ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY OF GENERIC HOMOMORPHIC AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION

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Abstract. Recently, a new type of encryption called Homomorphic Authenticated Encryption (HAE) has been proposed. This combines the functionality of homomorphic encryption with authentication. Several concrete HAE schemes have been developed and security results for homomorphic authenticated encryption, designed by combining a homomorphic message authentication scheme with a homomorphic secret-key encryption, have been partially reported.

In this paper, we analyze the security of a design method that combines homomorphic message authentication and homomorphic encryption, with a focus on the encryption after authentication (EAA) type. The results of our analysis show that while non-forgery and indistinguishability are maintained, strong non-forgery is not.

1. Introduction

Homomorphic encryption is a promising approach to enhance information security in cloud computing environments ([3], [6], [7]). It enables operations to be performed on plaintext while it remains encrypted, allowing for the processing of information without the need for decryption. However, the reliability of the results of these operations is not guaranteed. This is because the subject of the operation may use an arbitrary ciphertext other than the intended one, or a third-party may generate a random ciphertext and manipulate the operation results on the cloud server. To address this issue, homomorphic authenticated encryption, which provides both encryption and authentication, has been recently proposed in studies ([8], [5], [11]).

The first homomorphic authenticated encryption scheme was proposed by Joo et al. [8]. Their scheme was designed to provide both indistinguishability and strong non-forgery against chosen plaintext attackers, using the approximate greatest common divisor problem. However, the size of the ciphertext was

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increased to support the multiplication operation in their scheme. To address this issue, Struck et al. [11] proposed a more efficient public-key type homomorphic authenticated encryption scheme, which only supports the addition operation. This scheme provides indistinguishability and non-forgeability against a chosen ciphertext attacker. Another efficient symmetric-key type homomorphic authenticated encryption, also supporting only the addition operation, was later proposed [5]. However, its security level is relatively low compared to other homomorphic authenticated encryption schemes. All of these schemes prevent plaintext exposure by encrypting the data with a randomized label used for authentication, similar to the generic encryption-after-authentication (EAA) construction [2]. However, this design approach has yet to be analyzed.

In this work, we perform a security analysis of the EAA type homomorphic authenticated encryption. Our analysis shows that if a homomorphic authenticated encryption scheme is constructed using a non-forgeable homomorphic message authentication code, it also exhibits non-forgeability. However, this does not hold for the stronger property of strong forgery. On the other hand, we confirm that the indistinguishability property is satisfied when a homomorphic authenticated encryption is designed using a homomorphic secret-key encryption that itself has indistinguishability.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide definitions and relevant terms for our security analysis. In Section 3, we present the results of our analysis of the encryption-after-authentication (EAA) type homomorphic authenticated encryption. Finally, in Section 4, we present our conclusions and discuss potential future work.

2. Definitions and Related Terms

In order to analyze the security of the combined homomorphic authentication encryption (EAA), we define terms related to the homomorphic authentication encryption and the homomorphic message authentication scheme. Some notations and definitions refer to references ([8], [9], [10], [1], [4]).

2.1. Homomorphic Message Authentication

The homomorphic message authentication scheme (HMAC) consists of the following four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.

• \((ek, sk) \leftarrow KeyGen(1^\lambda)\): an operation key \(ek\) and a secret key \(sk\) are outputted for the security parameter \(\lambda\).

• \(\mu \leftarrow Aut(\tau, m, sk)\): given a label \(\tau \in L\) and a secret key \(sk\), a tag \(\mu \in T\) is outputted for the message \(m\).

• \(\mu \leftarrow Eval(ek, f, \mu_1, \cdots, \mu_l)\): given an evaluation key \(ek\), an function \(f : M^l \rightarrow M\) and \(l\) number of tags, \(\mu_1, \cdots, \mu_l \in T\), this algorithm outputs a tag \(\mu \in T\).
• $h \rightarrow \text{Ver}((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m, \mu, sk)$: given a secret key $sk$, a labeled program $(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l)$, a message $m \in M$ and a tag $\mu \in T$, this algorithm outputs the verification result as a bit $h \in \{0, 1\}$.

The security of the homomorphic message authentication scheme is determined whether or not an attacker can arbitrarily create a forgery without secret information. The attack model is divided into two types of attacks, a chosen plaintext attack and a chosen authentication attack, depending on the level of the attacker’s ability. In the case of a chosen plaintext attack, an attacker can obtain authentication by querying an arbitrary plaintext, whereas in the case of a chosen authentication attack, a verification query for authentication is also possible in addition to an authentication query for plaintext [1]. In both cases, the label used to generate the result of the attacker’s authentication query is not recycled and must be used only once.

