Rethinking Soft Power from the Power Recipient's Perspective: Voluntary Compliance is the Key

Kadir Jun Ayhan

Ewha Womans University / Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Public Diplomacy

Abstract

In this editorial, I build on my recent article (Ayhan, 2023) to explain three ideal types of power recipients' compliance with power wielders' desires: fear-, appetite-, and spirit-based compliance. Soft power is often conflated with fear- or appetite-based compliance, but it is actually present when power recipients comply voluntarily with power wielders while maintaining their sense of esteem and agency. Habit is the hardened effects of soft power. It comes into play when voluntary compliance becomes commonsense and habitual, although this compliance could initially rest on fear or appetite. I illustrate the ideal types with a case study of regional actors' motives for compliance with China-centric hierarchical order in historic East Asia.

Keywords: soft power, compliance, legitimacy, hegemony, China, East Asia, public diplomacy

*Corresponding author: ayhan@ewha.ac.kr

Introduction

According to a Scopus search conducted in March 2023, the number of manuscripts having "soft power" in the title, abstract, or keywords increased from one in 1991 to ten in 2003, 29 in 2005, 95 in 2009, and 432 in 2021 (see Figure 1). The growing popularity of the concept of soft power over the last two decades has led to it becoming a catchall phrase.

Source: Author's Own Compilation Based on Scopus Data as of March 2023

Figure 1. Number of Scopus-indexed Soft Power-related Manuscripts

The literature on public diplomacy took a new turn following Joseph Nye's first publication on the concept of soft power (Ayhan, 2021, p. 1). Many scholars have taken up the framework of soft power in their study of public diplomacy. According to a Web of Science search conducted in June 2023, nearly a quarter of all public diplomacy articles have "soft power" in their titles, abstracts, or keywords (author's calculation). "Soft power" is the second most used bigram in these articles, following "public diplomacy." However, the concept of soft power suffers from analytical ambiguity (c.f. Bakalov, 2019; Daßler et al., 2018; Kearn, 2011; Nye, 2007, p. 162), which makes its use by authors in public diplomacy research less rigorous. For example, it is common to see public diplomacy and soft power used interchangeably. In some studies, soft power does not refer to power; in other cases, it may refer to power that is not as soft as the authors think.

In a recent article, I proposed three ideal types to enable a more rigorous approach to discussing soft power (Ayhan, 2023). In this editorial, I summarize these ideal types and offer an illustrative case study.

Soft Power from the Perspective of the Power Recipients: Understanding the Reasons for Compliance

Following Nye's definition of soft power, "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye, 2004, p. x), we must understand why power recipients comply with the desires of the power wielder. Ned Lebow has written extensively on generic explanations for initiating a war (from the power wielder's perspective) (Lebow, 2010) and for compliance with a hierarchical order (from the power recipient's perspective) (Lebow, 2008).

Following Lebow's work, I offered four main categories of reasons for compliance: fear, appetite, spirit, and habit (Ayhan, 2023).[1] Actors comply with others' desires when they fear the consequences of explicit or implicit coercion. In other cases, they may comply when an appetite has been satisfied through provision of material needs such as a wealth and security. Appetite-based compliance works insofar as an arrangement "makes sense" and results in an "immediate payoff" (Suchman, 1995, p. 603).

Compliance can also be considered voluntary when an actor internalizes a foreign idea and genuinely believes that compliance with it would provide esteem and status. Internalization involving a clear sense of agency[2] is called voluntary, or spirit-based, compliance. This can be compared to the phenomenon of receptive or willing compliance in child psychology. In such a situation children comply with the parents' desires without coercion or inducement (Maccoby & Martin, 1983). In contrast, situational compliance does occur as a result of coercion or inducement (Maccoby & Martin, 1983).

A fourth category of explanation is habit,[3] which is not a motive in itself, as it builds on other motives (Ayhan, 2023, p. 11; Lebow, 2008, p. 5). Over the long run, compliance becomes commonsensical and turns into habitual routines. Tracing the formation of societal habits makes it possible to identify any role that fear and/or appetite plays. However, over time coercion or inducement can fade away, which results in compliance that is legitimate[4] and voluntary. In habit-based compliance, we can witness the "hard effects" of soft power (LaFeber, 1999, p. 157).

