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A Test of Individual Firm's Collusive Behavior: The Case of Purchase Price Fixing in the Iron Scrap Market

담합 사례 연구: 철스크랩 구매가격 담합 사건에서 개별 기업의 담합 실행 여부에 대한 실증적 검증

  • Yangsoo Jin (Department of Economics, Sungshin Women's University)
  • 진양수 (성신여자대학교 경제학과)
  • Received : 2024.03.24
  • Accepted : 2024.05.20
  • Published : 2024.05.28

Abstract

In the steel industry, there is a perception that "collusion has become a long-standing practice" and it is expected that the authorities' legal response to collusion will be strengthened in the future. This necessarily requires improving the accuracy of the legal response, the most important of which is to accurately identify whether the allegedly colluding firms actually did collude. This study focuses on the recent iron scrap price-fixing case and examines whether a single accused firm actually engaged in price-fixing in a situation where there is a mix of firms that acted independently of the collusion and firms that actually engaged in price-fixing. The results of the analysis allow us to infer that the accused steelmaker did not actually collude, which is consistent with the authorities' final judgment against the steelmaker. In the real world, some collusions are carried out by only a subset of firms in a market, and in these cases, there are often disputed firms as to whether or not they carried out the collusion. This study can serve as an analytic guide for industries, including the steel industry, to verify the behavior of individual firms, especially those whose collusive practices are disputed.

국내 철강산업에 대해서는 "담합이 오랜 관행으로 정착되었다"라는 인식이 존재하며, 이에 따라 향후 철강산업 담합에 대한 당국의 법 대응도 강화될 것으로 전망된다. 이 경우 법 대응의 정확성 제고도 필수적으로 수반되어야 하는바, 가장 중요한 것은 혐의를 받는 기업이 실제로 담합을 실행했는지를 정확히 식별하는 일이다. 본 연구는 최근 발생한 철스크랩 구매가격 담합 사건을 중심으로, 담합과 무관하게 독자적으로 행동한 기업, 실제로 담합을 실행한 기업 등이 혼재하는 상황에서 혐의를 받은 한 기업이 실제로 담합을 실행하였는지를 검증하였다. 분석 결과는 혐의를 받은 해당 기업이 실제로는 담합을 실행하지 않았다는 추론을 뒷받침하며, 이는 해당 제강사에 대한 당국의 최종 판단과 일치한다. 현실에서는 한 시장에 속하는 기업들 중 일부 기업만이 가담하여 실행되는 담합도 발생하는데, 이 상황에서는 담합 실행 여부에 대해 다툼의 여지가 있는 기업이 존재하는 경우가 많다. 본 연구는 철강산업을 포함한 여러 산업에서, 특히 담합 실행에 대해 다툼의 여지가 있는 개별 기업의 행동 검증을 위한 분석적 가이드가 될 수 있을 것이다.

Keywords

References

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