Forgery, which is an attacker’s goal for HMAC, is defined in two forms as follows.

• $1 = \text{Ver}((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu', sk)$, and $f(m_i)_{i \in I}$ is not constant.

• $1 = \text{Ver}((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu', sk)$, and $f(m_i)_{i \in I}$ is constant. But, $f(m_i)_{i \in I} \neq m'$. where I is the set of indices used for the label, $f(m_i)_{i \in I}$ is a function whose domain is $M^{l-|I|}$ and its range is $M$.

Another type of forgery, strong forgery, is defined in two forms as follows. By definition, strong forgery includes all forgery.

• $1 = \text{Ver}((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu', sk)$, and $f(m_i)_{i \in I}$ or $\text{Eval}(f, \mu_1, \cdots, \mu_l, ek)$ is not constant.

• $1 = \text{Ver}((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu', sk)$, and $f(m_i)_{i \in I}$ or $\text{Eval}(f, \mu_1, \cdots, \mu_l, ek)$ is constant. But, $f(m_i)_{i \in I} \neq m'$ or $\text{Eval}(f, \mu_1, \cdots, \mu_l, ek) \neq \mu'$.

Based on the definition of forgery, the non-forgeability for the chosen message attacker is defined as the following game, $UF - CMA^{\lambda}_A$.

• Initialization : The challenger is issued an evaluation key $ek$ and a secret key $sk$ for security parameter $\lambda$, and $ek$ is passed to the attacker.

• Queries : To the attacker’s authentication query for $\tau, m$, the challenger calculates $\mu = \text{Aut}(\tau, m, sk)$ and responds to the attacker.

• Finalization : The attacker submits a forgery attempt $((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu')$ to the challenger. The challenger checks whether it is a forgery, outputs 1 if it is a forgery, and 0 if it is not, and ends the game.

The advantage of attacker in the above game is defined as follows.

$$\text{Adv}^{UF-CMA}_{HMAC,A} (\lambda) := \Pr[UF - CMA^{\lambda}_A = 1]$$

If the value is negligible for a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker, the homomorphic message authentication scheme is said to have non-forgeability against a chosen plaintext attacker.
Similarly, based on the definition of strong non-forgeability, the strong non-
forgeability for the attacker is defined as the above game. (In the finalization
phase, it is checked whether it is a strong forgery or not.) The advantage of
attacker in the game is defined as follows.

\[
Adv_{HMAC,A}^{SUF-CMA}(\lambda) := Pr[SUF - CMA_A^\lambda = 1]
\]

The non-forgeability for the chosen tag attacker is defined as the following
game, \(UF - CTA^\lambda_A\).

- **Initialization**: The challenger is issued an evaluation key \(ek\) and a secret
  key \(sk\) for security parameter \(\lambda\), and \(ek\) is passed to the attacker.
- **Queries**: To the attacker’s authentication query for \(\tau, m\), the challenger
calculates \(\mu = Aut(\tau, m, sk)\) and responds to the attacker. On the other
  hand, for each verification query \(((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m, \mu)\) of \(A\), give \(b \leftarrow Ver((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu', sk)\) to \(A\) as an answer for the query.
- **Finalization**: The attacker submits a forgery attempt \(((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu')\)
to the challenger. The challenger checks whether it is a forgery, outputs
1 if it is a forgery, and 0 if it is not, and ends the game.

The advantage of attacker in the above game is defined as follows.

\[
Adv_{HMAC,A}^{UF-CTA}(\lambda) := Pr[UF - CTA^\lambda_A = 1]
\]

If the value is negligible for a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker, the
homomorphic message authentication scheme is said to have non-forgeability
against a chosen plaintext attacker.

Similarly, based on the definition of strong non-forgeability, the strong non-
forgeability for the attacker is defined as the above game. (In the finalization
phase, it is checked whether it is a strong forgery or not.) The advantage of
attacker in the game is defined as follows.

\[
Adv_{HMAC,A}^{SUF-CTA}(\lambda) := Pr[SUF - CTA^\lambda_A = 1]
\]

2.2. Homomorphic Authenticated Encryption

The homomorphic authenticated encryption scheme (HAE) consists of the
following four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.