In my article in Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, I argue that "*soft power is rare in world politics*," as compliance is usually due to fear or appetite (Ayhan, 2023). Soft power can only be considered to be present where the power recipient complies with the desires of

---

1) These motives are in line with the three types of social control summarized by Hurd (1999, p. 379; 2008, p. 35):, namely, coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy, but I used Lebow's ideal types for compliance since they are more clearly from the power recipient's perspective.

2) On a state's desire for a sense of agency and personhood, see e.g., Lebow (2008, 2010, 2016); Mitzen (2006); Sasley (2011); Wendt (2004); Zarakol (2016).

3) For an overview of habits and their political consequences, see, e.g., Abdelal et al. (2006); Bourdieu (1994); Castells (2015); Rosati (2000).

4) An oft-cited definition of legitimacy that takes into account the recipient's perspective calls it "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, pp. 573-574).

the power wielder because the desires are seen as legitimate and appealing to the recipient's sense of esteem and agency. Understanding the agency of the power recipient in this way is important for identifying the true nature of power. Indeed it is true for all aspects of social science research, which must go beyond the "functional relationships and rules…typical" of the natural sciences (Weber, 2019, pp. 91-92).

Nye considered soft power mainly in terms of the maintenance of the United States' (US) hegemony (c.f. Kearn, 2011). Nye prescribed soft power to the US as "the means to success in world politics" (Nye, 2004) in which the US is "bound to lead" (Nye, 1990).

It is common to conflate compliance with a hegemon's leadership to its soft power, but exploring compliance from the perspective of smaller actors shows that all three motives can coexist to varying degrees. A hegemon can maintain others' compliance by instilling fear in or satisfying the appetite of its subjects, but it can be costly and may be temporary. Material capabilities based on a strong military, advanced technology, and a robust economy instill fear in others. Even in the case of allies, the fear of abandonment can entrap and produce involuntary compliance with the desires of the stronger ally (Bially Mattern, 2005; Misalucha-Willoughby, 2018). In addition, the provision of public goods for the order and economic benefit of members of the society in the form of trade advantages or ODA has the ability to satisfy the appetite of a hegemon's subjects. In contrast, when the order is understood to be legitimate. It allows other actors to feel a sense of agency and esteem. It also appeals to its subjects' spirits, masking hegemonic power and thereby reducing the reliance on fear and appetite (Finnemore, 2009; Lebow, 2005).

Rigorous study of soft power requires the elimination of alternative explanations for fear- or appetite-based compliance. Soft power builds on a standard of civilization that materially powerful actors establish, make central, and maintain in an international society.[5]

Internalizing The Standard of Civilization: A Litmus Test for Soft Power

Compliance with another actor's desires based on spirit occurs once the initial actor's "moral authority…is institutionalized as a convention…socially embedded in a system of actors whose social identities and interests impel them to recognize it" as legitimate (Hall, 1997, p. 594; see also Finnemore, 2009, p. 60). It is within the boundaries of the standard of

---

[5] It is not a coincidence that soft power today is correlated with the liberal values of the Western-centric international order. Similar attempts by others, such as Russia or China, to exercise such power, when they only have a thinly shared value system with the West and challenge some aspects of the Western standard of civilization, are not readily accepted as soft power (Nye, 2018, 2021; Walker & Ludwig, 2017). A related example can be taken from the War on Terror. The US government convinced Muslim leaders to support the War on Terror efforts by instilling fear in them (giving them a non-choice of you are either with us or against us (Bially Mattern, 2005)) or by satisfying their appetite (offering them grants and loans (Arraf & King, 2003)). However, it was more difficult to appeal to Muslims' spirit, as they had little sense of esteem and agency in the war. Both US Presidents George W. Bush and Barrack Obama needed to explicitly state that the war was not a war on Islam, even though Bush (2001) referred to it as a "crusade." In a clear attempt to appeal to Muslims' spirit to legitimize the War on Terror based on their own value system (giving them sense of esteem), Obama (2009) made Islamic references to peace and condemning terrorism in his famous speech, A New Beginning, given in Cairo.

civilization that spirit-based compliance occurs.

