분석과 대안 (Analyses & Alternatives)

  • 제9권2호
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  • Pages.145-178
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  • 2025
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  • 2508-822X(pISSN)
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  • 2508 - 8238(eISSN)
사단법인 코리아컨센서스연구원 (Korea Consensus Institute(KCI))
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Sanctions and Countermeasures: Rethinking Russia's Resistance to Economic Coercion

  • Heejae Park (Institute of Russian Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
  • 투고 : 2025.05.13
  • 심사 : 2025.06.12
  • 발행 : 2025.06.30
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초록

This paper examines how Russia's retaliatory measures against sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union evolved over time. Moving beyond conventional accounts that frame sanctions as one-directional coercive tools, the study conceptualizes them as interactive processes that can provoke strategic countermeasures. Using the cases of the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the paper traces how Russia's retaliation evolved from symbolic travel bans and food import restrictions to more institutionalized and long-term responses, including asset nationalization, energy leverage, and economic realignment toward non-Western partners. While these measures have allowed Russia to assert control and signal defiance, they have also introduced new structural vulnerabilities and economic inefficiencies. The analysis underscores the dual nature of retaliation - both as a means of resilience and a source of long-term risk - and calls for sanctions strategies that are more adaptive and better coordinated with broader diplomatic and economic frameworks.

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참고문헌

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