

A Humanity-Centered Vision of Soft Power for Public Diplomacy's Global Mandate

R.S. Zaharna

Professor, American University

Received: 26 September 2021 | Accepted: 14 December 2021

Abstract

Remarkably, despite the growing frequency and severity of global problems such as climate change, earthquakes and health pandemics, public diplomacy has remained largely focused on the goals of state actors and threats from other actors. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the consequences of focusing on individual actors of public diplomacy, including their competitive quest for soft power, over the more pressing needs of humanity and public diplomacy's global mandate. The aim of this piece is to expand the vision of soft power from a competitive state-centric perspective to a broader and more collaborative, humanity-centered perspective. Although public diplomacy's link to power may appear recent and linked to Nye's (2004) concept of soft power, research suggests that it may stem from the traditional diplomacy's "diplomacy of imperialism" (Langer, 1935) that immediately preceded public diplomacy's rise. While this diplomatic heritage may currently dominate public diplomacy perspectives, humankind's global heritages and evolutionary capacity for cooperation suggest another vision is possible. The paper draws upon Alexander Vuving's (2009) explanation of how soft power works in a comparative analysis with Nye's original works to sketch out a new humanity-centered perspective of soft power. The paper concludes with implications of a humanity-centered perspective of soft power for public diplomacy's global mandate.

key words: soft power, public diplomacy, diplomacy of imperialism, humanity-centered public diplomacy

*Corresponding author: zaharna@american.edu

©2021 This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works License (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. However, the work may not be altered or transformed.

As scholars grapple to understand the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on public diplomacy, it is helpful to return to earlier global shocks that impacted the field. Yi et al. (2015) analyzed two useful examples of shocks that highlight the challenges that major catastrophes pose to the notion and practice of public diplomacy. The first shock was the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the United States, which forced nation-states to consider non-state actors. The realization that foreign publics' perceptions have domestic consequences prompted a resurgence of interest in public diplomacy. The second was the March 11, 2011 (3/11) earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima catastrophe in Japan. The state's failure to anticipate and overcome the impact of the disaster, the scholars say, challenged state legitimacy.

These two shocks reveal two challenges. One is the traditional threat to state-security from other states or international actors. The second is the issue-oriented non-traditional security threat. Global issues such as natural disasters, climate change, or pandemics as Yi et al. note, "pose new ethical issues, are focused on human rather than state-based security and required new forms of trust and cooperation" (2015, p. 321).

Remarkably, despite the growing frequency and severity of such global issues, public diplomacy has remained largely, if not exclusively, focused on the needs, interests, and goals of individual actors – primarily state actors –and threats from other actors. Public diplomacy also assumed a focus on power, including soft power. Nye's (2004) concept of soft power, which rests on the perceived attractiveness of a country's culture, values and policies, views public diplomacy the primary tool for exercising soft power. While Nye suggested that soft power could promote cooperation through shared values, the competition among states for top soft power rankings has intensified over the years (McClory, 2018, 2019; Nye, 2021), and continued during the pandemic (Friedman, 2020; M. Jennings, 2021; Leng & Lemahieu, 2021). While both the concept of soft power has been critiqued (Lukes, 2005a; Yun, 2018) as well as its competitive nature (Hall & Smith, 2013; Rawnsley, 2012), public diplomacy's individual-level, actor-centric focus on securing and exercising soft power has largely gone unquestioned.

The Covid-19 pandemic gives pause to question the wisdom of privileging attention to individual actors over global issues in public diplomacy scholarship and practice, especially in an age of connectivity. This essay adopts a historical and cultural lens to explore assumptions buried in public diplomacy, beginning with the role of public diplomacy during the pandemic. It then examines public diplomacy's assumption of individual power —which one could argue did not begin with Nye's concept of soft power, but rather with traditional diplomacy and the "diplomacy of imperialism" (Langer, 1935) of the late 19th and early 20th century. The paper then turns to the emerging quest for an expansive, humanity-centered public diplomacy to address what might be called public diplomacy's global mandate. With this global mandate in mind, the paper draws upon the works of Alexander Vuving (2009), who articulated a vision of how soft power works using three novel concepts -- benignity, beauty and brilliance – and an outcome of cooperation. A comparative analysis of Vuving's (2009) and Nye's (2004, 2011, 2019) works is used to construct a humanity-centered perspective of soft power.

The goal of the paper is to expand the vision of soft power and public diplomacy so they may address global issues of humanity and the planet.

Public Diplomacy: Failing the Covid Test

As the Covid-19 pandemic rolled unimpeded across the globe, one may ask, where was public diplomacy? Zhang and Swartz (2009) wrote about the ethical role of public diplomacy during the SARS coronavirus that gripped Asia in 2003. The scholars suggested public diplomacy had a duty-based and moral obligation in the service of the Global Public Good (GPG). They identified several functions of public diplomacy:

In dealing with global health crisis and natural disasters, public diplomacy plays an important role by facilitating global cooperation, creating and building agendas, promoting mutual understanding, and involving non-governmental actors and international organizations. (2009, p. 384)

Public diplomacy could have taken the lead in a global collaboration to mitigate the spread and cost of the Covid-19 virus. Yet, as Galvez (2020) wrote in the *DiploBlog*, “Public diplomacy was at the forefront of no one’s mind.” Public diplomacy did however remain focused on the quest for soft power. The report *Socially Distanced Soft Power* (McClory, 2021), for example, surveyed the pandemic’s impact on the reputation of countries and regions and its effect on the global balance of soft power.

Rather than a collective, problem-solving approach, states appeared to view the humanitarian crisis as an opportunity to enhance their own soft power (Leng & Lemahieu, 2021). When vaccines were developed, countries rushed to curry favor with foreign populations. As Jennings (2021) noted, “The global response to Covid-19-19 has thus far tended to be uncooperative and divisive, casting blame or seeking to spread distrust.”

It is important to note that for publics, the pandemic was but one in a cascade of crises. First was the virus itself. For global publics, Covid-19 was a “mortality shock” (Verdery et al., 2020) of lost loved ones that rippled across generations and communities. As forced lockdowns, quarantines, social distancing spread, researchers warned of a mental-health pandemic (Abbott, 2021). The loss of jobs, income, and livelihoods precipitated for many a financial crisis. The pandemic disproportionate impact exposed health and economic disparities for people of color. The deaths of Black men and women by police officers precipitated a crisis in race relations and calls of “racism as a pandemic on a pandemic” (Laurencin & Walker, 2020).

