



Newchwang before Newchwang, c1368-1863*

Kai Yiu Chan

Associate Professor, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan

E-mail: kaiychan@mail.ncku.edu.tw

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ABSTRACT

Though known for its connections with maritime trade at varying degrees before the rise of the Manchus and their Qing Empire, Newchwang as a fortress did not become a populous urban settlement in the nineteenth century when the Euro-American observers arrived. Through examining the history of this trade-related locale in the Qing Empire, this article explores the broader historical context, especially the Eight Banners System of the Manchus, which prevented Newchwang from developing into a port-city, and the implications behind.

Key Words: Newchwang, Eight Bannermen System, fortress, port-city, Manchu/Qing Empire

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I . Introduction

This article studies the history of Newchwang (Niuzhuang牛莊) to review the problem of developing urbanity in Manchuria before 1860. It depicts Newchwang's historical transformation before another locale called "Yingtsz" (營子) assumed the name of "Newchwang" during the 1860s, revealing the fact that the original locale named "Newchwang" had developed with domestic trade between the Liao (遼) River system and other parts of the Qing/Manchu Empire. Nonetheless, its development after 1644 was entangled with the socio-political structures of the Manchu Empire in Manchuria. This was to have a significant impact on Newchwang which maintained its status as a land-locked "walled-city" instead of a "port-city."

The misleading naming of "Yingtsz" as "Newchwang" is the result of the treaty on the 9th May 1864. The Imperial Maritime Customs of China opened its office at the southwestern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, where this new office called "Ying-tsz" (or Yingkow [Yingkou] 營口) was established to supervise the Qing Empire's external trade from this locale.¹⁾ Although the name "Yingtsz" was generally used by later generations of customs officials of the port, the name "Newchwang" was the official name of the port in all trade statistics and reporting. This was also the name of the "port" in the treaties of 1858 and 1860.²⁾ Still, as the two settlements are miles away from each other,³⁾ the naming of the two locations by the Customs officials and foreign diplomats is a source of confusion and leads one to question what the relationship between the two might have been historically.⁴⁾ What happened to "Newchwang" before "Ying-tsz" was named after it in the 1860s?

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- 1) Mackey, James (1865). Office of Maritime Customs, Ying-tsz, Inspector General of Customs, *Reports on Trade at the Ports of Shanghai, Canton, Swatow, Amoy, Ningpo, Hankow, Kiukiang, Chefoo, and Newchwang for the Year 1864*. Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs' Press, pp. 1-2.
 - 2) MacPherson, A. (1866). Report on the Trade at the Port of Newchwang, for the Year 1865, Inspector General of Customs, *Reports on the Trade at the Ports in China Open by Treaty to Foreign Trade, for the Year 1865*. Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs' Press, pp. 13-23, particularly p. 13.
 - 3) In the early twentieth century, the distance between the two locales was reported 30 miles, see Hosie, Alexander (1904). *Manchuria: Its People, Resources and Recent History*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 1. In the late-twentieth-century measurement, it was 40 km distance between the two locales, see Li, Yousheng (李有升) (ed.) (1995). *Yingkou Difangshi Yanjiu* (Local historical research on Yingkou營口地方史研究). Shenyang瀋陽: Liaoning Minzu Chubanshe遼寧民族出版社, p. 150.
 - 4) For example, Alexander Hosie referred "Ying-tzu" as known "in the interior of Manchuria" while "Newchwang" was mentioned "outside Manchuria." Hosie rather used the name "Niu-chuang" to reference the inland town, while "Newchwang" was the port-city. See Hosie, Alexander (1904). *Op. cit.*, p. 1. The Japanese-controlled South Manchuria

Historians are also to blame for the confusion. In fact, the historical writings of present-day Yingkou have included Newchwang as part of its history. According to local historians, Yingkou's history can be traced back to the ancient port of Liaoyanggang (遼陽港), the Ming-Qing ports of Newchwang, Mogouying (沒溝營), and Liangfangkou (梁房口), together with Yingkou after it was opened to external trade.⁵⁾ All these different places have been incorporated into the historical narratives of Yingkou because of the expanding urbanity in the region. In other words, these urban centers have been incorporated into earlier histories because historians have retroprojected today's conurbation into the past. Some important chapters in history, moreover, have been ignored, re-written or erased. Therefore, this article reconstructs the history of Newchwang across the longue durée, from its early existence in the Ming till the eve of the opening of the treaty port in the name of "Newchwang."

The longer history of Newchwang should not only interest local historians, but also makes a contribution to the history of port-cities in East Asia. China's economic historians have suggested that "port-cities" flourished while trade expanded along the major river systems and along the coastline of the Qing Empire. Earlier studies have therefore portrayed substantial urban development in the Canton Delta, Lower Yangzi Region, and North China.⁶⁾ To scholars of these previous studies, trade facilitated not only economic expansion in general, but also led to a growth in population, employment, and urban settlement. With reference to the case study of Newchwang, this article

Railway Company has nothing to say about the inland town, but called it "the port of Newchwang (now Yingkow)." See Thomas F. Logan, Inc. (comp.) (1922). *Manchuria: Land of Opportunities*. New York: South Manchuria Railway/Thomas F. Logan, Inc., p. 49.

- 5) Yingkou Gangshi Bianweihui (營口港史編委會) (comp.) (1995). *Yingkou Gangshi* (History of the Yingkou Port 營口港史). Beijing北京: Renmin Jiaotong Chubanshe人民交通出版社, pp. 7-88; Li, Yousheng (ed.) (1995) *Yingkou Difangshi Yanjiu*, pp. 139-156; Ma, Dongti (麻東堤) and Zhang, Zuomin (張卓民) (eds.) (1992). *Zhongguo Guoqing Congshu: Baixianshi Jingjishenhui Diaocha, Yingkou Juan* (Volumes on China's national condition: Social economic surveys on hundreds of counties and cities, the Yingkou volume 中國國情叢書——百縣市經濟社會調查營口卷). Beijing北京: Zhongguo Dabaikaquanshu Chubanshe中國大百科全書出版社, pp. 2-6.
- 6) Concerning earlier contributions to the urban history of China before the late nineteenth century, see Skinner, G. William (ed.) (1977). *The City in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. However, many economic historians have linked the growth of port-cities to the expansion of trade, see Xu, Dixin (許濂新) and Wu Chengming (吳承明) (comp.) (1985). *Zhongguo Zibenzhuyi Fazhanshi* (A history of development of Chinese capitalism 中國資本主義發展史), vol.1. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe人民出版社; Li, Bozhong (李伯重) (2000). *Jiangnan de Zaoqi Gongyehua (1550-1850 nian)* (Proto-industrialization of the Jiangnan (1550-1850) 江南的早期工業化[1550-1850年]). Beijing: Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe中國社會科學文獻出版社; Long, Denggao (龍登高) (2003). *Jiangnan Shichangshi: Shiyi zhi Shijiu Shiji de Bianqian* (History of the market in Jiangnan: Transformation from the 11th to 19th century 江南市場史——十一至十九世紀的變遷). Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe清華大學出版社.

discusses a locale that grew prosperous from trade flows through its hinterland during the eighteenth century. Still, it did not grow into a densely populated urban settlement, or a “city” so to speak, as other cities had in the nineteenth century. This article, moreover, pays special attention to the Eight Banners System of the Manchus which effectively prevented Newchwang from developing into an urban settlement.

In fulfilling this research agenda, this article draws on three types of sources. First, it studies sources prepared by the imperial central government, the *Qing Shilu* (The verifiable records of the Qing Dynasty清實錄). This summarizes all the major memorials and royal replies that relate to the empire as a whole.⁷⁾ Second, it references the local gazetteers of the Liaodong Peninsula in general, and of the capital Shenyang in particular, since Newchwang had been placed under its jurisdiction. Third, this article shall explore Korean literary materials which often made contributions about Newchwang from the vantage point of an outsider. Last, we shall examine some scholarly works from China which drew on archival materials that are inaccessible to outsiders. Their findings are instrumental for obtaining a better grasp of the local archival sources at hand.

II. The Post Station

The history of Newchwang can be dated back in the early Ming period. The location of Newchwang was originally called “Niujiashuang” (牛家莊), and had been placed under the jurisdiction of the Ming’s “garrison station” (*weisuo*衛所), “Liaohaiwei” (遼海衛).⁸⁾ After the garrison had been withdrawn by the government, the locale was deserted, and became an uncharted place in the Liao River estuary between the garrisons of Haizhou (海州) and Gaizhou (蓋州).⁹⁾ In the early

7) Anonymous authors (1985), *Qing Shilu* (The verifiable records of the Qing Dynasty清實錄), 60 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju中華書局.

8) Wang, Shunan (王樹楠), Wu, Tingxie (吳廷燮) and Jin, Yufu (金毓黻) (comp.) (1983). *Fengtian Tongzhi* (Gazatteer of Fengtian奉天通志). Shenyang瀋陽: Dongbei Wenshi Congshu Bianji Weiyuanhui 東北文史叢書編輯委員會reprinted 1934 version, pp. 1191, 1193-1194.