The establishment the standard of civilization is often a coercive process that requires the instillation of fear and the satisfaction of appetites. However, as other actors internalize the standard of civilization, this standard becomes commonsense and habitual, morphing into a source of voluntary compliance, that is, of soft power. For example, Japan and Germany are both known today for supporting the maintenance of the current liberal international order and meeting the standards of this civilization as good and peaceful international citizens. However, it took post-war US occupation, which instilled fear, and immense US economic support, which satisfied their appetites, for this standard of civilization to be duly internalized. This paved the way for an eventual appeal to their spirit (Ayhan, 2023; Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990).

A litmus test for soft power is the distinction between instrumental prosocial behavior and the internalization of foreign values and ideas, including the standard of civilization (c.f. Kearn, 2011, p. 68). Weaker actors often mimic the behaviors of the leading actor(s)' established standard of civilization to achieve a desired status and esteem, giving them an opportunity for social mobility (cf. Larson and Shevchenko 2010). This benchmarking is internalized because power recipients regard a power wielder's behaviors (e.g., domestic, or foreign policies) that stem from the accepted standard of civilization as genuinely ideal, making power recipients' compliance spirit-based. To the extent that emulation is only instrumental, compliance is initially appetite-based, so as to take advantage of a newly acquired status.[6] Once actors are socialized into the standard, even if this is initially achieved through fear or appetite, it is likely that the practices in line with the standard of civilization (most importantly, overall compliance) will become habitual and taken-for-granted (Ayhan, 2023). Thus, appetite-based compliance fades away in light of voluntary compliance (Ayhan, 2023).[7]

The Good Country Index of Simon Anholt (2022) ranks countries based on how much each "contributes to the common good of humanity, and what it takes away, relative to its size." To create this index, Anholt uses objective indicators with data drawn mainly from international organizations rather than using subjective public opinion polls. However, the selection of the indicators and the definition of "good" are unquestionably informed by the standard of civilization of the liberal international order. Therefore, at the top of this Good Country Index are the like-minded "usual suspects," including Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and Canada among others (see also Ayhan & Sevin, 2021; Cooper et al., 1993; de Carvalho & Neumann, 2014; Neumann, 2014), who construct their goodness based on their more normative foreign policy, which is in line with the standard of civilization. This bias is also apparent in the correlation (Pearson correlation = 0.736) between

---

6) It is an analytically difficult task to determine whether such compliance is for the instrumental or intrinsic value of a standing. However, the difference matters in studies on soft power. If compliance is for instrumental reasons, the quest for honor and status is conflated with the motives of fear and appetite. On the other hand, if it is for intrinsic value alone, it becomes possible to make a stronger claim about the motive of spirit (c.f. Lebow, 2010).

7) For potential reasons for socialization following policy coercion, see Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, pp. 291-292).

Good Country Index scores (Anholt, 2022) and ideal point scores for United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting (Bailey et al., 2017; Voeten et al., 2009), which measures the countries' position vis-á-vis a US-centric liberal international order (see Figure 2). Like-minded liberal democracies have internalized the standard of civilization so their compliance with the liberal international order and normative behavior along its standard is voluntary. This is because they have a sense of agency and esteem with respect to their own behavior in foreign policy. Through spirit-based compliance they gain standing by their 'normative' foreign policy behavior conforming to the liberal international order.

Source: Author's own calculation using UNGA Ideal Point Scores (Bailey et al., 2017; Voeten et al., 2009) and the Good Country Index (Anholt, 2022).

Figure 2. Correlation between the Good Country Index and the UNGA Ideal Point Score

China-centric Regional Order in Historical East Asia

In this editorial, I illustrate my arguments with a case study of the various motives of non-hegemonic actors for compliance with a China-centric hierarchical order in historical East Asia. I am only providing this case study for illustrative purposes only. Empirical details and rigorous analyses of contending explanations are not of primary concern.