As people—or the public—focused on these shared issues, the shared emotional connection became the prism for viewing the actions of nations and their soft power competition. Sundeep Khanna (2020) captured the public’s perspective :

... the virus cruelly exposed the hidden vulnerabilities of these superpowers... It wasn't just how they [traditional powerhouses] dealt with the virus at home but how in this moment of civilisational crisis countries dealt with the rest of the world that will have a long-term impact on how we see them.

States didn't just fail the Covid-19 response test, they also failed humanity's test. Publics expect governments to act in the global interest. A 2018 Soft Power 30 report cautioned that a country's conduct in global affairs has the largest impact on how people feel towards that country:

When we average the data ... the area that has the largest impact on international perceptions of a country - is whether people believe that a given country will do the right thing in global affairs. (McClory, 2018, p. 165)

This observation is significant. Anholt's (2020) observed a similar trend in his research on nation brands. The effect of moral behavior, or how countries act for the good of the global community was so pronounced that he made it the first element of the "good country equation." Public diplomacy may be driven by national interests, but a country's conduct regarding global interests carries the most weight. There appears to be a growing gap between the global public concern for a host of global issues—many exposed or exacerbated by Covid-19—and states' concern with their individual soft power. Why was public diplomacy so off the mark?

Public Diplomacy: Assuming a Quest for Power

In the first-of-its-kind *Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Snow (2008) laid out the ideas shaping public diplomacy post 9/11. Snow declared, "Public diplomacy is linked to power" (2008, p. 4). A decade later in the second edition, she cemented that link: "Public diplomacy, after all, is inevitably linked" (2020, p. 4). How did the assumed link between public diplomacy and power become "inevitable"?

The answer may lie in the concurrent rise of public diplomacy and the concept of soft power. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the United States, public diplomacy or "battle for hearts and minds" was seen as second to the military offensive. Public diplomacy gained traction after Joseph Nye (2004) linked public diplomacy to soft power. Jan Melissen's (2005) early and widely read collection, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, similarly tied public diplomacy to soft power. Deos and Pigman capture the implicit assumption: "Public diplomacy is an exercise in power" (2010, p. 159). As Gilboa observed, "Soft power provides the theoretical and intellectual foundations for public diplomacy" (2015, p. 3). Scholars developed different theoretical frameworks (Chitty, 2020; Hayden, 2012; Pamment, 2016) and compared how different countries practiced or build their

soft power (Melissen & Sohn, 2015).

As soft power gained steam in academic writings, foreign ministries worldwide put the quest for soft power into practice. Policy papers highlighted the goal of enhancing their country's image and soft power ranking (McClory, 2018, 2019). In a personal retrospective, Nye (2021) recalled how the United States was somewhat reluctant to embrace the idea of soft power. Mattern's (2005) influential piece helped highlight how soft power was not so soft, but actually quite forceful.

Nye's discussions of soft power are clearly state-centric and competitive. Most scholars echo Nye's wording, even as they critique the concept (Lukes, 2005a; Seong-Hun, 2018). A notable exception to the language of competitive power is found in Alexander Vuving (2001) paper. Vuving sought to explain the mechanism of soft power using novel concepts of "benignity, brilliance and beauty" and how they elicited attraction – and cooperation. We return to Vuving's work in greater detail later in this study.

From the state's perspective, public diplomacy's competitive focus on soft power appears to align to the competitive nature and assumed focus on power in the international political arena (c.f. Lukes, 2005b). In their extensive review of public diplomacy scholarship since 1965, when the term "public diplomacy" was coined, Sevin, Metzgar and Hayden found that "power" and "soft" were the most frequently used term in titles and abstracts in the 2,124 studies they surveyed (2019, p. 4831). Vanc and Fitzpatrick (2016) found in their survey of public diplomacy in public relations, which is not traditionally focused on power, that soft power was the most dominant theoretical framework.

It may be easy to assume that the link between public diplomacy and soft power is relatively new. However, a historical look at public diplomacy's links to traditional diplomacy reveals assumptions of a competitive quest for power from an earlier era.

Public Diplomacy's Legacy of Power

When public diplomacy experienced resurgence of interest in 2001, scholars used a short-hand descriptor for the new term by contrasting it with the more familiar traditional diplomacy (c.f., Pigman, 2010; Snow, 2008). Whereas traditional diplomacy was government-to-government (G2G), public diplomacy was government-to-publics (G2P). Diplomacy, by definition, was the domain of the state. The state-centric focus was so strong, that including non-state actors in public diplomacy was controversial (Kelley, 2014). Public diplomacy echoed traditional diplomacy's focus on the state. For example, Nicholas Cull's (2008, 2019) oft-cited taxonomy of public diplomacy's core functions—listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting— was proposed in the service of the state.

If we see public diplomacy as distinct from traditional diplomacy, with its own history beginning in 1965 with the coining of the term, public diplomacy may appear rather benign

and the intense soft power competition curious. Yet, probing public diplomacy's ties to traditional diplomacy more deeply reveals a missing link between diplomacy and power. Diplomatic scholarship often progresses historically from ancient diplomacies to Italian renaissance diplomacy to contemporary diplomacy of nation-states (c.f. Berridge, 2015; Hamilton & Langhorne, 2013; Nicolson, 1963). Missing in this historical leap is the era of colonial conquests by European powers.

However, if we return to the bookshelves of diplomatic history, we would find the works by noted Harvard University historian William Langer (1935), including his treatise, *Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902*. Langer labeled diplomacy as such because imperialism was the dominant characteristic of the period. He described "the psychology of imperialism" and the social and emotional milieu that made arguments for imperialism not only viable but appealing (1935, pp. 67–99). Beyond the political and economic factors that fueled imperial quests, domestic publics appear to provide further impetus for colonial conquests. In speaking of England, the evolutionary debate raging at the time touted a belief in 'survival of the fittest.' British writer Rudyard Kipling fanned ardor for colonial conquests in such works as "The White Man's Burden" (1899), which claimed it was the "burden" of the white race to raise up non-white people seen as uncivilized or primitive, despite often being more advanced than their European counterparts. Christian missionaries espoused a divine purpose in bringing God to people in the colonial territories.

What is interesting about Langer's rich detail is that the native or indigenous populations' perspective is conspicuously absent from the text. Diplomacy of imperialism was primarily a competitive race between dominant European empires in a global quest to see who could amass more territory or power. If Langer were surveying the practice of public diplomacy today, he might find ready parallels between the quest for territory and the soft power competition.

