications and influences on the industry. Since a construction project involves various stakeholders including public organizations, financial institutions and households, a downturn in construction industry might lead to significant economic loss. In this regard, it is meaningful to examine the relationship between changes in construction business cycles and insolvency of construction companies. This study conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between construction business cycles and how much they affect operation of construction companies. To this end, KMV model was used to estimate probability of bankruptcy, which represents business condition of a construction company. To examine construction business cycles, investment amount for different construction types-residential, non-residential, and construction work-was used as a variable. Based on the investment amount, VECM was applied and the analysis results suggested that construction companies should put priority on diversifying project portfolio. In addition, it was shown that once a construction company becomes unstable in business operation, it is hard to recover even when the market condition turns for the better. This suggests that, to improve business operation of a construction company, internal capacity-building is as important as the market condition and other external circumstances.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.75-94
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• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.