There is virtually unanimous agreement that the China-centric regional order in historical

East Asia was relatively stable for over a millennium until its demise in the nineteenth century, having had well-established primary institutions of an international society (Buzan & Zhang, 2014; Kang, 2010, 2020). The main members of this international society, namely Korea, Vietnam, Ryukyu, and to some extent Japan, did not demonstrate much resistance to the China-centric regional order; instead, they usually showed compliance without inter-state wars, excepting the Imjin War (1592) and China's occupation of Vietnam (1402) (Kang, 2010, 2020).

The balance of power was certainly an important primary institution for this China-centric international society. Throughout this period, Imperial China's disproportionate material capabilities relative to other regional actors tipped the balance of power in its favor. This asymmetrical material preponderance of China, as well as the consequences of potential resistance, instilled fear in and extracted compliance from regional actors. Compliance with the China-centric order guaranteed both the material benefits of relative security and stability and the welfare benefits of trade, thus satisfying the appetites of compliant states.

However, even together, fear- and appetite-based compliance are insufficient to explain the longevity of this order and neighboring powers' compliance with the China-centric hierarchical order. Many studies have suggested that the acceptance of China's moral authority as the leader of the *fanshu* (suzerainty, but with more independence regarding foreign policies) international society explain this compliance more convincingly (Kang, 2010; Zhang, 2014). China's moral authority and superiority accrued to it from other actors out of its role as the source of the standard of civilization in this international society. A shared Confucian vocabulary facilitated cultural achievements and moral authority as major status markers in the social hierarchy (see also Haggard & Kang, 2020; Kang, 2010, 2020; Kang & Swope, 2020; Kim, 1980; Park, 2017; Zhang, 2015). China's cultural achievements as the hub of Confucian thought solidified its status at the top of the hierarchy. For those powers that internalized this hierarchical relationship, China was the legitimate leader for the "all-under-heaven" (*tianxia*) (c.f. Mingming, 2012; Puranen, 2019; Wang, 2017; Zhao, 2006). Elites in other countries in the region internalized Chinese culture and ideas, particularly by emulating the Confucianism-informed Chinese bureaucracy (Kang, 2020). This helped strengthen the Confucian vocabulary as commonsensical, leading to creation of routines, practices, and habits that conformed to the ideal Confucian society. Furthermore, the less intrusive nature of Chinese suzerainty respected the self-esteem of actors in this order. Belonging to this hierarchy enhanced esteem and legitimacy, both of which aided in developing a spirit-based, voluntary, compliance.

The longevity of this *fanshu* international society and the tributary system as its institution was largely due to the voluntary compliance that major members of this society exhibited. Other actors wished to emulate China in order to achieve higher standing in the social hierarchy in a way that is clearly not based simply on China's material capabilities. That is, compliance with a China-centric hierarchical order in historical East Asia owed much to Imperial China's appeal to tributary states' spirit. The distinction between motives of appetite and spirit should be noted here. Higher status came with material benefits, such as

more and easier access to trade with China, which hints at appetite-based (induced) compliance with the order. However, relative to the parallel international society of *diguo,* which is discussed below, appetite played a less significant role.

The *diguo* international society was based on relations of equality between China and nomadic tribes in Central Asia that did not accept a China-centric hierarchy (Zhang, 2014). The Chinese referred to these tribes as "barbarians," as they did not accept the Chinese standard of civilization. These groups were unpersuaded by their exposure to Chinese values and ideas, essentially because they did not consider Confucian cultural achievements to be a significant status marker that appealed to their spirit. However, the relations with China were also not totally anarchic (c.f. Krishna, 2017). There were pockets of order in this thin international society, based on the primary institutions of diplomacy, balance of power, trade, treaties, and "peace and kinship (princesses and gifts from China to barbarians)" (Zhang, 2014, p. 24). The "barbarians" complied to some extent in their turn with China's hegemony, mainly due to fear (balance of power) and appetite (trade, treaties, gifts, etc.).