Tied to the basic assumption of power then and now is the presumed focus on the individual diplomatic actors and their relations to other actors. Diplomatic scholar Brian Hocking (1999) called this assumption "actorness." In the soft power race, one is left wondering if the real target audiences are not publics but other states. Perhaps similar to the overlooked indigenous population of colonial powers, "target publics" are viewed as passive, and instrumental means to influence the behavior of other actors.

As logical or appealing as the quest for soft power may appear in the competitive international arena, that logic may reflect the privilege of dominance and European influence rather than reality of humanity in diplomacy. As Neumann noted, "diplomacy is Euro-centric in the sense that its predominantly European origins still mark a number of its practices" (2012, p. 300). While scholars have sought to move beyond the Eurocentric perspective with studies of non-Western diplomatic practices (e.g., Sevin, 2017; Thussu, 2013; Wang, 2010), the analytical lens of conventional (Eurocentric) diplomacy remains with discussions focused on actorness, interests, power, legitimacy and image. Constantinou described the result of the limited vision of the conventional, state-centric perspective as "an avalanche of exclusions,

marginalizations, and exoticizations” (2013, p. 142). Swept away in this avalanche, he noted, are “all kinds of pre-Westphalian polities . . . all kinds of pre-colonial encounters . . . all kinds of unofficial mediations and innovations . . . all kinds of human ways and means of dealing with others within and across cultures” (2013, p. 142). This omission of heritages of humanity in contemporary diplomacy represented a vulnerability in the face of a global pandemic. While actorness and power may dominate diplomacy’s focus, as we see in the next section, the link between diplomacy and power is not universal, nor has it been the dominant norm in human history.

Traditions of a Humanity-Centered Public Diplomacy

Today’s international political arena assumes diplomacy is inherently tied to power, but this assumption does not reflect the prevailing trend of human history or traditions. State-based diplomacy’s key functions—negotiation, representation and reporting—respond to the needs of the state but do not necessarily to human needs. Unlike the rational state actor, as the pandemic so vividly underscored, humans have social and emotional needs. The pandemic also highlights the imperative of joint problem-solving throughout human history. Diplomat and scholar Tran van Dihn (1987, p. 11) provides insight into the diplomatic function of problem-solving in an example from his native Vietnam:

Whenever a crisis such as flood, fire, or drought occurred, the villagers would communicate among themselves through lengthy discussions to reach a consensus as to how to deal with the disaster collectively. They would negotiate to resolve whatever individual or group antagonisms might exist, and to devise a common strategy for collective action. Often, this collective action, depending on the extent of the problem, would spread to several villages. (1987, p. 11)

The importance of problem-solving as key diplomatic focus has been perhaps overlooked and with it the centrality of cooperation as a pivotal feature of public diplomacy. In his evolutionary study of diplomacy from prehistoric times to today, Iver Neumann calls human’s capacity for cooperation the “hard-won battle of diplomacy” (2018, p. 9). By banding together, humans found they could successfully hunt prey rather than become prey themselves. Researchers suggests that the survival of the human species rests on a capacity for cooperation, including collaborative problem-solving (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Burkart et al., 2014).

The human capacity for cooperation has been cited as the reason *homo sapiens* beat out the much stronger Neanderthal (Harari, 2018). The adage “survival of the fittest,” which emerged during the colonial era, has been mistakenly attributed to the noted evolutionary biologist Charles Darwin. The statement is actually Darwin’s contemporary, Herbert Spenser. Darwin instead proposed that “sympathy” – the capacity to care for others—was the heart of evolutionary success. As he wrote, “those communities, which included the greatest number

of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring” (1871, p. 131).

Questioning the assumption of competition over cooperation resonates with the need for the “decoloniality,” or dismantling dominant ideological frameworks from the colonial powers and “opening up multiple other forms of reading and responding to the world” for diplomacy as advocated by Tarusarira (2020, p. 88). Indeed, if we look across the world’s heritages, we see assumptions of cooperation as the norm. Unlike the tradition of contentious debate that was unique to the ancient Greeks, other traditions favored consensus building and harmony (Kennedy, 1998). Diplomatic heritages such as the Iroquois of North America (Brandão & Starna, 1996; F. Jennings, 1995), Aztecs of Mesoamerica (Almazán, 1999; Portilla, 1992), or pan-Polynesian and Aboriginal peoples of the Pacific (Beier, 2009; Costa, 2007) viewed fellow humans and nature in familial terms, as “brothers,” “fathers” and “mothers.” Diplomacy, by extension, implied fellowship and relationship building for the sake of good relations and prosperity (Zaharna, 2019b).

In her study *Before European Hegemony*, anthropologist Abu-Lughod describes the world economy of the thirteenth century as “remarkable” for its growing economic integration and cultural effervescence, which she claimed were interrelated:

Technological and social innovations produced surpluses, which were, in turn, traded internationally to further intensify development. Parallel advances in navigation and statecraft facilitated contact among distant societies, which generated even more surpluses. (Abu-Lugod, 1991, p. 4)

She also noted that there was no singular hegemonic entity or a quest for hegemonic power, but instead a synergistic, creative power. Although some of that era’s intellectual heritages have been partially erased by colonization, they are nevertheless an integral part of the heritage of humankind. They form the foundation for a humanity-level or humanity-centered perspective of public diplomacy and soft power that is inherently collaborative and synergistic.

Cultivating a Humanity-centered Perspective of Public Diplomacy

Even as the Covid-19 pandemic exposed limitations of public diplomacy as an individual-level focus on needs, interests, and goals of individual actors, it is possible to envision a humanity-centered public diplomacy driven by the broader needs, interests, and goals of humanity (Zaharna, 2019a, 2021). Whereas state-centric diplomacy represents the mindset of separateness, mindset of global connectedness. A growing chorus of public diplomacy scholars have called for public diplomacy to expand its global vision. Castells (2008) emphasized “the diplomacy of the public,” contrasting private interests and values against a shared public interest. Zhang and Swartz (2009), mentioned earlier, suggested “public diplomacy for Global Public Goods (GPG).” Similarly, Fitzpatrick (2017) proposed

“public diplomacy in the public interest” that is more socially-conscious with increased focus on global issues, problem-solving, and shared goals. In 2014, Anholt launched the Good Country Index (goodcountry.org), which ranks countries based on their contribution to humanity.

