DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

Impact of managerial overconfidence on Valuation Error

경영자 과신성향이 가치평가오류에 미치는 영향

  • Joon-Seok Lee (Department of Accounting and Taxation, Yeungnam University) ;
  • Myung-Gun Lee (Department of Accounting and Taxation, Yeungnam University)
  • 이준석 (영남대학교 회계세무학과) ;
  • 이명건 (영남대학교 회계세무학과)
  • 투고 : 2024.08.30
  • 심사 : 2024.09.25
  • 발행 : 2024.09.30

초록

Purpose - This study was a study on managerial overconfidence and valuation errors to verify how the increase in managerial overconfidence affects valuation errors. Design/methodology/approach - Managerial overconfidence propensity refers to managers having excessive confidence in their position or ability (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Park Jin-hee, 2021) and was measured according to Schrand and Zechman (2012). Valuation error refers to a situation where a company's actual stock price differs from its intrinsic value as a result of numerous information asymmetries in the market, and was measured using the measurement method in Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) study. The sample of this study used companies listed in the capital market for a total of 12 years from 2011 to 2022. Findings - As a result of the verification, there was a significant positive (+) relationship between managerial overconfidence and valuation errors, and this relationship was alleviated as the percentage of foreign shareholders shares or the number of financial analysts they followed increased. It can be interpreted that when the information demands of investors, such as foreign shareholders and financial analysts, increase significantly, managers provide more information to meet investors demands, thereby reducing information asymmetry and leading to a decrease in valuation errors.. Research implications or Originality - Previous studies on overconfidence, among the cognitive characteristics of individual managers, have yielded mixed results. In this study, we conducted a direct empirical analysis of managerial overconfidence using a measure called valuation error, which evaluates numerous information asymmetries in the capital market. This is expected to help stakeholders in the capital market understand the characteristics of managers and recognize their importance. It can also be used as a basis for establishing policies to reduce valuation errors.

