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Bayesian Game Theoretic Model for Evasive AI Malware Detection in IoT

  • Jun-Won Ho (Division of Information Security, Seoul Women's University)
  • Received : 2024.07.06
  • Accepted : 2024.07.18
  • Published : 2024.09.30

Abstract

In this paper, we deal with a game theoretic problem to explore interactions between evasive Artificial Intelligence (AI) malware and detectors in Internet of Things (IoT). Evasive AI malware is defined as malware having capability of eluding detection by exploiting artificial intelligence such as machine learning and deep leaning. Detectors are defined as IoT devices participating in detection of evasive AI malware in IoT. They can be separated into two groups such that one group of detectors can be armed with detection capability powered by AI, the other group cannot be armed with it. Evasive AI malware can take three strategies of Non-attack, Non-AI attack, AI attack. To cope with these strategies of evasive AI malware, detector can adopt three strategies of Non-defense, Non-AI defense, AI defense. We formulate a Bayesian game theoretic model with these strategies employed by evasive AI malware and detector. We derive pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria in a single stage game from the formulated Bayesian game theoretic model. Our devised work is useful in the sense that it can be used as a basic game theoretic model for developing AI malware detection schemes.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported by a research grant from Seoul Women's University (2024-0008).

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