• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.111-118
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• 2022

This study is an analysis of auditor's response to audit risk. Specifically, audit risk is measured by the amount of correction of the current financial statements, and auditor's response is measured by the rate of change of audit hour in next auditing. The amount of correction can be viewed as audit risk recognized by auditor because the degree of auditor's correction will increase as the company's financial statement preparation ability is lower or the profit management amount is larger. Auditor's response is measured as the rate of change of audit hour because audit risk would be incorporated in audit plan. Although auditing is performed by a team, auditor's response would differ depending on their roles. It is expected the leaders who establish the audit plan and manage the audit quality would respond more sensitively to audit risk than the other auditors. The results show that when the amount of correction is greater than a certain level, auditors recognize it as audit risk and increase total(and leaders') audit hour in next year audit.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.183-191
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• 2022

The Korea Stewardship Code 'Principles on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors' was introduced in 2016 and the National Pension Service adopted it in 2018. the National Pension Service casted 'dessent' vote on the agenda which is able to reduce the ownership interest of shareholder in general meeting. This paper examines whether 'dissent' voting affected on the ownership interest of shareholder or not. The 'dissent' vote on the agenda are related to revision artical of corperation, appointment or compensation of director and auditor, approval of financial statements ect. The proxies of earnings management is discretionary accruals calculated by modified Jones model. The control variablies are size of assets, liabilities per assets, returns on assets. The results of this study are as followings. First, the 'dissent' voting on the agenda are related to revision artical of corperation, M&A, approval of financial statements ect. are not significant because their sample size is too small, Second, the 'dissent' voting on appointment of director and auditor affected on reduction of discretionary accruals. So the National Pension Service activism shall affect on increasing the ownership interest of shareholder. Third, the 'dissent' voting on compensation of director and auditor is not affected on reduction of discretionary accruals. This results show that 'unconditional dissent voting' on the agenda in general meeting is not to reduce the ownership interest of shareholder.