키워드

참고문헌

  1. 강선아, 유지연 (2017), "산업특성이 경영자의 낙관적 성향과 경영성과의 관계에 미치는 영향", 관리회계연구, 17(2), 85-109.
  2. 김경혜, 최경수 (2020), "경영자의 자기과신 성향과 내부회계 담당인력의 우수성", 회계저널, 29(6), 1-36.
  3. 김문태 (2004), "외국인의 지분참여가 이익관리의 크기와 방향에 미치는 영향", 회계정보연구, 22(4), 85-112.
  4. 김민수, 최희정 (2020), "애널리스트 예측이 주가지체에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구", 재무관리연구, 37(4), 83-111.
  5. 김새로나 (2015), "기업지배구조 특성을 고려한 경영자 과신성향과 발생액을 통한 이익조정실태", 회계.세무와감사연구, 57(4), 149-188.
  6. 김새로나, 최준혁 (2022), "경영자의 과신성향이 기업의 배당정책에 미치는 영향: 기업수명주기를 고려하여", 세무회계연구, 74, 167-198.
  7. 김성환, 이현경 (2022), "경영자의 과신성향이 신용평가에 미치는 영향", 회계정보연구, 40(1), 129-153.
  8. 라기례, 박상봉 (2016), "경영자 과신성향과 수익비용대응 정도 및 비용인식 패턴", 대한경영학회지, 29(10), 1527-1547.
  9. 박진희 (2021), "경영자 과신성향, 회계적 보수주의, 경영환경이 기업의 미래 경영성과에 미치는 영향", 박사학위논문, 중앙대학교 대학원
  10. 안윤영, 신현한, 장진호 (2005), "외국인투자자와 정보비대칭 간의 관계", 회계학연구, 30(4), 109-131.
  11. 양대천, 구정호 (2016), "경영자의 낙관주의적 오류와 비대칭적인 원가행태", 회계저널, 25(6), 159-186.
  12. 유혜영, 김새로나 (2015), "경영자의 과신성향이 재무보고 방식에 미치는 영향: 보수주의를 중심으로", 회계학연구, 40(6), 41-80.
  13. 유성용 (2008), "외국인 투자자 지분율에 따른 이익지속성과 시장의 반응", 회계정보연구, 26(1), 137-162.
  14. 유한결, 김응길 (2023), "경영자 능력과 과신성향이 감사보고시차에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구", 기업경영연구, 30(1), 81-104.
  15. 이병산 (2021), "경영자의 과신성향이 감사품질에 미치는 영향", 상업교육연구, 35(4), 175-195.
  16. 이성구, 김영길 (2014), "회계이익과 세무이익의 차이에 따른 가치평가 오류현상", 회계와 정책연구, 19(2), 149-170.
  17. 이진원, 윤성용 (2015), "회계이익의 질이 가치평가오류와 주가급락에 미치는 영향", 회계연구, 20(2), 151-179.
  18. 이혜미, 홍창목 (2018), "경영자의 과신성향과 주가정보성: 미래이익반응계수와 주가동조성을 중심으로", 경영학연구, 47(5), 1201-1230.
  19. 전영순 (2003), "외국인투자자 및 국내 기관투자가의 투자의사결정과 회계이익의 질", 경영학연구, 32(4), 1001-1032.
  20. 차명기, 김수성, 황국재 (2016), "경영자의 자기과신 성향과 조세회피", 회계정보연구, 34(4), 441-485.
  21. 황국재, 차명기 (2015), "최고경영자의 자기과신 성향이 이익조정에 미치는 영향", 한국회계학회 학술발표논문집, 2015(2), 420-458.
  22. 황규영, 김응길 (2018), "경영자의 자기과신 성향과 배당성향의 관계:재벌기업을 중심으로", 금융정보연구, 7(1), 61-90.
  23. Adhikari, B., S. Bindal, T. Campbell and S. Johnson (2018), Competing against overconfident CEOs (Working Paper), Available From https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223778.
  24. Ahmed, A. S. and S. Duellman (2013), "Managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism", Journal of Accounting Research, 51(1), 1-30.
  25. Altinkilic, O. and R. S. Hansen (2009), "On the Information Role of Stock Recommendation Revisions", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(1), 17-36.
  26. Arbel, A. and P. Strebel (1983), "Pay Attention to Neglected Firms", Journal of Portfolio Management, 9(2), 37-42.
  27. Asquith, P., M. B., Mikhail and A. S. Au (2005), "Information Content of Equity Analyst Report", Journal of Financial Economics, 75, 245-282.
  28. Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2013), "Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey", In Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2, 357-424, Elsevier.
  29. Barry, C. B. and R. H. Jennings (1992), "Information and Diversity of Analyst Opinion", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27, 169-183.
  30. Ben-David, I., J. Graham and C. Harvey (2013), "Managerial Miscalibration", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(4), 1547-1584.
  31. Bradley, D., J. Clarke, S. Lee and C. Ornthanalai (2014), "Are Analysts' Recommendations Informative? Intraday Evidence on the Impact of Time Stamp Delays", Journal of Finance, 69, 645-673.
  32. Brown, R. and N. Sarma (2007), "CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and Corporate Acquisitions", Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 358-379. 
  33. Chen, S. S., S. M. Lai, C. L. Liu and S. E. McVay (2014), Overconfident managers and internal controls (Working Paper), Available From https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510137.
  34. Chyz, J. A., F. Gaertner, A. Kausar and L. Watson (2019), "Overconfidence and corporate tax policy", Review of Accounting Studies, 24, 1114-1145.
  35. Cyert, R. and J. March (1963), "A behavioral theory of the firm", Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall.
  36. Dechow, P. M. (1994), "Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(1), 3-42.
  37. DeFond, M. L. and J. Jiambalvo (1994), "Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1-2), 145-176.
  38. DeFond, M. L. and C. W. Park (1997), "Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115-139.
  39. Deshmukh, S., A. M. Goel and K. M. Howe (2013), "CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(3), 440-463.
  40. Dow, J., I. Goldstein and A. Guembel (2006), Commitment to Overinvest and Price Informativeness (Working Paper), Available From https://ssrn.com/abstract=846245.