We see evidence of humanity-centered public diplomacies and diplomatic practices as well. Constantinou and Der Derian (2010) advanced the idea of “sustainability diplomacy,” which incorporated regional or global interest. Similarly, cosmopolitan diplomacy promotes values such as tolerance, friendship and respect (Gulmez, 2018; Villaneuva Rivas, 2010). We see assumptions of finding commonality and mediating diversity in “everyday diplomacies,” which build relations even if the participants are not aware of the diplomatic repercussions (Marsden et al., 2016).

Several aspects of humanity-centered public diplomacies suggest advantages for complex problem solving. First, humanity-centered public diplomacies assume a broad, global perspective of human and diplomatic relations. Second, humanity-centered public diplomacies assume diversity as a core dynamic. Third, humanity-centered public diplomacies are issue-driven, defined by the saliency of the problems rather than the actors. Humanity-centered public diplomacies are inherently process-oriented in order to work through complex problems to find agreeable solutions. Whereas state-centric diplomacy seeks to gain the competitive advantage, humanity-centered public diplomacies seek to foster a cooperative environment and privilege collaboration.

Perhaps the most important feature common to humanity-centered public diplomacies is the element of emotional connections. Humanity-centered public diplomacies are rooted in an awareness of being connected to others and feeling part of the larger family of humankind. The feeling of shared humanity is expressed in many of the world’s heritages. We find the African concept of *ubuntu*, “one is human through others,” or the Confucian principle of *ren* in guiding relations. Even the origin of the English word “humanity,” from the Latin *humanitas* for human nature and kindness, echoes a relational affinity. Perhaps before the global pandemic, these features of humanity-centered public diplomacy may have been viewed as idealistic. However, after witnessing the realities and human costs of the pandemic, the need for a humanity-centered perspective and a global mandate for public diplomacy has become an imperative.

Re-envisioning Soft Power in Humanity-Centered Public Diplomacy

If the pandemic has made the need for humanity-centered perspective abundantly clear, how can one reconcile such a perspective with the appeal of soft power? Here, we can turn to Alexander Vuving’s (2009) oft-cited conference paper, “How Soft Power Works.” Nye refers to Vuving’s paper in his (2011) book, and credits Vuving again in his most recent article on the evolution of soft power (Nye, 2021).

Vuving sought to tackle the gap in operationalizing soft power by explaining its underlying mechanism. Vuving focuses on the distinction between what Nye calls soft power resources (i.e., culture, values and policies) and instead proposes that they be considered as soft power currencies. In reading Vuving's work, one may be first struck by the uniqueness of the terms he suggests for the three power currencies: benignity, brilliance and beauty, or the "three Bs." Benignity is the "kindness of behavior and attitude," brilliance "is the shine of capabilities and successes," and beauty is "the resonance of shared norms and goals" (p. 20).

Although Vuving cites Nye and Nye draws from Vuving, multiple closer reads of the two scholars works reveal two very different assumptions about power and relations. In contrast to Nye's individual-level power assumptions, Vuving's assumptions suggest a relational power perspective. This section presents a close comparative reading of Vuving's paper to Nye works with the aim of providing a preliminary a sketch of vision of soft power in humanity-centered public diplomacies.

Premise of Relationality

In reading Vuving's paper alongside Nye's work, the assumption of "relationality" emerges as an overarching premise. Relationality is the idea that all things, including people, are connected or rooted in a relationship (Miike, 2012; Qin, 2016, 2018). No one and no one thing are truly separate or isolated from others. States are similarly bound in their relations to other states, according to Qin (2018), who developed a relational theory of world politics.

Vuving's assumption of relationality is subtle but permeates his explanations of the three B's in his conception of soft power. Vuving implicitly lays the foundation of relationality in a brief footnote (Footnote 18, p. 8), explaining his decision not to label publics as "targets" as Nye does and instead proposes the term "client." Vuving takes issue with the idea of a "target" because it suggests a "passive or an unwilling participant in the power process" and the soft power wielded by agents (p. 8). He also rejects the term because it suggests hard power (militaristic) framing.

Vuving explains his use of "client" in order to center attention on soft power processes rather than the actors. However, by opting for "client" over "target," Vuving fundamentally alters power dynamics from an agent who is acting independently from its target to an agent acting within a relationship with its client. The word "client" also suggests not only a relationship between the actor and the public, but a favorable relationship in which the state or agent is accountable to the public, as might be expected in a good sponsor-client relation.

Vuving's discussion of the three soft power currencies similarly assumes relationality; all three rely on relational dynamics rather than actor agency. For example, Vuving writes: "Benignity is an aspect of the agent's *relations with others*, especially the *client* of soft power" (p. 8). The phrase "with others" underscores the premise of relationality.

Implications: Humanity-center public diplomacy is grounded in the premise of relationality, and a humanity-centered vision of soft power similarly assumes relationality, such as Vuving suggested by the term “client.” In re-envisioning soft power in this more relational view, humanity-centered public diplomacy would view global publics or humanity as a client. Agents or states would be accountable to humanity.

Mutuality

Underscoring the premise of relationality as an overarching structure is the assumption of a relational stance of mutuality. Not only are parties in a relationship, but each is able to affect or influence the other. We see the assumption of mutuality most explicitly again in Vuving’s Footnote 18. As he states, “In soft power processes, both parties [agent and client] are willing participants” (Footnote 18, p. 8).

Not only are agent and client set in the context of a mutually defined participatory relationship, they have relational parity regarding agency and goals. Soft power from an individual, state-centric perspective assumes that the state-as-agent and public-as-target are separate. This separation makes plausible the idea that a state can influence a target public – without being influenced in return by that public. Relationality and mutuality remove this illusion of one-way influence.

It is worth pausing to take in the significance of viewing publics as “clients” alongside the idea of mutuality. Nye’s conception of power suggests getting others to do what you want. The term “target” is not only passive; targets are used instrumentally to achieve the agent’s goals. Even engagement or relationship building with a public is not an end goal in itself for the public’s benefit or the sake of good relations; but rather, it is meant for enhancing the soft power of the agent.

Mutuality also has implications for multiple understandings of power within a relational construct. Whereas individuals as independent agents may have agency and exercise power over others, individuals within a relational construct may have agency as well; however, the agency of one is tied to reciprocal duties and responsibilities to the other in order to maintain the relationship. This suggests that within relational configuration of agent-client, power is not so much about control over the other, but rather responsibility to the other. An agent with greater wealth, resources, or knowledge has a social trust and responsibility to client, or others and society. This conception of position of privilege as duty or obligation to others is found in many of the world’s spiritual heritages. It is implicit in the pan-African concept of *ubuntu* and echoed in the English expression, “to whom much is given, much is expected.”