9) Yang, Tonggui (楊同桂) and Sun, Zonghan (孫宗翰) (comp.) (1985). *Shengjing Jiangyukao* (An investigation on the territories of Shengjing盛京疆域考), Vol. 6, p. 3, in Xing Zhenfang (興振芳) (comp.) *Liaohai Congshu* (Books on Liaoning遼海叢書). Shenyang: Liaoshen Shushe遼瀋書社.

Ming, salt fields existed as the place was located between fresh and sea waters, and thus, there were also some customs' checkpoints to oversee the Liao River trade. In the local gazetteer of the Liaodong Peninsula completed in the 16th year of the Jiajing (嘉靖) reign (1537), it shows that an imperial post (*yizhan*驛站) was erected and called "Newchwang Station" (*Niuzhuangyi*牛莊驛), thus revealing the origin of the locale.¹⁰ Such a station belonged to an empire-wide network of prison transfers, logistics and information flows.¹¹ Although nothing is known about the number of people working here, the Newchwang station was home to 25 horses and 15 donkeys in line with other stations.¹² By 1570, "Newchwang Station" was established between the stations of Haizhou and Shaling (沙嶺), about 80 li apart.¹³ By the early seventeenth century, with an addition of a "Sanchahe Station" (*Sanchaheyi*三叉河驛), the distance between stations was shortened to around 50 li.¹⁴

As a post station, Newchwang served not only the Ming officials but also the Korean scholar-gentry who passed through on their way to pay tribute to Beijing on behalf of the Korean Kingdom.¹⁵ Through the writings of the scholar-gentry, one can glean more details about Newchwang Station. According to Lee Seungso (李承召), there were clerks at the station's gate, stablemen for the horses,

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- 10) Bi, Gongxiu (畢恭修) and Ren, Luo (任洛) (et. al. comp.) (2005). *Liaodongzhi* (Gazetteer of Liaodong遼東志). Beijing 北京: Xianzhuang Shuju線裝書局, p. 46; Wang, Shunan, Wu, Tingxie and Jin, Yufu (comp.) (1983). *Op. cit.*, Vol. 87, p. 9. Yang, Yang (楊陽) (1988). *Mingdai Liaodong Dusi* (The Liaodong Commander Board in Ming Dynasty明代遼東都司). Zhengzhou鄭州: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe中州古籍出版社, pp. 158-160, 165-168.
- 11) Yang, Yang (楊陽) (1988). *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-160, 165-168.
- 12) Bi, Gongxiu (畢恭修) and Ren, Luo (任洛) (et. al. comp.) (2005). *Op. cit.*, p. 266.
- 13) Huang, Bian (黃汴), annotated by Yang, Zhengtai (楊正泰) (2006). *Yitong Lucheng Tuji* (Mapping of the unified roads 一統路程圖記), in Yang Zhengtai (楊正泰), *Mingdai Yizhankao* (An investigation of the post stations in the Ming Dynasty明代驛站考), enlarged edition. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe上海古籍出版社, Appendix 2, pp. 195-292, particularly p 197 and p. 233.
- 14) Dan, Yizi (憺漪子) (ed.) (1992). *Tianxia Lucheng Tuyin* (Roadmap of all roads under heaven and earth天下路程圖引) in Yang, Zhengtai (楊正泰) (ed. and annotated). "Tianxia Shuilu Lucheng," "Tianxia Lucheng Tuyin," and "Keshang Yilan Xingmi" (Distances of roads by water and on land under heaven and earth 天下水陸路程; Roadmap of all roads under heaven and earth 天下路程圖引; A list of reminders for sojourning merchants客商一覽醒迷). Taiyuan太原: Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe山西人民出版社, pp. 354-514, particularly p. 485.
- 15) Zhang, Cunwu (張存武) (1978). *Qing-Han Zongfan Maoyi* (Tributary trade between Qing and Korea清韓宗藩貿易). Taipei臺北: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica中央研究院近代史研究所, unpaginated. On the relationship between the Kingdom of Korea and the Ming and Qing Empires, see Zhang, Shizun (張士尊) (2012). *Niudai: Ming-Qing Liangdai Zhong-Chao Jiaotong Kao* (Bondage: An investigation on the communications between China and Korea during the Ming and Qing Dynasties紐帶——明清兩代中朝交通考). Harbin哈爾濱: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe黑龍江人民出版社, pp. 56-64; Wang, Wei (王薇), Yang, Xiaolei (楊效雷) and Wu, Zhenqing (吳振清) (2002). *Zhong-Chao Guanxishi* (History of the Sino-Korean relations中朝關係史). Beijing北京: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe世界知識出版社, pp. 94-95.

as well as servants for fire, tea and food.¹⁶⁾ Water from the springs tasted so bad that people mostly relied upon snow for drinking water.¹⁷⁾ Meanwhile, some Ming sources reveal that there were sedan chairs and their bearers, nearly a hundred-strong gathered in two days on demand.¹⁸⁾

Besides being a post on land, the Newchwang Station's vicinity to Liao River estuary made it a maritime outpost of the Liaodong military commander of the Ming Empire.¹⁹⁾ A custom station, named "Liangfangkou Guan" (梁房口關), was formed as a connection between the riverine and maritime transport.²⁰⁾ Meanwhile, it also performed as the nodal point for military logistics of the Ming Empire and in transshipping supplies from the sea.²¹⁾ With a bridge at Sanchahe,²²⁾ the "Newchwang Station" had access to riverine, maritime and overland modes of transport.

Other than forming part of the military supply chains and intermodular transport, Newchwang Station during the Ming (and Qing) periods featured open fields for horse-rearing herders as well as boatmen for fishing activities. In spring and summer, the Liao River flooded, rendering land transport almost impossible, except regional passages along the Ming's Great Wall.²³⁾ In winter, when the Liao River was frozen over, most overland and riverine traffic subsided.²⁴⁾

16) Poem written by Lee, Seungso (李承召, 1422-1484), in his *Samtanjip* (Collections on *Samtan*三灘集), database searched at "Hanguok Gojeon Jonghap DB" (Korean Classics General Database韓國古典綜合DB), last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

17) Travel notes by Choi, Rip (崔崑, 1539-1612), in his *Gan-i-jip* (Collected works of *Gan-i*簡易集), in which Choi talked about the poor quality of water in Newchwang, database searched at "Hanguok Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

18) Yang, Yang (1988), *Op. cit.*, p. 168.

19) *Ibid.*, p. 166.

20) Ibahan (伊把漢) and others, comp. (1684). *Shengjing Tongzhi* (The gazetteer of Shengjing 盛京通志) (Unknown publication location: Publisher unknown, 1684 edition, deposited with Kyoto University Library), Vol. 11, p. 2.

21) Wang, Shunan, Wu, Tingxie and Jin, Yufu (comp.) (1983), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 76, p. 62.

22) Ibahan and others, comp. (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 11, p. 2.

23) Travel notes of Lee, Sugwang (李晔光, 1563-1628) mentioned about the inconvenience in the vicinity of Newchwang, in his *Ji-bongjip* (Collected works on *Ji-bong*芝峯集). In his *Gan-i-jip*, Choi Rip mentioned in his travel notes that it was difficult to use the water transport in the vicinity of Newchwang, which worked similar to the previous periods. All database searched at "Hanguok Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

24) Shin, Yong-gae (申用漑, 1463-1519) used his poems to describe the winter transports in Newchwang, in Shin, Yong-gae, *I-lak-jeongjip* (Collected works of *I-lak-jeong*二樂亭集). So, Seyang (蘇世讓, 1486-1562) in his poem, *Yang-gokjip* (Collected works in *Yang-gok*陽谷集) also mentioned about the environment of Newchwang, including the Great Wall, the meadows, the fishing boats). All database searched at "Hanguok Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

III. The Fortress

Newchwang rose as the Ming Empire transformed it into a fortress in the war against the Jurchens (later renamed Manchus) during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.²⁵⁾ Bandits spread along the roads and trails connecting different stations,²⁶⁾ leading as is claimed to a decline in ordinary business.²⁷⁾ Danger from all sides also lurked in the open spaces during daytime.²⁸⁾ The fortress at Newchwang eventually fell into the hands of the Jurchen army.²⁹⁾ It was first rebuilt in 1623 under the order of Nurgaci (努爾哈赤), the Jurchens' first ruler against the Ming.³⁰⁾ Hong Taichi/Taiji (皇太極), the second Jurchen ruler, ordered to rebuild the Newchwang fortress in 1629, raised its walls to more than 2 *zhang* (丈) and 2 *chi* (尺), and reinforced its defense with four additional towers.³¹⁾ According to a late-eighteenth-century description, the fortress's "circumference was two li and 93 steps,"³²⁾ featuring three gates in the east, north and west, but not in the south as this side was close to the seashore.

