초록
Using a trade policy, government can shift profits from foreign firms to domestic firms. This paper will reexamine how asymmetric information can affect the equivalence of tariff and quota in a duopoly, where one domestic firm competes with one foreign firm. It can happen that the domestic firm has informational advantage against the government. Within this framework, the domestic firm has private information about own marginal cost as well as the foreign firm's. The domestic firm would exploit the advantage to draw a favorable policy from the government. When the government is misled, social welfare would decline. This paper will guide how the government can extract information from the domestic firm by offering a menu of tariff or quota. Previous studies showed that quota demands information more than tariff. With the principle of revealed information, the domestic firm chooses tariff (quota) if the marginal cost of foreign firm is low (high). The quota level will be high (low) if the marginal cost of domestic firm is high (low). To prevent misrepresentation, the domestic firm should be charged when quota is implemented. When the quota level is low, the domestic firm is charged additionally. This paper can contribute to the literature of trade policy and information.