Implications: Assuming mutuality and participation in the soft power process suggests that clients (targets) can influence agents or states. Humanity-centered public diplomacy would assume that states, publics and others are in an interconnected web of relations, and as such, have the ability to mutually influence each other. Soft power attraction would similarly suggest an element of mutuality; without it, power might be elusive or hard to wield.

Self- and Other Orientation

Relationality assumes both a self-orientation and an other-orientation. An individual-level perspective would tend to assume that self-orientation and other-orientation are mutually exclusive or in a natural state of opposition. Relationality assumes that self and other are not in natural opposition but instead co-exist in a natural state of shared similarities and differences within a complex, holistic relational universe. In fact, because the self is inherently connected to others, the self is inherently oriented toward the other. To feign being exclusively self-oriented – within an inter-connected relational universe – is self-isolating and ultimately self-defeating.

As mentioned above, Nye's discussions of soft power are agent-centric and thus inherently self-oriented. Individual goals take precedence over the goals of others. An agent wields soft power for the benefit of the self, not for the other. If the other does benefit, it may be a by-product such as a shared goal, but it is not the primary motivating factor.

Vuving's discussion of power currencies and soft power goals privileges not just the agent's goals, but also the other's goals. Benignity, for example, is not about achieving one's own goals or self-directed toward the individual state, but rather is other-directed. Note the phrasing: "Benignity represents a wide spectrum of behaviors, ranging from doing no harm to others to actively protecting and supporting others" (p. 9). We clearly see that the client or the other matters Vuving describes benignity behaviors as "kindness." In reality, they are oriented toward the well-being of the other.

What is particularly interesting are Nye's descriptions of Vuving's concepts. Nye's phrasing turns Vuving's relational orientation into an individual-level perspective that is exclusively self-oriented. For example, in describing benignity, Nye writes: "Being perceived as benign tends to generate sympathy, trust, credibility and acquiescence" (2011, p. 92). Nye's phrasing highlights attributes and outcomes that the agent wants – not how the agent treats others. Similarly, Nye's description of brilliance privileges a self-orientation: "'brilliance' or 'competence' refers to how an agent does things, and it produces admiration, respect, and emulation" (2011, p. 92). Again, the admiration, respect and emulation are directed back toward the self, or agent. Finally, we see a self-orientation in Nye's description of beauty: "'beauty' or 'charisma' is an aspect an agent's relations to ideas, values, and vision, and it tends to produce inspiration and adherence" (2011, p. 92). Interestingly, the relation aspects of these qualities of beauty are tied to the agent.

Implications: Humanity-centered public diplomacy rests on both self-orientation and other-orientation. The goals of the self cannot be at the expense of the goals of the other; nor can the goals of the other be at the expense of the self. A humanity-centered perspective of soft power would expand the goals, behaviors, vision of the agent to be both self- and other-oriented. Soft power is mutually enhancing for the benefit the self and the other. Both the agent and the client need to be similarly attracted.

Open-ended goals

We see the relationality assumption of self-orientation and other-orientation also in terms of articulating goals. While relationality rests on self- and other-orientation, bridging differences to arrive to shared goals is often a process of exploring alternatives and seeking accommodation and alignment. This process of working effectively with others requires that goals be initially open-ended rather than predetermined.

It took several readings to spot the subtle distinction between closed- and open-ended goals in Nye's and Vuving's works. In Nye's works, we encounter the oft-cited phrase, "Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes *you* want through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment" (Nye, 2004, p.8), or simply, "Power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want" (Nye, 2019, p. 7). The outcome or goal is that of the agent. As mentioned above, the target is instrumental in achieving the agent's goal. Implicit also, is that the goal is predetermined. The agent has a predetermined outcome it seeks to achieve. On the surface, these are eminently logical goals for state-centric public diplomacy, which must request and account for expenditures of personnel and other government resources.

In Vuving's writing, we see a more open-ended statement of goals that are not explicitly tied to a specific agent (i.e., "you"). Note Vuving's phrasing of Nye: "Soft power is the ability to affect the behavior of others by influencing their preferences" (Vuving p. 6, citing Nye, 2004, p. 5). By dropping the word "you," the quote does not specifically tie the goal to the agent or even an identifiable entity. Additionally, because of Vuving's earlier note that the agent and the client are "both willing participants" and have agency, the goal could be for either or both. Similarly, in describing soft power as a tool, Vuving again leaves the goal open-ended rather than self-directed or predetermined: "states can and often use policy tools to deploy power currencies to achieve goals" (p. 12).

Throughout his paper, Vuving discusses goals within a relational framework of the agent and the client. Vuving even suggests the idea of "selflessness" or giving up one's own goals for those of the other. As Vuving writes, "Benignity is also present when you behave unselfishly. Selfless behaviors signals that you are putting other people's interests before your own" (p. 9).

Implication: Humanity-centered public diplomacy's focus on processes and problem-solving often call for open-ended goals, particularly in the initial stages. Open-ended goals contribute to problem solving efforts by signaling a willingness to explore desired outcomes and ability to accommodate different approaches. Having an open-ended stance would be part of the mutual attraction of soft power of the various participants as they engage in problem-solving.

Cooperative orientation

Relationality assumes a dynamic that tends toward cooperative orientation. Cooperation is assumed because of the underlying assumption of mutuality and connectivity. If all are connected and mutually influencing, what happens to one, can happen to all in the chain of connection. What is sometimes overlooked from the prism of individualism is that connectivity is not an individual choice. Relationality assumes connectivity is a permanent condition. As Shi-Xu (2009) explains about the force and permanency of connectivity; if all are inherently connected, cooperation is more desirable than competition.

Nye suggested that the pursuit of soft power could be used to promote cooperation through shared values. Researchers now question that assumption, citing the competition for soft power among Asian countries who supposedly share similar values (Hall & Smith, 2013; Melissen & Sohn, 2015). Writing of competition among Asian states, Hall and Smith called “ongoing struggle for soft power puzzling and possibly problematic as well” (2013, p. 10).

