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Current Status and Challenges of BGP Hijacking Security Threat

BGP 하이재킹 보안 위협 대응 현황 및 과제

  • Han, Wooyoung (Undergraduate Student, Web Programming, Korea Digital Media High School) ;
  • Hong, Yunseok (Undergraduate Student, Goyang-il High School)
  • Received : 2022.08.25
  • Accepted : 2022.09.30
  • Published : 2022.10.31

Abstract

BGP(Border Gateway Protocol) is a routing protocol that is actively used in inter-AS routing on the Internet. However, BGP routing protocol is vulnerable to BGP hijacking attacks that hijack the network by impersonating normal BGP sessions. BGP Hijacking attacks can lead to causing intercept IP traffic or interference with the normal service operation. Recently, BGP hijacking attacks, which have often occurred overseas, have also occurred in Korea. It means threatening the security of the Internet. In this paper, we analyze the overall process of attack through representative attack cases and virtual scenarios of BGP hijacking and based on the results of analyzing the application status of security technology to prevent BGP hijacking attacks by Korea and global major ISPs. It covers the technical proposal of ISPs and autonomous system operators should take to defend against BGP hijacking attacks.

BGP는 인터넷에서 자율시스템(AS) 간 통신에 많이 사용되는 라우팅 방식이다. 그러나 BGP 라우팅은 정상적인 BGP 세션을 가장하여 네트워크를 하이재킹 하는 BGP 하이재킹 공격에 취약하다. 하이재킹 공격을 통해 공격자는 IP 트래픽을 감청하거나, 정상적인 서비스가 불가하도록 방해할 수 있다. 최근 해외에서만 종종 발생하던 BGP 하이재킹 공격이 국내에도 발생하며 인터넷의 보안을 위협하고 있다. 본 논문에서는 BGP 하이재킹 공격에 대한 사례와 가상 공격 시나리오를 통해 공격이 이루어지는 과정 전반을 분석하고 하이재킹 공격을 방어하기 위한 보안 기술 현황과 국내, 해외 ISP 들의 BGP 보안 기술 적용 실태를 분석한 결과를 기반으로 ISP와 자율 시스템 운영자가 BGP 하이재킹 공격을 방어하기 위해 해야 할 기술적 조치를 다루고 있다.

Keywords

References

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