During the Qing Dynasty, the China-centric regional hegemony reached the level where China could conquer neighboring outer regions and integrate them as part of the empire. Thus, since China did not need to treat these tribes as equals, they became direct subjects of China without necessarily having to accept Chinese values. Yet, this was at the expense of their self-esteem, which was associated with their freedom and self-determination. The "civilizing mission" (Pomeranz, 2005) of Imperial China against the "barbarians" who became its direct subjects continues today. In the end, compliance from those who do not share China's values stems mainly from fear (e.g., the fear of becoming subject to enforcement based on domestic law) or appetite (e.g., the reward for being loyal subjects), and not spirit.

Yet another significant aspect of the Imperial China-centric hierarchy must be discussed. Mongols and Manchus took control of China under the Yuan and Qing dynasties, respectively. Both of these dynasties introduced themselves as the new rulers of Imperial China, under which China experienced more continuity than change in terms of state bureaucracy and culture.[8] The Yuan and Qing dynasties understood that their legitimacy as rulers in the regional hierarchy depended on this continuity, since it was already the established, routinized, and commonsensical Confucian-inspired Chinese standard of civilization. Without this legitimacy appealing to their subjects' and tributary states' spirit, they would have had to rely more on force (instilling fear) or inducement (satisfying appetites), which would have been more costly if not impossible.

Following encounters with West, regional actors ranging from Japan in the early stages all the way through to China itself in later years began to question the traditional, Confucian-informed Chinese standard of civilization. The Western standard of civilization was so strongly accepted that it reached the point of forcibly promoting Western hairstyles

---

8) The same can be said of Japan, which was intending to take over Ming Dynasty as the ruler of a China-centric social hierarchy, moving its capital from Japan to China (Lee, 2016).

and fashion among their populations (Holcombe, 2017). Westerners had material capabilities that helped them kickstart promoting their standard of civilization. Initially, this conformity was based on fear and appetite; in time, however, it appealed to the spirit of the people in the region (elites in particular) as something legitimate, normative, and commonsensical.

In summary, Chinese soft power in the hierarchical historical East Asian order was built on its successful establishment and maintenance of a standard of civilization that tributary states largely accepted. Fear and appetite certainly played a role here, but compliance with the order and emulation of the Chinese standard of civilization became an important status marker. Hence doing this provided the various states with a sense of agency and esteem through appealing to their spirit. As such practices became commonsensical and developed into habits, these soft power effects became hardened and long-lasting. This continued until the China-centric standard of civilization was replaced by the Western-centric standard of civilization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Conclusion

I teach a graduate school course entitled "Soft Power in World Politics." However, in the first class, I tell my students that I would rather call the course "Power in World Politics," even though I would not have as many students taking the course. Thus, I call it "soft power" to "attract" students.

Just as soft power has a certain appeal in the media, political circles, and academic publications, so too in the enrollment for my course. However, in most cases the term itself is rather misleading, just like in the name of my course. It would be better to consider different aspects of power in world politics, taking into account the perspective of the power recipient.

My article in Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (Ayhan, 2023) and this editorial are attempts to help provide soft power with an analytical framework that is more sound. In both works, I lay out the conceptual groundwork with ideal types of compliance. Empirical studies can utilize these ideal types to trace the existence of "soft power" through the compliance of power recipients to the desires of power wielders and the relative "softness" of said compliance.

References

Abdelal, Rawi, Herrera, Yoshiko M., Johnston, Alastair Iain, & McDermott, Rose. (2006). Identity as a Variable. *Perspectives on Politics, 4*(4), 695-711.

Anholt, Simon. (2022). *The Good Country Index.* Retrieved April 6, 2023 from https://good country.org/index/about-the-index/

Arraf, Jane, & King, John. (2003, February 18). Turkey holds out for extra U.S. aid over Iraq. *CNN.* http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.erdogan/index.html

Ayhan, Kadir Jun. (2021). Journal of Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of a New Interdisciplinary Journal for an Emerging Academic Field. *Journal of Public Diplomacy, 1*(1), 1-4.

