• Title/Summary/Keyword: 경독(更讀)

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피휘(避諱)의 유래와 종류, 방법에 관한 고찰 - 관우피휘지유래종류화방법적연구(關于避諱之由來種類和方法的硏究)

  • Yun, Chang-Yeol
    • Journal of Korean Medical classics
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    • v.22 no.2
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    • pp.127-137
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    • 2009
  • 通過對避諱的由來, 種類和方法進行硏究和考察, 得到了如下之結論. 古人認爲人的名字乃自身之代表, 本身就具尊嚴性, 所以古來既有不輕易呼喚名字, 並尊崇名字的風俗, 而在行冠禮之後, 則取字以替代其名, 這都與實名敬避和尊名的風俗有所關系. 早期的避諱, 以對生者不隨便呼叫其名的"不名"和對死者不輕易稱呼其名的死諱爲主, 這些都源於樸素的尊敬與恭敬. 生諱始自秦始皇之時, 初期僅限於對天子和諸侯的名字進行避諱, 而對嫌名则未曾進行避諱. 避諱的種類, 包括出於恭敬而避諱的敬諱, 出於心理排斥而避諱的忌諱, 以及出於憎惡和討厭而避諱的憎諱, 但總以敬諱爲其主幹. 至於避諱的方法, 主要有改字, 改稱, 空字, 作某, 標諱, 缺字, 缺筆(缺劃)和更讀等法. 在我國, 避諱究竟始於哪一时代目前难以確認, 但在新羅時代的金石文中, 可以看到不少有關避諱與缺筆的例子, 在高麗時代則對帝王的名字通過改字或缺筆來进行了避諱, 朝鮮時代則爲了排除避諱的弊端, 對王族的名字取以生僻之字, 使避諱所致的弊端大为減少.

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Some Patterns of Confucian Literati's Daily Lives in the Joseon Dynasty Analyzed from a Perspective of Ritualization (조선시대 사족(士族) 일상생활의 유교적 의례화 양상)

  • Park, Jong-chun
    • Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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    • v.39
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    • pp.175-214
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    • 2021
  • In the Joseon Dynasty, Confucian literati sacralized their daily lives through ritual practices across the three dimensions of time, place, and humanity. 1) In the dimension of time, they cultivated in their personal lives by accepting and thoroughly practicing the ethical principles of the Elementary Learning (『小學』). These practices of self-cultivation developed into ritualized practices of daily routine from the perspective of neo-Confucianism. 2) In the spatial dimension, local public schools (鄕校), local private academies (書院), and village private schools (書塾) were constructed as the symbolic places for disseminating Confucian norms through intensive seminar activities and collective learning sessions (講會). These places were also used for the pious recitations of selected Confucian proverbs that had been ritualized by Confucian literati. 3) In the dimension of humanity, pious consciousness, reinforced by the ritualized practice of periodic sacrifices or intensive reading, was subconsciously deepened and projected onto dreams individuals reported of their deceased fathers or teachers. According to the Confucian ritualization process, people were seen as being able to sanctify their daily lives by thoroughly internalizing and effectively realizing Confucian values.

The Concentration of Economic Power in Korea (경제력집중(經濟力集中) : 기본시각(基本視角)과 정책방향(政策方向))

  • Lee, Kyu-uck
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.31-68
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    • 1990
  • The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

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