As an upgraded fortress near the Liao River, Newchwang served the Jurchen in battle, such as for launching assaults on and in repelling Ming warships, or building warships of their own for the

25) A Fortress Guard Commander was appointed there in 1621. The fortress was used by the Jurchen to deter the attacks from the Ming in 1627. See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp.52-1; Ibahan and others, (comp.) (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 14, p. 14. On the wars between the Ming and the Jurchens/Manchus, and the subsequent Qing conquests, see Li, Gertraude Roth (2002). "State Building before 1644," in Willard J. Peterson, ed., *The Cambridge History of China Volume 9 Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, 9-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Rowe, William T. (2009). *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp. 11-30.

26) Huang Bian, annotated by Yang Zhengtai (2006), *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

27) Choi Rip's travel notes mentioned that the Newchwang Post Station had been rising in military importance. This development consequently impacted the economic life of the common people nearby, and even upon the Korean kingdom. All database searched at "Hanguok Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

28) Lee, Homin (李好閔, 1553-1634) in his poetry, *O-bongjip* (Collected works of *O-bong* 五峯集), mentioned that Newchwang's vicinity suffered from increasing tension in military affairs. All database searched at "Hanguok Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

29) Fortress Guard Commander was appointed there in 1621. The fortress was used by the Jurchen to deter the attacks by the Ming in 1627. See Ibahan and others (comp.) (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 14, p. 14; Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 52.

30) Wang, Shunan, Wu, Tingxie and Jin, Yufu (comp.) (1983), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 87, p. 9.

31) Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 70.

32) Ibahan and others (comp.) (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 10, p. 4.

Jurchens.³³⁾ Besides, the Newchwang garrison forces fought against the Mongolian forces in the region.³⁴⁾ They also coordinated with other fortresses to capture the Ming smugglers disguised as fishermen with fishing boats.³⁵⁾ The strategic importance of the Newchwang fortress can be observed by the fact that a Jurchen/Manchu Prince Ajige (阿濟格) (a doroi giyvn wang 多羅武英郡王 rank of prince) was appointed to the fortress as commander.³⁶⁾ Newchwang's fortress also sheltered the various Jurchen/Manchu troops when the Liao River was frozen.³⁷⁾ When the major Ming city of Jinzhou fell into Manchu hands in 1642, the Newchwang fortress became an entry point for surrendered Ming subjects to become Manchus under the Qing's jurisdiction.³⁸⁾

In 1644, the Manchus entered Shanhaiguan (山海關), took over Beijing as their new imperial capital, and in the next few years they practically evacuated most of the Manchus and their subjects into the original Ming Empire's jurisdictions,³⁹⁾ and reshuffled the pre-1644 military personnel arrangements in Manchuria. Nevertheless, despite the conquest and moving into the new imperial capital, the Qing court maintained their original capital-city of Shenyang (瀋陽), or now renamed Shengjing (盛京), as the adjunct imperial capital (*peidu* 陪都). It had all the needed bureaucratic and military personnel ready for the Manchu emperor to return in a real withdrawal from "China" if the Han people pushed him back.

Accordingly, after 1644 the Newchwang fortress transformed into part of the Manchurian establishment centred at Shengjing. Initially, the Newchwang fortress and its Manchu garrison remained intact, with an additional Liaodong-tied Han soldiers also present.⁴⁰⁾ According to one

33) For example, in 1633, Newchwang's troops participated in a coordinated attack on the Ming's marine forces on the Peninsular. In the same year, Newchwang's forces also built 16 war ships. See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 209-210. Eight war ships were later stationed at Newchwang, see anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 360.

34) For example, some Mongolian forces invaded the vicinity of Newchwang in 1636. See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 352.

35) For example, see the coordinated attacks in 1636, ending with the capture of 32 people and confiscation of silk products. See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 387.

36) For example, in late 1636, when the name of the state was changed to "Qing," Prince Ajige was sent to Newchwang. This prince led the local garrison to attack the Ming troops in the vicinity in 1637. See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 409 and 520.

37) See the military operation in 1637. See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 422.

38) See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 807 and p. 822.

39) On the movement of the Manchus into the Ming Empire to establish garrison forces of the Eight Banners Army, see Im, Kaye Soon (Ren Guichun 任桂淳) (1993). *Qingchao Baqi Zhufang Xingshuaishi* (History of rise and decline of the Eight Banners Garrisons in the Qing Dynasty 清朝八旗駐防興衰史). Beijing: Sanlian Shudian 三聯書店, pp. 2-19.

40) See anon. (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 75.

estimate, by 1659, Newchwang together with five other major fortresses and walled-cities counted about 1,100 soldiers in the garrison.⁴¹⁾ This implies that each place had on average less than 200 men in the garrison.

In 1662, the Prefect of Fengtian claimed that in Ming times Newchwang divided Manchuria into two regions, one covered the land-frontier defense, while the other the maritime defense.⁴²⁾ We do not know the subsequent development of this official's claim. Still, in 1682, a sub-commander of the patrols (*xunjian fenzhu* 巡檢分駐) was appointed to the fortress, which now became the main base of the local garrison-patrol.⁴³⁾

Though Newchwang was located close to the sea, and despite its role in constructing war ships for the Qing government during the Ming-Qing war, it did not develop into a naval base. In 1745, the Board of War (*bingbu* 兵部) upgraded the patrol force of the Liaodong Peninsula to a naval squadron (*shuishu* 水師) where five war ships were stationed. According to the Board's ruling, that squadron was located at Lushun (旅順), a larger port than Newchwang that is located at the southwestern tip of the peninsula. The Board also ruled that the naval forces should have an annual drill. The army at Newchwang together with seven other fortresses and cities, moreover, should also conduct drills every three years under the supreme command of the Fengtian General.⁴⁴⁾

The garrison at Newchwang grew throughout the first hundred years of Qing history. The estimated "fewer-than-200-men" garrison of 1659 doubled to 400 bannermen by 1748.⁴⁵⁾ In 1751, the Qing government redesignated the top official of Newchwang from a *zhangyin zhangjing* (掌印章京) to the rank of *fangshouwei* (防守尉).⁴⁶⁾ The former represented a rank in the central government while the latter apply to a local level. Change in Newchwang's bureaucratic ranking implies a relative decline of Shengjing's military importance in the Manchurian region.⁴⁷⁾ Even so, throughout

41) Wei, Ying (魏影) (2009). *Qingdai Jingqi Huitun Wenti Yanjiu* (A study of the problems of the colony-settlements of the returned bannermen from Beijing in the Qing Dynasty清代京旗回屯問題研究). Harbin哈爾濱: Heilongjiang Daxue Chubashe黑龍江大學出版社, p. 11.

42) See anon. (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 64.

43) Wang, Shunan, Wu, Tingxie and Jin, Yufu (comp.) (1983), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 87, p. 9.

44) See anon. (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 12, p. 287.

45) See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, p. 46.

46) See anon. (1985), *Ibid.*, Vol. 14, p. 209.

47) Regarding Shengjing's defense networks, see Lu, Haiying (陸海英) (2002). Peidu Shengjing Qiren Chengfen Kaoshi – Jianlun Shengjing Baqi Zhufang de Chongjian (An analytical study of the composition of the Bannermen in the adjunct capital Shengjing --- A supplementary discussion on the reconstruction of Shengjing's Eight Banners defense陪都盛京奇人成分考述---兼論盛京八旗駐防的重建), in Zhi, Yunting (支運亭) (ed.), *Baqishidu yu Manzu Wenhua* (The Eight

the eighteenth century these positions were filled with bannermen who formed the backbone of the Qing Empire's military prowess and became a hereditary title in Manchuria under the Eight Banner System.

IV. The Passage

Once resistance had been pacified by the early 1680s, Newchwang's broader role in the Qing Empire changed. As part of the defense networks of the Jurchen/Manchu military, Newchwang under the Qing served the emperor as a stop between Manchuria and the imperial capital when paying ancestral-worship visits. For example, in 1682, the Kangxi Emperor spent an evening in Newchwang on his return trip from a visit to Shengjing where he had conducted ancestral worship. On that occasion, the emperor reportedly killed a tiger with an arrow.⁴⁸⁾ Although the Newchwang fortress did not host the Manchu emperors for such evenings in subsequent years, its position along the road to Shengjing continued, and for this reason the garrison was maintained.

Newchwang's newfound role in guarding the route to Shengjing for imperial ancestral worship also appealed to others who also began to visit it for safety along the route. The Korean scholar-gentry or official envoys also lodged at Newchwang as their predecessors had during the Ming times. Some, such as Lee Yo (李滄), a Korean official during the early Qing, mentioned his delivery of gifts to his Manchu counterparts at Newchwang en route to Beijing.⁴⁹⁾ Another Korean official Park Sedang (朴世堂[1629-1703]) expressed his appreciation over lodging at Newchwang, regarding it as a place of warmth in the frigid Liao River region.⁵⁰⁾ Many others wrote numerous poems mentioning

Banners System and Manchu culture 八旗制度與滿族文化), 234-246. Shenyang: Liaoning Minzu Chubanshe 遼寧民族出版社; regarding the banners' hereditary status, particularly p. 240. Regarding the Manchu occupation forces across the Empire, see Elliot, Mark C. (2001). *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 89-132.

48) See anon. (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 27.