For Vuving, cooperation is an explicit outcome of the soft power process between the agent and client. Vuving’s description of each of the 3-Bs ends with the goal of cooperation. In speaking of benignity, he writes: “How does benignity translate into power? Benignity produces gratitude and sympathy. It reassures others of the agent’s peaceful or benevolent intentions, thereby inviting *cooperation*” (p. 10). Similarly, he describes brilliance, in which one is perceived as capable or successful, as “the admiration, the adoption, and the affinity after that may act against suspicion and hostility and facilitate understanding and *cooperation*” (p. 11). Finally, he wrote of beauty: “shared values and causes provide a push toward the perception that the other regime is beautiful, which in turn will encourage confidence, friendship, and *cooperation*” (p. 11)

Implications: Humanity-centered public diplomacy’s focus on joint problem-solving rests on not only finding common goals, but on cooperating to fulfill those goals. In terms of soft power, the goal is not accumulating power for an individual actor, but for augmenting the power of both willing participants in the soft power process toward a larger goal.

Behavior Emphasis

In relationality, words matter, but behaviors—how one acts toward others one is connected to—matter more. We see the comparative emphasis on words versus behavior in Nye’s and Vuving’s writings. In a recent summary profile of soft power and public diplomacy, Nye (2019) subtly privileges the verbal in repeated references to “information” and related terms, such as “credibility,” “message,” “narrative,” or “truth.” For example, Nye attributes the rise of soft power to the “information revolution . . . [that] is changing the nature of power and increasing its diffusion” (p. 10). He highlights the role of technology, from the printing press to algorithms, and writes: “Information provides power” (p. 10). A word search revealed that Nye used the word “information” 33 times in the summary piece. In contrast, the word “behavior” appears only four times in the piece and within the context of influencing the

other's behavior, not on how the agent's behavior.

By comparison, Vuving piece does not mention the word "information" once. The emphasis is on behavior. We find the words "behavior," "behaving," and references to such actions as listening and supporting instead. Noteworthy, Vuving speaks of the agent's behavior, not just as influencing the behavior of others. For example, Vuving's description of benignity focuses on how an agent would treat others: "Benignity represents a wide spectrum of behaviors, ranging from doing no harm to others to actively protecting and supporting others" (p. 9). He gives several examples of specific behaviors:

For example, when you are nice to others...when you do good to others; when you help them, support them, protect them; when you care about others; when you pay attention or listen to others; when you respect the rights, interests, or self-esteem of others... (p. 9)

Brilliance also involves action in being "capable" or "successful in doing something" (10) and beauty represents value "with strong confidence and convictions, and high energy and perseverance" (p. 11). However, benignity relies most heavily on action, so much so that Vuving speaks of "acts of benignity" (pp. 13-14). Vuving mentions specific behaviors for relationship-building in public diplomacy: "spending time and energy and money to cultivate foreign partners, keeping frequent and close contact with them" (p. 13) or "simply paying attention to others, listening to them in international forums, or engaging ... in dialogues" (p. 14).

Implications: Humanity-centered public diplomacy's focus on collective problem-solving imply not just a verbal component, but a behavioral component. Actors must act, and actions should match words. Trust, a key dynamic of relations, rests on alignment of words with action. Soft power from a humanity-centered perspective puts equal weight on verbal and behavioral components.

Fellowship

Finally, relationality assumes a feeling of fellowship; fellowship in the sense of being connected to others and valuing the well-being of others. Connectivity is not merely digital or networked mapped, it is emotionally bonding. Underlining the self- and other-orientation is an emotional connection of fellowship in which others are intuitively known and recognized as fellow humans.

As we saw earlier, traditional diplomacy's assumption of the rational actor in pursuit of its interests and goals undergirds the competitive quest for power. This assumption is echoed in Der Derian's (1987) classic *On Diplomacy* that assumed "estrangement" as the diplomatic norm. In turning to Vuving's work, we see an overarching assumption of fellowship. This posture is reflected in his focus on behaviors and efforts to understand the other – "listening,

attending.” The actions Vuving discusses show investments of time and energy in the relationship and signal that the other is valued.

Implications: Humanity-centred public diplomacy subscribes to the overarching sentiment of fellowship. All of these aspects—mutuality, self-and-other orientation, open-ended goals, cooperative orientation, emphasis on behavior—are all interrelated and flow into the idea of fellowship. The interlocking aspects of these elements makes a humanity-centered perspective particularly compelling for public diplomacy. Here, soft power is not so much wielded by any one entity so much as co-created. As others join in fellowship, collaborative synergy can emerge.

Implications & Conclusion: Public Diplomacy’s Global Mandate

In her introduction to a volume on soft power in the Indo-Pacific region, Caitlin Byrne (2017) observed how discourse on soft power has been and continues to be dominated by European and American frameworks and experiences. “Remarkably,” she noted, “there is little interrogation of how soft power and public diplomacy are evolving to find relevance in alternative contexts” (2017, p. 684). The Covid-19 pandemic offers an opportunity to reflect upon alternative contexts, as well as alternative perspectives of public diplomacy and soft power. It is important to note that early and continued domination of the European and American perspective establishes a normative perspective of soft power. Buried within that perspective are assumptions about soft power that have gone unquestioned. Several points are now worth questioning.

First is the continued quest for soft power in public diplomacy. The pandemic has put public diplomacy scholarship and practice on notice. However, the problems plaguing public diplomacy appear deeper than the Covid-19 pandemic. As mentioned by Yi et al. (2015) in the opening of this paper, states faced both traditional and non-traditional threats. Why were states focused on their own individual soft power quest when physical, economic, social, and civic health were threatened across the globe? This paper has probed the skewed focus on power in public diplomacy, highlighting the legacy of competitive power in the diplomacy of imperialism (Langer, 1935) that prevailed just before the rise of contemporary public diplomacy. While the quest for individual domination may have been appropriate for the carved-up 20th-century world, it appears misplaced in today’s hyper-connected world—as the virus has so vividly illustrated. However, that said, the proposed vision of soft power from a humanity-centered perspective is not designed to replace the state-centric vision of soft power anymore than humanity-centered public diplomacy can replace state-centric public diplomacy. Both have their place and purpose in the global arena. Rather than replace, the operative word is expand or even balance; expand our vision from a state-level to humanity-level perspective and work to balance the approaches.

Second, despite the current dominance of state-centric public diplomacy, as mentioned earlier humankind has an expansive, diverse, and rich heritage of indigenous diplomatic

practices that assume fellowship and privilege the needs, interests and goals of humankind and the planet. Many of these practices included diplomatic rituals that addressed human emotional and social needs and draw upon the capacity for cooperation for joint problem-solving and action. Although many of these indigenous, pre-colonial diplomatic heritages have been overshadowed by the dominant state-centric practices, future research in public diplomacy can help recover and re-introduce them to the field. Much research is needed to fill this missing gap in humankind's history of diplomacy.