Ayhan, Kadir Jun. (2023). Soft Power is Rare in World Politics: Ruling Out Fear- or Appetite-based Compliance. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy.* https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-023-00304-7

Ayhan, Kadir Jun, & Sevin, Efe. (2021). Non-Coercive Influence in World Politics: Intersection with State Inclusive Index. In J. Park & H.-S. Lyu (Eds.), *Developing State Inclusiveness Index: Conceptualization and Measurement* (pp. 419-435). National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences.

Bailey, Michael A., Strezhnev, Anton, & Voeten, Erik. (2017). Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61*(2), 430-456.

Bakalov, Ivan. (2019). Whither soft power? Divisions, milestones, and prospects of a research programme in the making. *Journal of Political Power, 12*(1), 129-151.

Bially Mattern, Janice. (2005). Why "Soft Power" Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 33*(3), 583-612.

Bourdieu, Pierre. (1994). Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power. In N. Dirks, G. Eleg, & S. B. Ortner (Eds.), *Culture/Power/History.* Princeton University Press.

Bush, G. W. (2001). Remarks by the President Upon Arrival. Retrieved from https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html

Buzan, Barry, & Zhang, Yongjin. (2014). *Contesting International Society in East Asia.* Cambridge University Press.

Castells, Manuel. (2015). *Communication Power* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Higgott, Richard A, & Nossal, Kim Richard. (1993). *Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order.* UBC Press.

Daßler, Benjamin, Kruck, Andreas, & Zangl, Bernhard. (2018). Interactions between hard and soft power: The institutional adaptation of international intellectual property protection to global power shifts. *European Journal of International Relations, 25*(2), 588-612.

de Carvalho, Benjamin, & Neumann, Iver B. (2014). *Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing.* Routledge.

Finnemore, Martha. (2009). Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity. *World Politics, 61*(1), 58-85.

Haggard, Stephan, & Kang, David C. (2020). Introduction. In S. Haggard & D. C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events that Shaped the Modern International Order* (pp. 3-21). Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Rodney Bruce. (1997). Moral Authority as a Power Resource. *International Organization, 51*(4), 591-622.

Holcombe, Charles. (2017). *A History of East Asia: From the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century* (2 ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Hurd, Ian. (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. *International Organization, 53*(2), 379-408.

Hurd, Ian. (2008). *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, G. John, & Kupchan, Charles A. (1990). Socialization and hegemonic power. *International Organization, 44*(3), 283-315.

Kang, David C. (2010). *East Asia before the West: Five centuries of trade and tribute.* Columbia University Press.

Kang, David C. (2020). International Order in Historical East Asia: Tribute and Hierarchy Beyond Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism. *International Organization, 74*(1), 65-93.

Kang, David C., & Swope, Kenneth M. (2020). East Asian International Relations over the *Longue Duree.* In S. Haggard & D. C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events that Shaped the Modern International Order* (pp. 22-43). Cambridge University Press.

Kearn, David W. (2011). The hard truths about soft power. *Journal of Political Power, 4*(1), 65-85.

Kim, Hey-Hiuk. (1980). *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire.* University of California Press.

Krishna, Sankaran. (2017). China is China, Not the Non-West: David Kang, Eurocentrism, and Global Politics. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic studies, 77*(1), 93-109.

LaFeber, Walter. (1999). *Michael Jordan and the new global capitalism.* Norton.

Lebow, Richard Ned. (2005). Power, Persuasion and Justice. *Millennium, 33*(3), 551-581.

Lebow, Richard Ned. (2008). *A Cultural Theory of International Relations.* Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. (2010). *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War.* Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. (2016). *National identities and international relations.* Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Ji-Young. (2016). *China's Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination.* Columbia University Press.

Maccoby, Eleanor Emmons, & Martin, John. (1983). Socialization in the context of the family: Parent–child interaction. In P. H. Mussen & E. M. Hetherington (Eds.), *Handbook of child psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 1-102). Wiley.