49) Lee, Yo (李滄, 1622-1658), "Yeon-do-gihaeng" (燕途紀行), in *Song-gyejip* (Collected works of Song-gye 松溪集), database searched at "Hanguk Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

50) Park, Sedang (朴世堂, 1629-1703), *Seo-gyejip* (Collected works of Seo-gye 西溪集), all database searched at "Hanguk Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

Newchwang, in passing or otherwise.⁵¹⁾

More importantly, beside serving as a safe passage for the emperors and the diplomatic envoys, Newchwang under the Manchus also played a part in the trade facilitating the economic development of Manchuria. Because Newchwang continued to function as a customs post, much of the wealth and commodities of Manchuria would have passed through the settlement during the Qing period. Historians have well documented that alongside with the long-established high-value Chinese medicine and fur trade, Manchuria gradually gained its reputation among traders for its soya bean exports, especially along the Liao River of South Manchuria long before the region opened to foreign trade in 1860.⁵²⁾ A trade network connected Newchwang, Shanghai, Tianjin, and several ports along the coast of the Shandong Province. Beans and bean cakes served the needs of farmers in the Yangzi Delta and along the southeast coast of China.⁵³⁾

At the regional level, Newchwang performed the role of distribution centre for paddy and rice from Shandong to its neighbouring cities, such as Fenghuangcheng (鳳凰城) and Liaoyang (遼陽) in the late seventeenth century.⁵⁴⁾ This worked within the tributary grain trade that developed along the Grand Canal.⁵⁵⁾ Together with the adjacent imperial capital in Manchuria, that trade encompassed

51) For example, Min, Jeongjung (閔鼎重, 1628-1692) in his travel notes, “Yeonhaeng-ilgi” (Diary in Yeonhaeng-ilgi 燕行日記), in *No-bongjip* (Collected works of No-bong 老峯集); Nam, Yongik (南龍翼, 1628-1692), “Yeonhaenglok” (燕行錄), in *Hogokjip* (Collected works of Hogok 壺谷集); Kim, Chang-eop (金昌業, 1658-1721), “Yeonhaenghoonjilok” (燕行墳簞錄), in *Noga jaejip* (Collected works of Nogajae 老稼齋集) in *Noga jaejip* (Collected works of Nogajae 老稼齋集); Cho, Munmyeong (趙文命, 1680-1732), Siyeonhaenglok (詩燕行錄), in Hak-eom Jip (Collected works of Hak-eom 鶴巖集); Cho, Susam (趙秀三, 1762-1849), Si (詩), *Chujajip* (Collected works of Chujajae 秋齋集); Cho, Dusun (趙斗淳, 1796-1870), Si (詩), *Sim-eom-yugo* (Posthumous works of Sim-eom 心庵遺稿). All from database searched at “Hangook Gojeon Jonghap DB,” last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

52) Yang, Yulian (楊余練), Wang, Gesheng (王革生) (et. al.) (1991). *Qingdai Dongbeishi* (History of the Northeast during the Qing times 清代東北史). Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu Chubanshe 遼寧教育出版社, 400-417; Katō, Sigeru (加藤繁) (1973). Kangxi Qianlong Shidai Guanneiwei de Tongshang, (Trade between the inlands and outside the border gates during the Kangxi and Qianlong periods 康熙乾隆時代關內外的通商), in Kato, Sigeru, trans. anonymous, *Zhongguo Jingjishi Kaozheng* (Investigation on the Chinese economic history 中國經濟史考證), vol. 3, 131-148. Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan 商務印書館; Wu, Chengming (吳承明) (1985). *Zhongguo Zibenzhuyi yu Guonei Shichang* (China's capitalism and domestic market 中國資本主義與國內市場). Beijing, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社. Wu, Chengming (吳承明) (1985). *Zhongguo Zibenzhuyi yu Guonei Shichang* (China's capitalism and domestic market 中國資本主義與國內市場). Beijing, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 247-265; 272-282.

53) Li, Bozhong, *Op. cit.*, 343-390; Long, Denggao, *Op. cit.*, 81-96.

54) See the imperial record of 1694, Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 771.

55) Regarding the grain trade in Grand Canal, see Cheung, Sui-wai (2008). *The Price of Rice: Market Integration in*

Newchwang and the Bohai (渤海) region. Besides, Newchwang witnessed the promotion of trade between Manchuria and Korea. In 1680, a Korean record explains that sheep were exported to Newchwang in great numbers.⁵⁶⁾ In the following decades, Newchwang worked with another post station, Fenghuangcheng, to attract cloth merchants from Shandong from across the sea, cotton merchants from other Manchurian cities overland, and silk merchants from Beijing, turning Fenghuangcheng into a prosperous city, crowded with fancy-dressed merchants, shops, and their horses, trolleys and houses.⁵⁷⁾

Being situated along a confluence of trade routes, Newchwang also witnessed a number of events relating to legitimate and illegitimate economic activities in the grain trade. Starting with 1732 a government warehouse/storage was built in Newchwang.⁵⁸⁾ Such a storage was primarily used by local officials to store the grains passing through Newchwang, but it also belonged to a network of grain storages on the Liaodong Peninsula that gave the opportunity to the local bannermen to borrow grain for sale and profit in time of good harvests.⁵⁹⁾ Although the central government in Beijing established rules for these storages in 1747,⁶⁰⁾ they were still likely to become instruments of embezzlement. To reduce the risk of embezzlement, therefore, the Board of Revenue in Shengjing ruled in 1754 that all clerical staff at the storage facilities must be rotated out every five years.⁶¹⁾ By 1765, another storage was added in Newchwang, evidently a step that aimed at reinforcing the locale's role in the grain trade.⁶²⁾ Interestingly, the emperor received reports about these storage facilities from that included transportation costs down to the different types of grain that were being stored.⁶³⁾ Any violation of the rules on part of the officials in charge was investigated.⁶⁴⁾

Meanwhile, it would appear that the garrisons imposed illegal duties to milk the merchants who

Eighteenth-Century China. Washington: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University.

56) Yejo-jeonhyangsa (禮曹典享司) [Korean], comp., *Sang-eonseunglok* (Collected speeches of His Majesty 上言謄錄), 1649-1743 part, 1680, <http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr/COM>, last visit, 2014/11/2.

57) Lee, Jeongsin (李正臣, 1660-1727), "Yeonhaenglok", in *Yak-ong-yugo* (The posthumous works of *Yak-ong* 樸翁遺稿), database searched at "Hanguk Gojeon Jonghap DB," last visit, <http://db.itkc.or.kr>, 2014/10/28.

58) See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 8, p. 443.

59) *Ibid.*, Vol. 12, p. 886.

60) *Ibid.*, Vol. 12, p. 886.

61) *Ibid.*, Vol. 14, p. 1013.

62) *Ibid.*, Vol. 18, p. 149.

63) *Ibid.*, Vol. 18, p. 741.

64) For example, see *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, pp. 382-384, 386-388, 402-404.

were passing through Newchwang. As late as 1741, some supervisory officials were despatched to Newchwang and other locations in order to keep an eye on the fortress commanders.⁶⁵⁾ In 1762, the Board of Punishment in Shengjing ruled that, should these supervisory officials attempt to illegally extort money from the merchants passing through Newchwang or its nearby ports, they would be severely punished.⁶⁶⁾ Later, Newchwang's port and storage continued to play a part in the throughput of grain from the sea to Shengjing.⁶⁷⁾ Meanwhile, illegal duties continued to be levied and remained a problem.⁶⁸⁾

V. The Dwellers

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the trade, throughput and storage at Newchwang involved the state, officials, or commanders, without much involvement on part of the ordinary subjects. Still, Newchwang was home not only to the fortress and military personnel, but also to a settlement comprising different peoples who lived as the “civilian population” at the fortress.

Before turning to elaborate on the population in more detail, it must be emphasized that the walled city of Newchwang only had a circumference of “two li and 93 steps”⁶⁹⁾ In other words, it enclosed a small space. The three gates mentioned in the eighteenth-century description located to the east, north and west sides of the fortress enabled traffic through and within the walled city. The wall and buildings characterized the locale well into the twentieth century. This is evidenced by a US military map published in the mid-twentieth century which contains information on Manchuria of the 1930s.⁷⁰⁾ On this map, the main roads within Newchwang (“Niu-chuang”) spanned ran along an east-west axis, with secondary roads spanning north to south. No road led out of the city walls in the south.

The question now invariably arises: Who were the residents of Newchwang apart from the

65) *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 932.

66) *Ibid.*, Vol. 17, p. 462.

67) For example, see *Ibid.*, Vol. 18, p. 741; Vol. 22, p. 243.

68) *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, pp. 382-384.

69) *Ibahan* and others (comp.) (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 10, p. 4.

70) Army Map Service (PV), Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, (comp.) (1956). *Ying-k'ou, China*. Washington, D. C.: Army Map Service (PV), Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army.