Third, following awareness and research, is a need to envision an expanded vision of public diplomacy, and by extension soft power beyond the individual-level perspective. This study has sketched preliminary elements of a humanity-centered vision of soft power aimed at meeting the needs of humanity. Rather than conceiving public diplomacy from an individual-level state-centric perspective with its own foreign or domestic mandate, public diplomacy can expand to recognize a global mandate. This study has deliberately refrained from mentioning any states. The goal in doing so was to avoid the state-centric perspective and individual state mandates that tends to focus and define public diplomacy in terms of "actorness," as Hocking (1999) so astutely observed. The current competitive view of soft power is linked to the primacy of actorness. A humanity-level perspective expands the vision to public diplomacy from a focus on actorness (who) to the primacy of the issues (what) and its core function of collaborative problem-solving for humanity and the planet.

In responding to public diplomacy's global mandate, we might bear in mind an observation mentioned earlier about the quest for soft power. As Hall and Smith (2013) observed, states were competing partly because everyone else was doing it; the soft power race had become the "norm" (p. 10). We might ask, what if humanity-centered needs and problem-solving became the new norm? Rather than soft power being the privilege of the few, what if it was the synergistic wealth of many or humanity? The richness of humankind's diverse diplomatic heritages suggests that public diplomacy's global mandate as well as a humanity-centered vision of public diplomacy and soft power are indeed possible.

References

- Abbott, A. (2021). COVID's mental-health toll: How scientists are tracking a surge in depression. *Nature*, 590(7845), 194–195. <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00175-z>
- Abu-Lugod, J. (1991). *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*. Oxford University Press.
- Almazán, M. A. (1999). The Aztec States-Society: Roots of Civil Society and Social Capital. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 565(1), 162–175. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716299565001011>
- Anholt, S. (2020). *The Good Country Equation: How We Can Repair the World in One Generation*. Berrett-Koehler.
- Beier, J. M. (2009). *Indigenous Diplomacies* (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

- Berridge, G. R. (2015). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. Springer.
- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2011). *A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution*. University Press.
- Brandão, J. A., & Starna, W. A. (1996). The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy. *Ethnohistory*, 43(2), 209–244. <https://doi.org/10.2307/483396>
- Burkart, J. M., Allon, O., Amici, F., Fichtel, C., Finkenwirth, C., Heschl, A., Huber, J., Isler, K., Kosonen, Z. K., Martins, E., Meulman, E. J., Richiger, R., Rueth, K., Spillmann, B., Wiesendanger, S., & van Schaik, C. P. (2014). The evolutionary origin of human hyper-cooperation. *Nature Communications*, 5(1), 4747. <https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms5747>
- Byrne, C. (2017). Introduction to the Special Issue: Recasting Soft Power for the Indo-Pacific. *Politics & Policy*, 45(5), 684–705. <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12224>
- Castells, M. (2008). The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 78–93.
- Chitty, N. (Ed.). (2020). *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power* (1st edition). Routledge.
- Constantinou, C. M. (2013). Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of Knowledge. *International Studies Review*, 15(2), 141–162. <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12037>
- Constantinou, C. M., & Der Derian, J. (2010). Introduction: Sustaining Global Hope: Sovereignty, Power and the Transformation of Diplomacy. In C. M. Constantinou & J. Der Derian (Eds.), *Sustainable Diplomacies* (pp. 1–22). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Costa, R. D. (2007). Cosmology, mobility and exchange: Indigenous diplomacies before the nation-state. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 13(3), 13–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2007.9673440>
- Cull, N. J. (2008). Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 31–54. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311952>
- Cull, N. J. (2019). *Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age* (1 edition). Polity.
- Darwin, C. (1871). *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*. J. Murray.
- Deos, A., & Pigman, G. A. (2010). Sustainable Public Diplomacy: Communicating about Identity, Interests and Terrorism. In C. M. Constantinou & J. Der Derian (Eds.), *Sustainable Diplomacies*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230297159>
- Der Derian, J. (1987). *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Blackwell.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2017). Public Diplomacy in the Public Interest. *Journal of Public Interest Communication*, 1(1), 78–93. <https://doi.org/10.32473/jpic.v1.i1.p78>
- Friedman, U. (2020, November 15). The Pandemic Is Revealing a New Form of National Power. *The Atlantic*. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/pandemic-revealing-new-form-national-power/616944/>

- Galvez, L. (2020, April 6). Public diplomacy in the time of Corona | Diplo. *Diplo Blog*. <https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/public-diplomacy-time-corona>
- Gulmez, S. B. (2018). Cosmopolitan Diplomacy. In G. Delanty (Ed.), *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*. Routledge.
- Hall, I., & Smith, F. (2013). The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition. *Asian Security*, 9(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2013.760926>
- Hamilton, K., & Langhorne, P. R. (2013). *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. Routledge.
- Hayden, C. (2012). *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts*. Lexington Books.
- Hocking, B. (1999). Patrolling the ‘frontier’: Globalization, localization and the ‘actorness’ of non-central governments. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 9(1), 17–39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13597569908421069>
- Jennings, F. (1995). *The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League*. Syracuse University Press.
- Jennings, M. (2021, February 22). *Vaccine diplomacy: How some countries are using COVID to enhance their soft power*. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/vaccine-diplomacy-how-some-countries-are-using-covid-to-enhance-their-soft-power-155697>
- Kelley, J. R. (2014). *Agency Change: Diplomatic Action Beyond the State*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kennedy, G. A. (1998). *Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-cultural Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Khanna, S. (2020, November 12). *Will COVID-19 Upend Our Notions Of Soft Power?* [Opinion]. Moneycontrol. <https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/will-covid-19-upend-our-notions-of-soft-power-6120751.html>
- Langer, W. L. (1935). *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. Volume II* (First Edition). Alfred A. Knopf.
- Laurencin, C. T., & Walker, J. M. (2020). A Pandemic on a Pandemic: Racism and COVID-19 in Blacks. *Cell Systems*, 11, 9–10. doi: 10.1016/j.cels.2020.07.002
- Leng, A., & Lemahieu, H. (2021). *Covid Performance Index: Deconstructing Pandemic Responses* [Interactives]. Lowy Institute. <https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-performance/>
- Lukes, S. (2005a). Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 477–493. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031201>
- Lukes, S. (2005b). *Power: A Radical View* (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marsden, M., Ibañez-Tirado, D., & Henig, D. (2016). Everyday Diplomacy. *Cambridge Anthropology*, 34(2), 2-22. <https://doi.org/10.3167/ca.2016.340202>
- Mattern, J. B. (2005). Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics. *Millennium - Journal of*