  41. Fairfield, P. M. (1994), "P/E, P/B and the Present Value of Future Dividends", Financial Analysts Journal, 50(4), 23-31.
  42. Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. M. Olsson and K. Schipper (2004), "Costs of Equity and Earnings Attributes", The Accounting Review, 79(4), 967-1010.
  43. Galasso, A. and T. S. Simcoe (2011), "CEO overconfidence and innovation", Management Science, 57(8), 1469-1484.
  44. Griffin, D. and A. Tversky (1992), "The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence", Cognitive Psychology, 24(3), 411-435.
  45. Hayward, M. L. and D. C. Hambrick (1997), "Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris", Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 103-127.
  46. Heaton, J. B. (2002), "Managerial optimism and corporate finance", Financial Management, 31, 33-45.
  47. Hiller, N. J. and D. C. Hambrick (2005), "Conceptualizing executive hubris: the role of (hyper-)core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making", Strategic Management Journal, 26(4), 297-319.
  48. Hirshleifer, D., A. Low and S. H. Teoh (2012), "Are overconfident CEOs better innovators?", Journal of Finance, 67(4), 1457-1498.
  49. Hong, H., T. Lim and J. C. Stein. (2000), "Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage and the profitability of momemtum strategies", Journal of Finance, 55(1), 265-295.
  50. Hribar, P. and H. Yang (2016), "CEO overconfidence and Management Forecasting", Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(1), 204-227.
  51. Hsu, C., K. E. Novoselov and R. Wang (2017), "Does accounting conservatism mitigate the shortcomings of CEO overconfidence?", The Accounting Review, 92(6), 77-101.
  52. Klein, A. (2002), "Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400.
  53. Koo, J. H. and D. Yang (2018), "Managerial overconfidence, self-attribution bias, and downwardly sticky investment: evidence from Korea", Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 54(1), 144-161.
  54. Langer, E. J. (1975), "The illusion of control", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(2), 311.
  55. Lee, C. M. (2001), "Market Efficiency and Accounting Research:A Discussion of 'Capital Market Research in Accounting' by S. P. Kothari", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 233-253.
  56. Malmendier, U. and G. Tate (2005), "CEO overconfidence and corporate investment", Journal of Finance, 60(2), 661-700.
  57. Malmendier, U. and G. Tate (2008), "Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction", Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 20-43. 
  58. Malmendier, U., G. Tate and J. Yan (2011), "Overconfidence and early-life experiences: the effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies", Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1687-1733.
  59. March, J. G. and H. A. Simon (1958), "Organizations. John Wiley & Sons", New York, 1958.
  60. Penman, S. H. (1996), "The Articulation of Price-Earnings Ratios and Market to Book Ratios and the Evaluation of Growth", Journal of Accounting Research, 34(2), 235-259.
  61. Presley, T. J. and L. J. Abbott (2013), "CEO overconfidence and the incidence of financial restatement", Advances in Accounting, 29(1), 74-84.
  62. Rhodes-Kropf, M., D. T. Robinson and S. Viswanathan (2005), "Valuation waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 561-603.
  63. Russo, J. E. and P. J. Schoemaker (1992), "Managing overconfidence", Sloan Management Review, 33(2), 7-17.
  64. Schrand, C. M. and S. L. Zechman (2012), "Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(1-2), 311-329.
  65. Sloan, R. G. (1996), "Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows about Future Earnings?", The Accounting Review, 71, 289-316.
  66. Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild and K. L. Wild (1995), "Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings", Journal of Accounting and Economics 20(1), 61-91.
  67. Wei, C. and L. Zhang (2018), The Informational Role of Overconfident CEOs (Working Paper), Available From https://ssrn.com/abstract=2823716.
  68. Weinstein, N. D. (1980), "Unrealistic optimism about future life events", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 806-820.
  69. Yang, D. (2015), "Mergers, CEO hubris, and cost stickiness", Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 51, 46-63.
  70. Yang, D. and Z. N. Zhang (2017), "Impact of managerial optimism on cost stickiness: Evidence from China", International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research, 15(21), 373-383.