400-men-strong garrison force mentioned above? There is not much evidence to substantiate an answer, though an entry in the *Qing Shilu* (The Verifiable Records of the Qing Dynasty清實錄) from 1747 is revealing:

“[The emperor] informed the Military-Intelligence Ministers (*junjidachen*軍機大臣) that, according to the memorial of Daledanga (達勒當阿), the locale of Newchwang in the Fengtian Prefecture suffered from rising rice prices because of the poor harvest last year. As the *zhangjing* Itu (章京 伊圖) ordered, grains were not allowed to be sold in other cities. The ordinary people therefore tried to intercept and seize carts carrying grains in transit to other cities. Later, the same *zhangjing* Itu despatched soldiers to escort those carts in transit to leave the fortress and prevent them from being intercepted again. As a result, some stone masons, including Wang Junbo (王君弼) and others, hit the gong on the street, in an attempt to again intercept those carts leaving the fortress. The patrol commander, Hong Kui (洪魁), heard of the event and was furious about the unrestrained actions of Wang Junbo and others. Even the living quarters of the patrol commander and *zhangjing* Itu were all barricaded by them. At present, officials have been sent to thoroughly investigate the unrest and suppress it without delay……”⁷¹⁾

In this passage, only two kinds of people were mentioned by occupation, namely the top officials of the fortress and the stonemasons. Apart from the stonemasons, there might have been the logistic workers who looked after the carts entering into the fortress and its storages. We do not know how many people were arrested for inciting the unrest, and yet, their numbers must have been sufficiently large to barricade the residence of Newchwang’s two top officials and to block the main roads within the walled city. Obviously, their life was seriously impacted by the rise in rice and grain prices and the unstable food supplies. Nonetheless, as the top official, *zhangjing*, served the needs of a wider network of grain collection and trade beyond the locale,⁷²⁾ and the carts which carried the grains had not been placed under Newchwang’s jurisdiction.

Apart from the officials, the stonemasons, and the workers engaged in transport and logistics, Newchwang hosted some groups of people who might work outside the fortress. An early 1779 entry of the *Qing Shilu* reveals that there were shops involved in maritime trade that also extended loans

71) See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 12, p. 831.

72) It is interesting to see that Newchwang’s top official had conflict with other officials on the matters regarding the transits of carts carrying grains. See *Ibid.*, Vol. 14, p. 983.

to some officials.⁷³⁾ The number of shops might not have been numerous, as Gaizhou, another walled city larger than Newchwang, only counted three shops near the sea.⁷⁴⁾ And yet, these shops still managed to lend an impressive number of silver taels to some officials in Newchwang as well as two other walled cities.

Nonetheless, beside the urban residents identified and discussed thus far, Newchwang was also home to people who were related through personal ties to the members of the garrison force. Another entry of the *Qing Shilu* dating from 1748 describes the following groups within Newchwang's jurisdiction:

“The General of Shengjing, Daledanga, memorialized that unlike the other provinces, the military officials of Shengjing was in charge of not only the affairs of soldiers. For example, in Jinzhou (錦州), Guangning (廣寧), Liaoyang, Newchwang and Gaizhou, these five fortresses spread over wide borders. Within those borders, there resided those colony-settlements of the Booi (*baoyi tunzhuang*包衣屯莊) of Shengjing's Board of Revenue, headmen of estates (*zhuangtou*莊頭) of the princes, colony-workers (*tunding*屯丁) of the estates of the Boards and Ministries, and bannermen, etc. As they all mingled together, they have legal conflicts on and off.”⁷⁵⁾

Among the four main groups living under the jurisdiction of Newchwang together with four other fortresses, there existed the Booi servants, the headmen of estates, the colony-workers of the estates, as well as the bannermen. Their existence reveals the underlying structure of Newchwang as a fortress and as a walled city. They served the economic needs of the garrison, the nobility, the emperor's court and government. They consisted of either the privileged bannermen and headmen, or those who worked for the privileged or powerful in the Qing politico-social-ethno hierarchy. Accordingly, when problem of conflicts among these different groups was discovered by the Qing court in 1748, the Board of War suggested an answer related directly to the structure's core. It ruled that as these different groups were formed according to the Eight Banner System, each banner's top personnel should be more careful in selecting candidates for promotion. In other words, any conflict of interest should be dealt with within the system. Non-bannermen (or civilian) elements in society did not play a part in this structure. This privileged structure can be clearly exemplified in the question of land, the

73) *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 402.

74) *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 403.

75) *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, p. 72.

topic of the next section.

VI. The Field

The question of land in Newchwang cannot be understood without explaining the use and ownership of land in Manchurian history. It began with a series of arrangements formed during the early days of the Jurchen (Manchu) state. When Nurgaci and his followers established their anti-Ming forces, the Eight Banner System was devised as a way of organizing manpower in military households.⁷⁶⁾ This system was reformed during the reign of Hong Taichi, who defeated the Mongols, Koreans and the so-called “Han” people in Manchuria. The conquered peoples were organized according to the Eight Banners.⁷⁷⁾ In military terms, the bannermen formed the pillar of the Manchu military establishment, won the war against the Ming, and created a Manchu Empire.

The lands in the Manchurian region, therefore, would be arranged in several fashions. First, each of the Eight Banners was headed by a prince, with the exception of two that were personally led by the Manchu Emperor. Under each prince, lands were distributed for farming and animal rearing in order to provide livelihood and secure supplies for the military, including horses and food. These lands were organized into princely estates (*wanggong zhuang* 王公莊) for each prince and royal estates (*huangzhuang* 皇莊) that were placed under the royal household.⁷⁸⁾ Under the princes and the emperor, the Manchu captains and their soldiers were also granted lands with the estates that would not support farming or animal rearing for the military, but were worked to generate cash income. To manage these estates, the Manchu princes and royals instituted the “Booi system” which used the hereditary servants (or bondservants), the Booi (*baoyi* 包衣), who might also possess some estates for

76) On the origin of the Eight Banners System, see Elliot, Mark C. (2001). *The Manchu Way*, pp. 39-88; Yang, Xuechen (楊學琛) and Zhou, Yuanlian (周遠廉), (1986). *Qingdai Baqi Wanggong Guizu Xingshuaisi* (History of the rise and decline of the princes and nobility of the Eight Banners in the Qing Dynasty 清代八旗王公貴族興衰史). Shenyang 瀋陽: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe 遼寧人民出版社, pp. pp. 1-178; on their estates, see 217-242. Zhao Zhiqiang (趙志強) (2002). Baqi yu Baqi Zidi (The Eight Banners and the Eight Banners’ Sons 八旗與八旗子弟), in Zhi, Yunting (支運亭) (ed.), *Baqishidu yu Manzu Wenhua* (The Eight Banners System and Manchu culture 八旗制度與滿族文化), 74-88. Shenyang: Liaoning Minzu Chubanshe 遼寧民族出版社, in Zhi, Yunting (ed.), *Baqishidu yu Manzu Wenhua*, pp. 74-88.

77) Yang, Xuechen and Zhou, Yuanlian (1986), *Op. cit.*, pp. 73-98.

78) *Ibid.*, pp. 217-242.

their own household.⁷⁹⁾

Beside the Booi, there existed the “headman” (*zhuangtou*莊頭) who organized the work force. They were responsible for collecting profits or resources from the estate grants.⁸⁰⁾ These “headmen” were entitled to have their own property, and shared the profits with the princes or the royal household. They were also responsible for ensuring that the grantees fulfilled their obligations and that taxes were paid.⁸¹⁾ In other words, the “headmen” fulfilled a function akin to a tax-farmer.

The land system was modified after 1644. Many bannermen households left from Manchuria as a result of the decree by the Shunzhi Emperor passed in the mid-seventeenth century. They supported the pacification of anti-Manchu resistance. In Manchuria the original estates of the princes and the royal household remained intact, but additional lands were placed under the control of the adjunct imperial capital Shengjing. In this way Shengjing mirrored Beijing, but it needed to raise additional income from the lands. Therefore, Shengjing’s government agencies, especially the six boards and the Fengtian General’s office, held lands and estates that fulfilled this purpose.⁸²⁾ These new estates were organized as “grain estates” (*liangzhuang*糧莊) or “grain-paying estates” (*naliangzhuang*納糧莊) as they had to provide the grain, hay, and other supplies for the government in Shengjing. Near Beijing there were estates which paid their tribute in silver rather than in kind (i.e. the so-called “silver-payment estates” [*nayinzhuang*納銀莊]). Such estates, however, did not exist in Manchuria.⁸³⁾

To support the operations of these estates, the Manchu “banner land system” deployed organized labour, the “estate workers” (*zhuangding*莊丁), who might also be the so-called “colony-workers” (*tunding*屯丁) mentioned *Qing Shilu* for 1748.⁸⁴⁾ These “estate workers” laboured under the Booi or

79) *Ibid.*, pp. 226-229. Regarding the Booi, also see Hsieh, Bao Hua (2014). *Concubinage and Servitude in Late Imperial China*. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 73-86.

80) Yi, Baozhong (衣保中), Chen Yufeng (陳玉峰) and Li Fan (李帆) (1992). *Qingdai Manzhou Tudizhidu Yanjiu* (A study of the land system in Manchuria of the Qing Dynasty清代滿洲土地制度研究). Changchun長春: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe吉林文史出版社, pp. 104-108.