- International Studies*, 33(3), 583–612. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031601>
- McClory, J. (2018). *Soft Power 30—2018*. Portland Group and USC Center on Public Diplomacy. <https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2019-1.pdf>
- McClory, J. (2019). *Soft Power 30—2019*. Portland Group and USC Center on Public Diplomacy. <https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2019-1.pdf>
- McClory, J. (2021). *Socially Distanced Diplomacy: The future of soft power and public diplomacy in a fragile world*. Sanctuary Counsel and USC Center on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/Sanctuary%2BCounsel%2Bx%2BCPD_Socially%2BDistanced%2BDiplomacy%2BReport_May%2B2021.pdf
- Melissen, J. (2005). The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice. In *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (pp. 3–27). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melissen, J., & Sohn, Y. (2015). *Leveraging Middle Power Public Diplomacy in East Asian International Relations* (EAI Issue Briefing). East Asia Institute.
- Miike, Y. (2012). Harmony without uniformity”: An Asiatic worldview and its communicative implications. In L. A. Samovar, R. E. Porter, & E. R. McDaniel (Eds.), *Intercultural communication: A reader* (pp. 65–80). Wadsworth.
- Neumann, I. B. (2012). Euro-centric diplomacy: Challenging but manageable. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(2), 299–321. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110389831>
- Neumann, I. B. (2018). A Prehistorical Evolutionary View of Diplomacy. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 14, 4–10. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-017-0089-z>
- Nicolson, S. H. G. (1963). *Diplomacy*. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.
- Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*. PublicAffairs.
- Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power*. PublicAffairs.
- Nye, J. S. (2021). Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept. *Journal of Political Power*, 1–12. <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/2158379X.2021.1879572>
- Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and the Digital Revolution* (1st ed. 2016 edition). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pigman, G. A. (2010). *Contemporary diplomacy: Representation and communication in a globalized world*. Polity.
- Portilla, M. L. (1992). *The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico*. Beacon Press.
- Qin, Y. (2016). A Relational Theory of World Politics. *International Studies Review*, 18(1), 33–47. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv031>
- Qin, Y. (2018). *A Relational Theory of World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rawnsley, G. (2012). Approaches to soft power and public diplomacy in China and Taiwan. *The Journal of International Communication*, 18(2), 121–135. <https://doi.org/10.1080/>

13216597.2012.695744

- Sevin, E. (2017). *Public Diplomacy and the Implementation of Foreign Policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey*. Springer.
- Sevin, E., Metzgar, E. T., & Hayden, C. (2019). The Scholarship of Public Diplomacy: Analysis of a Growing Field. *International Journal of Communication*, 13(0), 4814–4837. <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/10020>
- Shi-Xu. (2009). Reconstructing Eastern paradigms of discourse studies. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, 4(1), 29–48. <https://doi-org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.1080/17447140802651637>
- Snow, N. (2008). Rethinking Public Diplomacy. In N. Snow & P. M. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (1st ed., pp. 3–11). Routledge.
- Snow, N. (2020). Rethinking Public Diplomacy. In N. Snow & N. J. Cull (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (2nd ed., pp. 3–12). Routledge.
- Tarusarira, J. (2020). Religion and Coloniality in Diplomacy. *Review of Faith and International Relations*, 18(3), 87–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2020.1795442>
- Thussu, D. (2013). *Communicating India's Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood*. Palgrave Macmillan US. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137027894>
- Van Dinh, T. (1987). *Communication and Diplomacy in a Changing World*. Ablex.
- Vanc, A., & Fitzpatrick, K. (2016). Scope and status of public diplomacy research by public relations scholars, 1990–2014. 42(3), 432–440. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.PUBREV.2015.07.012>
- Verdery, A. M., Smith-Greenaway, E., Margolis, R., & Daw, J. (2020). Tracking the reach of COVID-19 kin loss with a bereavement multiplier applied to the United States. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 117(30), 17695–17701. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2007476117.
- Villaneuva Rivas, C. (2010). Cosmopolitan Constructivism: Mapping a Road to the Future of Cultural and Public Diplomacy. *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, Winter(3), 45–56. <http://www.publicdiplomacymagazine.com/cosmopolitan-constructivism-mapping-a-road-to-the-future-of-cultural-and-public-diplomacy/>
- Vuving, A. L. (2009, September 3). *How Soft Power Works*. American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, Canada. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1466220>
- Wang, J. (2010). *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication*. Palgrave Macmillan US, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Yi, K., Hayes, P., Diamond, J., Denney, S., Green, C., & Seo, J. (2015). The Implications of Civic Diplomacy for ROK Foreign Policy. In K. Yi & P. Hayes (Eds.), *Complexity, Security and Civil Society in East Asia* (1st ed., pp. 319–392). Open Book Publishers. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt16gzg36.10>
- Yun, S.H. (2018). An Overdue Critical Look at Soft Power Measurements. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 25(2), 1–20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26909941>
- Zaharna, R. S. (2019a). Culture, Cultural Diversity and Humanity-centred Diplomacies. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 2019, 14(1–2), 117–133. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14101018>

- Zaharna, R. S. (2019b). Western Assumptions in Non-Western Public Diplomacies: Individualism and Estrangement. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 14(3), 216–223. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14401073>
- Zaharna, R. S. (2021). *Boundary Spanners of Humanity: Three Logics of Human Communication and Public Diplomacy*. Oxford University Press.
- Zhang, J., & Swartz, B. C. (2009). Public diplomacy to promote Global Public Goods (GPG): Conceptual expansion, ethical grounds, and rhetoric. *Public Relations Review*, 35(4), 382–387. <https://doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.08.001>

■ R.S. Zahanra

R.S. Zaharna is a professor in the School of Communication, American University, Washington, D.C. and Faculty Fellow, with Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California. She received the Distinguished Scholar Award in International Communication from the International Studies Association in 2018. Her books include *Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11* (Palgrave, 2010), *Relational, Networked, and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift*. (A. Arsenault & A. Fisher, co-editors; Palgrave, 2013), and *Boundary Spanners of Humanity: Three Logics of Communication and Public Diplomacy for Global Collaboration* (Oxford University Press, 2021).