분석과 대안 (Analyses & Alternatives)

  • 제5권1호
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  • Pages.25-57
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  • 2021
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  • 2508-822X(pISSN)
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  • 2508 - 8238(eISSN)
사단법인 코리아컨센서스연구원 (Korea Consensus Institute(KCI))
권호 표지

중국의 비공식적 경제 제재

China's Informal Economic Sanctions

  • 투고 : 2021.02.14
  • 심사 : 2021.03.16
  • 발행 : 2021.03.30
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초록

미국과 중국의 전략적 경쟁이 격화되면서 중국을 비롯하여 전세계적으로 경제 제재가 더욱 빈번하게 사용되고 있다. 미국의 동맹국이면서도 중국을 최대 교역국으로 두고 있는 한국은 중국의 사드(THAAD) 배치에 대한 보복에서 보듯이 향후에도 경제 제재에 맞닥뜨릴 가능성이 높다. 이러한 배경에서 본 논문은 비공식성을 중심으로 중국의 경제 제재를 분석한다. 중국은 경제 제재를 거의 인정하지 않는다. 대부분의 경우, 중국은 한국의 사드 배치 사례처럼 거대한 시장을 가진 구매자로서의 지위를 적극 활용하여 비공식적으로 경제 제재를 시행한다. 핵심이익과 관련되어 있거나 유리한 무역구조를 활용할 수 없어 실질적인 제재 효과를 발휘할 수 없는 경우, 그리고 상호 분쟁이 고조되어 비공식성을 유지할 수 없을 때에만, 공식적인 대응을 한다. 중국의 비공식적 경제 제재에 취약한 한국은 무역구조를 개선하는 것과 함께 비공식성을 비롯한 중국의 경제 제재가 갖는 특성을 심도 있게 분석하면서 다양한 전략과 방안을 통해 이에 대비해야 할 것이다.

As the strategic competition between the United States and China for global hegemony intensifies, China is using economic sanctions against other countries more and more frequently. Republic of Korea, which has China as its largest trading partner but is an ally of the United States, is more likely to be a target of economic sanctions, as seen in China's retaliation toward its deployment of a THAAD missile-defense system. Against the background, this paper analyzes China's economic sanctions, especially focusing on its informality. China does not publicly declare economic sanctions in most cases, such as Korean one, in which the trade structure is in its favor and can take advantage of its position as a big buyer with huge markets. However, China responds in a more open and formal manner when it is related to its core interests, when it is impossible to exert substantial sanctions effect and when mutual disputes intensify and cannot maintain informality. Korea, which is vulnerable to China's informal economic sanctions, should prepare for them by analyzing the characteristics of China's economic sanctions in depth and thinking about various strategies and measures in advance.

키워드

과제정보

본 연구는 2019년 인천대학교로부터 지원받아 연구되었음.

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