81) Lai, Hui-min (賴惠敏) (1997). *Tianhuang Guizhou: Qing Huangzu de Jiezeng Jiegou yu Jingji Shenghuo* (The Qing imperial lineage: Its hierarchical structure and economic life 天潢貴胄：清皇族的階層結構與經濟生活). Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, pp. 166-167.

82) Diao, Shuren (刁書仁) and Yi, Xingguo (衣興國) (1994). *Jinsanbainian Dongbei Tudi Kaifzshi* (History of land development in Northeast in the last three hundred years近三百年東北土地開發史). Changchun長春: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe吉林文史出版社, pp. 151-163.

83) Yi, Baozhong, Chen Yufeng and Li Fan (1992), *Op. cit.*, pp. 173-181.

84) And yet the “colony-workers (*tunding*)” appeared only once in the *Qing Shilu*, *Op. cit.*, records concerning Newchwang. Nor does it appear in the researches on the Eight Banner System.

the headmen. They could represent unfree labour and comprised both Manchus and the “Han,” as some have suggested.⁸⁵⁾ Nonetheless, as Hui-min Lai suggests, these workers came from different backgrounds.⁸⁶⁾ First, they could be farm workers who voluntarily joined with the Manchu estates in the early days of the Qing. Second, some might have had a criminal background whose lives were spared but had been stripped of their titles or property as a punishment. Third, some might represent direct descendants of another “estate headmen.” Apart from these state-run or royal estates, the princely estates also recruited their own estate workers in the same system. Nonetheless, once they were recruited as “estate workers,” they would have an entry in the records of the estate. They served as part of the workforce, received benefits from qualifying lands, and paid the head tax as required.⁸⁷⁾ As many of them had a family ties, a stable labour force could be mobilized for these banner lands in the eighteenth century. In short, the bannermen system blended different ethnic groups in the early seventeenth century, but remained primarily a Manchu institution in substance. Its objective was to preserve the social, economic, and political status of the ruling circles through privileges and power.

As part of the socio-political structures of the Qing in Manchuria, the Newchwang fortress and its jurisdiction were assigned plots of land as “grain estates,” mainly with an eye on meeting the needs of the garrison. As reported by the local gazetteer for 1684, the estate was located 240 li away from the fortress without, however, specifying its size.⁸⁸⁾ Another archival source suggests that in 1749, the expanse of the “grain estates” (of the royal household or the Shengjing government) under Newchwang’s jurisdiction amounted to more than 83,820 mu, and as such was the fifth largest among ten.⁸⁹⁾ These lands were organized as “grain estates” for the Shengjing government, each managed by an estate headmen, and worked by *tunding* (屯丁). These estates paid tribute in kind to the government in Shengjing that included grain and hay. Surpluses generated by the estates would be used for the benefit of the bannermen. Therefore, any headmen who failed to meet the grain quota would be dismissed by the Booi.⁹⁰⁾ By the same token, when a capable headman passed away, his

85) Diao, Shuren and Yi, Xingguo (1994). *Op. cit.*, p. 156; Liu Xiaomeng (劉小萌) (2001). *Manzu cong Buluo dao Guojia de Fazhan* (Development of the Manchus from tribes to nation滿族從部落到國家的發展) Shenyang瀋陽: Liaoning Minzu Chubanshe遼寧民族出版社, pp. 318-319.

86) Lai, Hui-min (1997). *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

87) *Ibid.*, pp. 172-176.

88) Ibahan and others (comp.) (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 18, p. 14

89) Yi, Baozhong, Chen Yufeng and Li Fan (1992), *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

90) For example, one case occurred in 1705, when the Booi dismissed and replaced a headman because he had failed to meet his tribute quota. See Liaoningsheng Dang’anguan (遼寧省檔案館), (comp.) (1993). *Shengjing Neiwufu*

descendants would also be considered the best choice as successor.⁹¹⁾

With reference to the estates of the Eight Banners princes in Newchwang, the records are less specific. It is reported that one of the Manchu banner princely families possessed 9,000 mu of land in Newchwang, Gaiping and Shenyang.⁹²⁾ Another notable banner princely family was reportedly to have more than 10,000 mu in both Hebei province and Manchuria, including Newchwang.⁹³⁾ Alongside with the Manchu banner princes, Newchwang and other Manchurian fortresses also had some notable princes of the “Han Eight Banners” who were former Ming generals or officials, but served the Manchus before 1644. For instance, the Fan family of Fan Wencheng (范文成) is said to have possessed 2,154 mu of estates around Newchwang, and had more substantial holdings while in ten other locations in Manchuria.⁹⁴⁾

Beside the various kinds of state-run and princely-owned banner lands, individual bannermen could also apply for banner land in the name of an individual or a household. Early Qing policy permitted the Manchus to develop land in Manchuria without much restriction. The local gazetteer of 1684 reports that the size of the banner lands under Newchwang’s jurisdiction amounted to 168,684 mu.⁹⁵⁾ These lands must have included the holdings of both the bannermen serving the local garrison as well as those serving other in places. According to another local gazetteer for 1693, the Newchwang garrison itself held only 58,804 mu of banner lands, which was increased to 140,897 mu by 1728.⁹⁶⁾ For the late seventeenth century, the Fengtian Prefecture recorded 7,005,264 mu of banner lands, with Newchwang alone representing 352,824 mu, or 5 per cent.⁹⁷⁾ An official appointed by the government was responsible for supervising land holdings, household registration, and distribution

Liangzhuang Dang'an Huibian (Compilation of archival documents of the grain estates from the Imperial Household in Shengjing盛京內務府糧莊檔案匯編), 2 vols. Shenyang瀋陽: Liaoshen Shushe遼瀋書社, Vol. 1, pp. 225-226.

91) For example, in 1777, it was reported that a headman’s passing away would usually be succeeded by his son, or next on the line of succession to his position. See Liaoningsheng Dang’anguan (comp.) (1993) *Shengjing Neiwufu Liangzhuang Dang’an Huibian*, Vol. 2, pp. 599-600.

92) Yi, Baozhong, Chen Yufeng and Li Fan (1992), *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

93) *Ibid.*, p. 233.

94) *Ibid.*, pp. 241-248

95) *Ibahan* and others (comp.) (1684), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 18, p. 16.

96) Ding, Haibin (丁海斌) and Shi, Yi (時義) (2007). *Qingdai Peidu Shengjing Yanjiu* (A study of the adjunct imperial capital of Shengjing in the Qing Dynasty清代陪都盛京研究). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 中國社會科學出版社, p. 158.

97) Yi, Baozhong, Chen Yufeng and Li Fan (1992), *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

of stipends arising from the lands.⁹⁸⁾ Although these banner lands could not be leased out to ordinary Han farmers as tenants, the original “Han bannermen” could give up their status as bannerman yet retained their lands. They were permitted to sell or to lease these lands and were subject to ordinary taxes.⁹⁹⁾

Despite the privileges enjoyed by the bannermen, their abuse of the system eventually caused changes in the land development in Manchuria. First, bannermen were originally not permitted to use banner lands as collateral for obtaining loans. From the early 1700s on, some bannermen settled in Beijing and lived an extravagant life-style but descended into poverty. Eventually, they mortgaged their lands to meet their expenses.¹⁰⁰⁾ As some of these mortgage transactions took place among the high-ranking bannermen, the Qianlong Emperor took notice and dispensed funds to redeem the land mortgaged by those high-ranking bannermen.¹⁰¹⁾

The Qianlong Emperor took another step in addressing this problem by introducing a new policy that affected the Manchus and Manchuria. Unlike other provinces of the Qing Empire, land development in Manchuria was restricted. Once they had left Manchuria, most Manchus were not permitted to return without express permission. After redeeming the mortgages on banner lands, the Qianlong Emperor encouraged the bannermen to return to Manchuria and engage in government-supported land development.¹⁰²⁾ But the bannermen did not settle at Newchwang where banditry was now becoming rife.¹⁰³⁾

Some headmen of the grain estates also became indebted due to the mismanagement of their estates or tax burden. They too mortgaged their banner lands against the rules. For example, in 1742, a headman within Newchwang’s jurisdiction is said to have illegally mortgaged some estates that had been placed under his management. He did this in order to cover up other mismanaged estates.¹⁰⁴⁾ According to the same report, there were at least seven other headmen in Newchwang, Tieling (鐵嶺)

98) Diao, Shuren and Yi, Xingguo (1994). *Op. cit.*, pp. 126-130.

99) Diao, Shuren and Yi, Xingguo (1994). *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

100) Wei, Ying (2009) *Qingdai Jingqi Huitun Wenti Yanjiu*, pp. 22-25; Yang, Siyuan (楊思遠) (et. al.) (2018). *Manzu Jingjishi* (Economic history of the Manchus 滿族經濟史). Beijing北京: shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe 社會科學文獻出版社, pp. 344-347.

101) Diao, Shuren and Yi, Xingguo (1994). *Op. cit.*, pp. 195-202; Wei, Ying (2009) *Op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

102) See Wei, Ying (2009) *Op. cit.*, pp. 39-80; Diao, Shuren and Yi, Xingguo (1994). *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-102..