- \((ek, sk) \leftarrow KeyGen(1^\lambda)\): an operation key \(ek\) and a secret key \(sk\) are
  outputted for the security parameter \(\lambda\).
- \(c \leftarrow Enc(\tau, m, sk)\): given a label \(\tau \in L\) and a secret key \(sk\), a cipher-text
c \(\in C\) is outputted for the message \(m\).
- \(c' \leftarrow Eval(f, c_1, \cdots, c_l, ek)\): given an evaluation key \(ek\), an function
  \(f : C^l \rightarrow C\) and \(l\) number of cipher-texts, \(c_1, \cdots, c_l \in C\), this algorithm
  outputs a cipher-texts \(c' \in C\).
- \(m\) or \(\bot \rightarrow Dec((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), \bar{c}, sk)\): given a secret key \(sk\), a labeled
  program \((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l)\), a cipher-text \(\bar{c} \in C\), this algorithm outputs a
  message \(m\) or \(\bot\).
The attacker’s goals for homomorphic authenticated encryption are to decrypt the cipher-text and forge it. Forgery, and its strong variant are defined in two forms as follows in a manner similar to the homomorphic message authentication scheme.

**Forgery**
- \( \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c', sk) \neq \perp \), and \( f(m_i)_{i \in I} \) is not constant.
- \( \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c', sk) \neq \perp \), and \( f(m_i)_{i \in I} \) is constant.

But, \( \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c', sk) \neq f(m_i)_{i \in I} \)

**Strong forgery**
- \( \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c', sk) \neq \perp \), and \( f(m_i)_{i \in I} \) or \( \text{Eval}(f, c_1, \cdots, c_l, ek) \) is not constant.
- \( \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c', sk) \neq \perp \), and \( f(m_i)_{i \in I} \) and \( \text{Eval}(f, c_1, \cdots, c_l, ek) \) is constant. \( \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c', sk) \neq f(m_i)_{i \in I} \) or \( \text{Eval}(f, c_1, \cdots, c_l, ek) \neq c' \)

where \( I \) is the set of indices used for the label, \( f(m_i)_{i \in I} \) is a function whose domain is \( M^{I-|I|} \) and its range is \( M \).

Based on these definitions, the (strong) non-forgeability for the chosen plaintext or cipher-text attacker is defined similar to the homomorphic message authentication scheme. IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of HAE is defined in a manner similar to the traditional secret-key encryption scheme.

### 3. Security Analysis

One common way to design a homomorphic authenticated encryption is to combine a homomorphic encryption with a homomorphic message authentication scheme. Specifically, one method is to generate authentication for plaintext and then encrypt it. The homomorphic authenticated encryption designed in this way is called \( \text{HAE}_{\text{EAA}} \), it is composed of the following key generation (\( \text{KeyGen} \)), encryption (\( \text{Enc} \)), operation (\( \text{Eval} \)), and decryption (\( \text{Dec} \)) algorithms.

\( \text{HAE}_{\text{EAA}} : \)
- \((ek, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)\): an operation key \( ek = (\text{HSE.ek}, \text{HMAC.ek}) \) and a secret key \( sk = (\text{HSE.sk}, \text{HMAC.sk}) \) are outputted via \( \text{HSE.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \) for the security parameter \( \lambda \).
- \( c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\tau, m, sk)\): given a label \( \tau \in L \) and a secret key \( sk \), a cipher-text \( c = \text{HSE.Enc}(m, \mu, \text{HSE.sk}) \) is outputted for the message \( m \) after the authentication \( \mu = \text{HMAC.Aut}(\tau, m, \text{HMAC.sk}) \).
- \( c' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(f, c_1, \cdots, c_l, ek)\): given an evaluation key \( ek \), an function \( f : C^l \rightarrow C \) and \( l \) number of cipher-texts, \( c_1, \cdots, c_l \in C \) , this algorithm outputs a cipher-texts \( c' \in C \).
- \( m \) or \( \perp \rightarrow \text{Dec}(f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I, c, sk)\): given a secret key \( sk = (\text{HSE.sk}, \text{HMAC.sk}) \), a labeled program \( (f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_I) \), a cipher-text \( c \in C \), this algorithm decrypt \( (m, \mu) \), \( \text{HSE.Dec}(c, \text{HSE.sk}) \), then verify \( h \leftarrow \)
$HMAC.Ver((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m, \mu, HMAC.sk)$. If $h = 1$, then return $m$. Otherwise, return $\bot$.

The following theorem shows the homomorphic authenticated encryption, $HAE_{EAA}$, preserves IND-CPA security.

**Theorem 3.1.** If the homomorphic secret-key encryption (HSE) is IND-CPA, then the homomorphic authenticated encryption ($HAE_{EAA}$) is also IND-CPA.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be a PPT adversary for the game IND-CPA of $HAE_{EAA}$. We can construct another adversary $A'$ for the game IND-CPA of $HSE$ from $A$ as follows.