Mingming, Wang. (2012). All under heaven (tianxia): Cosmological perspectives and political ontologies in pre-modern China. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 2*(1), 337-383.

Misalucha-Willoughby, Charmaine G. (2018). The Role of the United States' Quasi-Alliances in Asia: Shadow Puppetry or Hard Alliances? In A. Chong (Ed.), *International Security in the Asia-Pacific: Transcending ASEAN towards Transitional Polycentrism* (pp. 175-193). Springer International Publishing.

Mitzen, Jennifer. (2006). Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. *European Journal of International Relations, 12*(3), 341-370.

Neumann, Iver B. (2014). Status is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great-Power Status. In T. V. Paul, D. W. Larson, & W. C. Wohlforth (Eds.), *Status in World Politics* (pp. 85-112). Cambridge University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. (1990). *Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power.* Basic Books.

Nye, Joseph S. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* Public Affairs.

Nye, Joseph S. (2007). Notes for a soft-power research agenda. In F. Berenskoetter & M. J. Williams (Eds.), *Power in World Politics* (pp. 162-172). Routledge.

Nye, Joseph S. (2018, January 24). How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence. *Foreign Affairs*. https://www.for eignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power

Nye, Joseph S. (2021). Soft power: the evolution of a concept. *Journal of Political Power, 14*(1), 196-208.

Obama, Barack Hussein. (2009). *President Obama's Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning.* Retrieved 2021, July 8 from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/NewBegin ning/transcripts

Park, Seo-Hyun. (2017). *Sovereignty and Status in East Asian International Relations.* Cambridge University Press.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. (2005). Empire & "Civilizing" Missions, Past & Present. *Daedalus, 134*(2), 34-45.

Puranen, Matti. (2019). "All under heaven as one family": Tianxiaist ideology and the emerging Chinese great power identity. *Journal of China and international relations, 7*(1).

Rosati, Jerel A. (2000). The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics. *International Studies Review, 2*(3), 45-75.

Sasley, Brent E. (2011). Theorizing States' Emotions1. *International Studies Review, 13*(3), 452-476.

Suchman, Mark C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of management Review, 20*(3), 571-610.

Voeten, Erik, Strezhnev, Anton, & Bailey, Michael. (2009). United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. In V. Erik (Ed.): Harvard Dataverse.

Walker, Christopher, & Ludwig, Jessica (Eds.). (2017). *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influe*nce. National Endowment for Democracy.

Wang, Ban. (2017). *Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture and World Politics.* Duke University Press.

Weber, Max. (2019). *Economy and Society: A New Translation* (K. Tribe, Ed. & Trans.). Harvard University Press.

Wendt, Alexander. (2004). The state as person in international theory. *Review of International*

Studies, 30(2), 289-316.

Zarakol, Ayşe. (2016). States and ontological security: A historical rethinking. *Cooperation and Conflict, 52*(1), 48-68.

Zhang, Feng. (2014). International societies in pre-modern East Asia: a preliminary framework. In B. Buzan & Y. Zhang (Eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia* (pp. 29-50). Cambridge University Press.

Zhang, Feng. (2015). *Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History*. Stanford University Press.

Zhao, Tingyang. (2006). Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept "All-under-Heaven" (Tian-xia, 天下). *Social Identities, 12*(1), 29-41.

▋ Kadir Jun Ayhan

Kadir Jun Ayhan, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Ewha Womans University Graduate School of International Studies. His main research interests include public diplomacy, power in world politics, and Korean diplomacy and foreign policy. Ayhan serves as Editor-in-Chief for Journal of Public Diplomacy. He regularly consults for governmental public diplomacy projects in Korea. Ayhan had served as a member of the Committee of National Cohesion under the Korean President-elect in 2022. He holds Ph.D. and M.I.S. from Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies and a Bachelor of Commerce from The University of Auckland. Ayhan has published over twenty peer-reviewed articles including in *International Studies Perspectives, Korea Observer, and The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, among others, and co-edited the volume entitled *Comprehensive Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula: Internal Dynamics in North Korea and South Korean Approaches* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).