103) It was reported in 1841 that some of these returned bannermen were allegedly gathering forces together and turned into bandit groups in Newchwang’s jurisdiction. See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 38, p. 251.

104) Liaoningsheng Dang’anguan (comp.) (1993) *Op. Cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 476-483.

and Guangning also mortgaged 6,000 mu of banner lands contrary to the rules.

It was not clear whether the emperor was adequately aware of the financial problems faced by these estate headmen. Still, he responded to the needs of these bannermen by augmenting the privileges associated with the banner lands. One of these privileges was the exemption from taxes, or alternatively the emperor offered loans to the bannermen in times of crisis or celebration. Although holders of Newchwang's banner lands had already asked Emperor Kangxi for tax exemption in 1702 citing extensive floods as an excuse,¹⁰⁵⁾ such requests had never been approved in earlier times. During the reign of Qianlong, more approvals were issued to forgive taxes due and offer relief on account of natural disasters. Table 1 summarizes entries of the *Qing Shilu* that cite tax exemption for Newchwang's bannermen. The first exemption was granted in 1743 and continued up until the Treaty of Peking in 1860. In most cases, the stated reason for granting exemption was flooding by the Liao River. Though there are valid reasons for providing aid or relief to the victims of flooding, the exemption from taxes aimed at lightening the financial burden on the bannermen in general. This is understandable, for the bannermen at Newchwang represented the political-military backbone of the Qing in this fortress and its surroundings.

<Table 1> Records of Tax Exemption and Relieves of Newchwang, 1743-1859

Year	Reason for Exemption	Explanation
1743	Emperor Qianlong paid royal visit to ancestral tombs in Shengjing	Half of the "tribute grains" (<i>naliang</i> 納糧) for the year to be exempted, with outstanding liabilities from the previous year forgiven. In addition, the head tax on bannermen for the current year waived.
1750	Flooding	Lending of grains to bannermen as relief.
1754	Emperor's mother paid visit to ancestral tombs in Shengjing	Half of the "tribute grains" exempted from bannermen lands; head tax waived.
1777	Flooding	Tax for past year waived.

105) See anon. (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 135.

Year	Reason for Exemption	Explanation
1778	Emperor Qianlong paid visit to ancestral tombs in Shengjing	All of the land and head taxes for the past year waived; tribute grains from the <i>zhuangtou</i> waived. All craftsmen should receive a ration of rice from the local storage; half of the “tribute grains” waived.
1811	Flooding	Grains to bannermen as relief.
1819	Flooding	Lending one-month portion of grains to bannermen as relief.
1820	Flooding	Grains as relief to bannermen affected by flooding during the past year.
1821	Flooding	Bannermen to receive one month worth of grain as relief.
1824	Flooding	“Relief rice” (<i>zhenmi</i> 賑米) to bannermen households.
1826	Flooding	Land tax waived for the year.
1829	Flooding	“Tribute grain” waived for the year; head tax waived for the year; unpaid taxes from previous years forgiven.
1831	Flooding	Bannermen to receive one month worth of grain as relief.
1834	Flooding	Bannermen to receive one month worth of grain as relief. Cash payments to bannermen for house repairs.
1935	Flooding	Bannermen affected by floods to receive grain as relief. Bannermen affected by floods to receive one month worth of grain as relief.
1841	Flooding	Bannermen to receive one month worth of grain as relief.
1842.1	Flooding	Bannermen affected by floods to receive one month worth of grain as relief.
1842.10	Flooding	Bannermen affected by floods in past year to receive one month worth of grain as relief.
1843	Flooding and Typhoon	Land tax deferral for current and previous year for bannermen affected by floods.
1852	Flooding	Deferred or waived land tax for bannermen affected by floods. Loaning of one month worth of grains to bannermen households affected by floods.

Year	Reason for Exemption	Explanation
1853	Flooding	Land tax deferral for bannermen affected by floods.
1856	Flooding	Land tax deferral for bannermen affected by floods.
1859	Flooding and earthquakes	Land tax deferral for bannermen affected by floods. Relief funds for those households that suffered injury or death during earthquake.

Sources: See Anonymous authors (1985), *Qing Shilu*, Vol. 11, pp. 595-596; Vol. 13, p. 1115; Vol. 14, p. 1110; Vol. 22, p. 243; Vol. 23, pp. 466, 893; Vol. 31, p. 211; Vol. 32, pp. 777, 839; Vol. 33, pp. 449, 456; Vol. 34, pp. 142, 820-821; Vol. 35, pp. 475, 1141; Vol. 36, p. 910; Vol. 37, p. 3; Vol. 38, pp. 476, 576, 884, 1126; Vol. 40, p. 954; Vol. 41, p. 664; Vol. 43, p. 291; Vol. 44, p. 344.

The arable land around Newchwang and in Manchuria generally could not be exempted from the illegal land development projects initiated by both the bannermen and the ordinary people in the 1800s. China scholars have retrieved ample evidence in the archives and evidence just how widespread this problem was in Manchuria.¹⁰⁶⁾ The aim of these illegal projects was to avoid payment of land taxes by failing to register land development. Without personnel to supervise, survey or investigate the land registry, both Beijing and Shengjing were unable to thwart such development.¹⁰⁷⁾

In fact, the development, reclamation and utilization of land around Newchwang not only bonded Newchwang to the Manchu privileged classes, but also transformed it from a nodal point in the grain trade into a fortress and settlement that became removed from the coastline. This changing topography of Newchwang realigned its connections with maritime trade and made urban expansion possible.

106) Diao, Shuren and Yi, Xingguo (1994). *Op.cit.*, pp. 74-78.

107) In this respect, a record in 1832 reveals that although the government in both Beijing and Shengjing wanted to check out the lands without registration in Newchwang and its vicinity, the personnel in charge of the task had failed to comply to the royal demand. See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol.36, p. 328.

VII. The Coastlines

The main reason for the changing geomorphology of Newchwang was silting and flooding by the Liao River. Historians of geography in China have debated where the mouth of the river was originally situated, how the river changed its course over time, and how the coastline has changed.¹⁰⁸⁾ Although these debates remain inconclusive, there can be no doubt that silting has extended the land into Bohai Bay. As a result, the fortress is no longer situated at the sea as in earlier times.

Silting was particularly intense around the mid-eighteenth century. In 1743, flooding by the Liao River devastated fifteen locations with banner lands in the Fengtian Prefecture, including Newchwang.¹⁰⁹⁾ Apart from deferring, exempting or forgiving taxes, the government despatched officials in 1744 who discovered that new lands had been created by floods. They discovered a great area of swamp land covering more than six thousand mu in Newchwang's Wudaogou (五道溝) district.¹¹⁰⁾ These newly formed lands became liable for land taxes and raised prospects for further land development.

Silting by the Liao River around Newchwang removed the harbour and coastline away from the settlement and fortress. Evidence to support this can be found in a memorial by Shengjing's Board of Revenue from 1767. Since most of the headmen responsible for the Board's estates were living in Liaoyang (a fortress located between Shengjing and Newchwang) it was suggested that the headmen should take their grains directly to Newchwang to load on ships. Previously they took their grains to Shengjing, paid taxes, and then took their grains to Newchwang.¹¹¹⁾ The report also notes that the

108) Xiao, Zhongchun (肖忠純) (2010). Ming-Qing Shiqi Liaohe Pingyuan Dongbudiqu Hedao Bianqian yu Zhaoze Shidi de Kuozhang (River course transformation and wetland expansion in the eastern Liao River region during the Ming-Qing periods 明清時期遼河平原東部地區河道變遷與沼澤濕地的擴展). *Dongbei Shidi* (東北史地), 4, 76-81; Lu, Huancheng (呂患成) (1994). Ming, Qing, Minguo Shiqi Liaohe Liuyu Lishi Dili Shulue (Overview of historical geography of the Liao River region in the Ming, Qing, and Republican periods 明、清、民國時期遼河流域歷史地理述略). *Songjiang Xuekan Shehuikexueban* (松江學刊社會科學版), 3, 36-41; Zhang, Shizun (張士尊) (2009). Ming-Qing Liangdai Lianghe Xiayou Liuxiangkao (An investigation on the direction of the Liao River's course in the Ming-Qing periods 明清兩代遼河下游流向考). *Dongbei Shidi* (東北史地), 3, 15-22; Li, Guanghua (李光華) and Li Zhongwang (李眾望) (2014). Liaohekou Yanbian Lishi yu Qushi Fenxi (History and tendency analysis of the changes in the Liao River's estuary 遼河口演變歷史與趨勢分析). *Dongbei Shuili Shuidian* (Water Resources & Hydropower of Northeast 東北水利水電), 8, 66-72.

109) See Anonymous authors (1985), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 11, pp. 595-596.

110) *Ibid.*, Vol. 11, p. 830.

111) *Ibid.*, Vol. 18, p. 741.

grains coming from Shengjing or directly from Liaoyang were stored at Newchwang, and from there transported to the harbour (*haiko*海口) located 30 li away. In other words, by 1760, Newchwang was no longer located at the sea.