- **Initialization**: For a given key $HSE.ek$, $A'$ generate a pair of keys $(HMAC.ek, HMAC.sk) \leftarrow HMAC.KeyGen(1^\lambda)$. Then $ek = (HSE.ek, HMAC.ek)$ is given to $A$.
- **Queries**: For each encryption query $\tau, m$ of $A$, $A'$ get $\mu \leftarrow HMAC.Aut(\tau, m, HMAC.sk)$, and an answer $c$ from the encryption oracle $HSE.Enc$. Return $c$ to $A'$ as an answer for the query.
- **Challenge**: For the challenge $(\tau^*, m^*_0, m^*_1)$ of $A$, $A'$ get tags, $\mu^*_b \leftarrow HMAC.Aut(\tau^*, m^*_b, HMAC.sk)$ for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and the random challenge ciphertext $c^*$ from the encryption oracle, $HSE.Enc$. $A'$ gives $c^*$ to $A$.
- **Queries**: Proceed in the same way as in the previous queries.
- **Finalization**: For the output bit $h \in \{0, 1\}$ of $A$, $A'$ submits her result $h' = h$.

Therefore, from the above simulation, $Adv^{\text{IND-CPA}}_{HSE,A'}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible if $Adv^{\text{IND-CPA}}_{HAE,A}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible.

\[\square\]

The following theorem shows the homomorphic authenticated encryption, $HAE_{EAA}$, preserves also non-forgeability security.

**Theorem 3.2.** If $HMAC$ is UF − CMA, then $HAE_{EAA}$ is UF − CPA.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be a PPT adversary for the game UF-CPA of $HAE_{EAA}$. We can construct another adversary $A'$ for the game UF-CMA of $HMAC$ from $A$ as follows.

- **Initialization**: For a given key $HMAC.ek$, $A'$ generate a pair of keys $(HSE.ek, HSE.sk) \leftarrow HSE.KeyGen(1^\lambda)$. Then $ek = (HSE.ek, HMAC.ek)$ is given to $A$.
- **Queries**: For each encryption query $(\tau, m)$ of $A$, $A'$ get $\mu$ from the authentication oracle, and an answer $c = HSE.Enc((m, \mu), HSE.sk)$ from the encryption oracle $HSE.Enc$. $A'$ gives $c$ to $A$ as an answer for the query.
- **Finalization**: For the forgery attempt $((f, \tau, \cdots, \tau_l), c')$ of $A$, $A'$ output $((f, \tau, \cdots, \tau_l), m', \mu')$, where $(m', \mu') \leftarrow HSE.Dec(c', HSE.sk)$. 
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Therefore, from the above simulation, $\text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC},A'}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible if $\text{Adv}_{\text{HAE},A}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible.

Similarly, we can show its non-forgability against chosen cipher-text attacker.

**Corollary 3.1.** If HMAC is $UF-CTA$, then $\text{HAE}_{EAA}$ is $UF-CCA$.

**Proof.** The only difference is the query phase in the previous game. Therefore, we only describe the query phase.

- Queries: For each encryption query $(\tau, m)$ of $A$, $A'$ get $\mu$ from the authentication oracle, and an answer $c = \text{HSE.Enc}((m, \mu), \text{HSE.sk})$ from the encryption oracle $\text{HSE.Enc}$. $A'$ gives $c$ to $A$ as an answer for the query. For each decryption query $((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), c)$, $A'$ has $(m, \mu)$, and an verification result $h$ from $\text{HSE.Dec}(c, \text{HSE.sk})$ and $\text{HMAC.Ver}((f, \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_l), m, \mu)$. If $h = 1$, $A'$ gives $m$ to $A$. Otherwise, $A'$ gives $\perp$.

Therefore, from the above simulation, $\text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC},A'}^\text{UF-CTA}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible if $\text{Adv}_{\text{HAE},A}^\text{UF-CCA}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible.

Unlike in previous cases, the homomorphic authenticated encryption does not preserve the strong non-forgability.

**Theorem 3.3.** The $\text{HAE}_{EAA}$ does not preserve the strong non-forgability security of an HMAC.

**Proof.** Due to its homomorphic property, we can easily produce another cipher-text $c'$ that has the same decryption result of $A$. This means that $c'$ is a strong forgery in $\text{HAE}_{EAA}$ by definition of the strong forgery.

4. Conclusion

In this work, we analyzed the security level of homomorphic authenticated encryption synthesized by combining a homomorphic message authentication code and a homomorphic secret-key encryption. We focused on the encryption-after-authentication (EAA) type of generic design methods for homomorphic authenticated encryption. Through the definition of relevant terms and the application of simulation and reduction processes, we showed that the non-forgability and indistinguishability properties of the homomorphic message authentication scheme are preserved in the homomorphic authenticated encryption. However, strong non-forgability is not guaranteed due to the homomorphic property. As a future research direction, it will also be important to study the security of authentication-after-encryption designed homomorphic authenticated encryption schemes.
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References


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