Later, the growing distance between Newchwang and the coastline fuelled problems of social unrest, piracy and banditry. Although Newchwang and several other fortresses were responsible for coastal security, social unrest was rare before 1775 according to the emperor's intelligence. In this year several underground religious groups were identified in Newchwang, its surroundings as well as in several other fortresses.¹¹²⁾ By 1795, Newchwang had so many cases of banditry that it attracted the attention of Emperor Qianlong. He instructed to conduct more patrols by local military officials.¹¹³⁾ Using Newchwang and other fortresses in suppressing banditry proved ineffective. Fifteen years later inspection squads would patrol the coastlines instead.¹¹⁴⁾

Returning bannermen turned to banditry as well as they found this to be more financially rewarding than working the land.¹¹⁵⁾ Although the government in Shengjing categorically denied that bannermen were involved in banditry, it did admit that certain pirates had positioned themselves along inland waterways and robbed cargoes from fishing boats. By 1850-1851, however, lawlessness had spread across Newchwang and its surroundings, with increasing number of cases in banditry, piracy, robbery, homicide, rape, and illegal mining.¹¹⁶⁾ Like other Manchurian walled cities, Newchwang was unable to enforce law and order along the coasts.

Nonetheless, the "harbour" now located of 30 li away from the settlement and fortress developed into a port city by its own right that benefitted from economic activities that were different from Newchwang's traditional rentier economy of the Eight Banners System. By 1812, grain merchants active between Shandong and Manchuria had their own warehouses that were able to store more than an aggregate 300,000 dan of grain.¹¹⁷⁾ Another record from a decade later intimates that Newchwang's harbour could have a role in the timber trade, connecting the hills and mountains of Manchuria's interior with Bohai Bay.¹¹⁸⁾ By 1832, Newchwang's harbour featured grain warehouses and shops with

112) *Ibid.*, Vol. 21, p. 89.

113) *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 790.

114) *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 177.

115) *Ibid.*, Vol. 38, p. 251.

116) *Ibid.*, Vol. 40, pp. 305, 452, 572.

117) *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 485.

118) *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 833.

an aggregate storage capacity of more than 500,000 dan of grain.¹¹⁹⁾ In 1835, some clerks of the local yamen opened their own offices to collect customs duties for the government¹²⁰⁾ which points toward the growth of customs brokerage. In other words, the harbour was developing all kinds of commercial facilities associated with the grain and timber trade in Manchuria well before the advent of the treaty ports.

Changes in the Liao River are also evident from early twentieth century cartography. A map prepared by a Japanese resident in the city of Yingkow in the late 1920s depicts the Liao River estuary named Sanchaho (*Sanchahe* 三叉河). This can also be found on Ming maps and was probably located at the northwestern edge of the Newchwang fortress (which the map calls “Old Town”).¹²¹⁾ From here the Liao River wound its way to Tienchuangtai (Tianzhuangtai 田莊台). From Tienchuangtai to Yingkou (the “Newchwang Port”), the river was wide and ran a fairly straight course. Seen in this way, Newchwang ended up being situated on an inland waterway full of twists and turns that could only be navigated by skilled pilots.¹²²⁾ Interestingly, the same map shows how efforts had been undertaken to straighten the route between Newchwang and its port by digging a canal (“A Line Extension”), constructing a main road (from “Old Town” to the “Port”) and also by opening two railway lines (Peking-Mukden Railway and South Manchurian Railway). By this stage, Newchwang, which had been a Manchu stronghold on the Liao River, had already declined substantially.

VIII. Preliminary Observations

This article began with the question of what happened to “Newchwang” before “Ying-tsz” was given the identical name in the 1860s. It reconstructs Newchwang’s history as an urban settlement, particularly after its transformation from a post station under the Ming to a Manchu bannermen fortress under the Qing. It has also explored the social fabric of the walled city, highlighting

119) *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 507.

120) *Ibid.*, Vol. 37, pp. 98-99.

121) Nishiyama, Ichisui (西山一穗) (comp.) (1928). *Eikō* (Yingkow營口). Dairen大連: Chū-Ni Bunka Kyōkai中日文化協會, unpaginated but folded between p. 108 and p. 109.

122) Wang, Shunan, Wu, Tingxie and Jin, Yufu (comp.) (1983), *Op. cit.*, Vol. 76, p. 61: also see a stone tablet of the temple of the sea gods, no date but certainly after 1860, in *Ibid.*, Vol. 245, pp. 23-25.

especially the links to the socio-political structures of the Qing Empire, the Eight Banners System and the privileges associated with the latter. Newchwang as a fortress remained, but as a result of silting the coastline moved away from the historic fortress and settlement. A new port emerged that was located a distance away from historic Newchwang.

Although the sparse source materials do not enable a deeper exploration of the ethnic backgrounds of the bannermen in and around the Newchwang fortress,¹²³⁾ it is clear that the bannermen system impacted Newchwang's urban development and determined the size of its population within the walled city. Central to this socio-political structure were the lands granted to the bannermen by the Qing Empire for their services and loyalty to the regime. Ironically, it also limited Newchwang's vision to expand.

The limitations were partially due to the Qing state which acted as a continental power over the original Ming territories together with some additional lands conquered in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹²⁴⁾ To consolidate their hold, the Qing state maintained its military capacity and institutions by emphasizing defenses on land rather than at sea.¹²⁵⁾ As Newchwang was located in the heartland of the Qing and served a gateway to the Manchurian homeland, the military establishment invariably left its imprint on the way local society and urbanity developed. Newchwang shared the status as a bannerman garrison town with other locations nearby.¹²⁶⁾

123) Regarding the bannermen as an ethnic group in general, see Elliott, Mark C. (2006). Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners, in Crossley, Pamela Kyle, Siu, Helen F., and Sutton, Donald S., *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-57. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, pp. 27-57; Crossley, Pamela Kyle (2002). The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire, in Willard J. Peterson (ed.) *Op. cit.*, pp. 310-359. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 310-359; also see Elliot, Mark C. (2001). *Op. cit.*, 275-344.

124) On the expansion of the Qing Empire, see Rowe, William T. (2009), *Op. cit.*, pp. 63-89; Cosmo, Nicola Di. (2016). The Extension of Ch'ing Rule over Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, 1636-1800, in Peterson, Willard J. (ed.) *The Cambridge History of China Volume 9 Part Two: The Ch'ing Dynasty to 1800*, pp. 111-145. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Perdue, Peter C. (2005). *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

125) Of course, that does not mean that the Qing state did not have naval forces, only that their naval force did not have a high-sea fleet, and focused mainly on coast guarding. See Xu, Yuliang (許毓良) (2003). *Qingdai Taiwan de Haifang* (Maritime defense in Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty清代台灣的海防). Beijing北京: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe社會科學文獻出版社.

126) For examples, see Chan, Kai Yiu (2015). Changing Society of Anping and Takow, 1683-1894, in Zheng Yongchang (鄭永常) (ed.) *Dongya Haiyu Wangluo yu Gangshi Shehui* (East-Asian maritime networks and port-city societies東亞海域網絡與港市社會), pp. 163-226. Taipei臺北: Liren Shuju里仁書局. It may also be interesting to compare with the Ming military colonies, see Szonyi, Michael (2017). *The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China*.

This sharply contrasts with the Newchwang that served as a treaty port. Before the treaties, Shanghai and Canton boasted cargoes of silk, tea, and paddy, while Tianjin had cargoes of grain and salt. Staple crops acted as sustainable economic opportunities for the foreign merchants who worked, traded, and settled here, thus boosting the prospects of the treaty ports. The treaty port called Newchwang not only gained a reputation in the bean trade, but also attracted merchants and shippers, followed by bankers and manufacturers. In other words, there are links between the future port of Newchwang and the now land-locked fortress of Newchwang located farther inland, particularly in the grain trade and in beans.

At the beginning of this article, it was argued that contemporary historians generally lack knowledge of Newchwang's more remote history. As has been seen, significant geomorphological changes resulted from silting and alterations in the course of Liao River over centuries. Accompanying these changes in the natural landscape was a decay of the socio-economic structures of the Manchus, as this article has argued based on the case study of the bannermen. There of course constants which connect the present with the more remote past. This is especially true of the grain trade and the orientation of the region as a whole toward maritime commerce. But beyond these the Liadong Peninsula has seen sweeping changes since the opening of the treaty port and the internationalization of Manchurian trade in the second half of the nineteenth century. This has seen a growth in the timber trade, mining, finance, manufacturing as well as Han resettlement across the Manchurian region.

In conclusion, the history of Newchwang before the 1860s was deeply rooted in the power structures of the Qing Empire, and set the stage for a different urban development trajectory in North East Asia that was substantially different from the maritime trading regime of later centuries. It serves to remind us how important it is to appreciate shifting socio-political structures in the rise and decline of a settlement and its transformation into a populous city.

Ethical considerations

Ethical issues (including plagiarism, informed consent, misconduct, data fabrication and/or falsification, double publication and/or submission, and redundancy) have been completely observed by the author.

Conflict of Interest

The author has no conflict of interests to declare.

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