



How could make people work for everyone? : City governance to activate social services in 1950's Shanghai neighborhood

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ABSTRACT

Examining how the CCP operated social services in Shanghai neighborhood[linong] in early 1950s, this article reveals the hidden relation between social service and rectification of neighborhood organizations in 1954. One of the main purpose of 1954 rectification was to guarantee provision of grassroots level of the city by recruiting local cadres, the implementers of social services. Though series of social service, such as night patrol, cleaning and public charity were indispensable for residents' life and welfare(fuli)[福利] of neighborhood, the social services was the something most of the Shanghai residents were reluctant to do. The result was the shortage of human resource for social service, triggering the "nominal position(gua ming)[挂名]" phenomenon. During political rectification of neighborhood organizations in 1954 Shanghai Municipal government tried to solve this 'decline of human resource in social services' problem by attracting the unemployed to the position of basic level cadre. To be specific, it demanded jobless person in neighborhood to be registered in time if they want a job placement. And it used that registration as the nominee of cadre in re-election process of the rectification campaign. The government measures were closely related to Shanghai people's inclination to rely on party-state when they try to get a job. Hence political rectification in neighborhood organizations become the strategic tool of city governance to mobilize residents in operating social services. So this article suggests that the CCP's urban governance was a complex and nuanced process to induce urban residents' interest and voluntarism beyond the suppression-oriented totalitarian perspective.

Key Words: neighborhood rectification, social service, neighborhood cadre, labor-employment policy, the unemployed.

I . Introduction

It is important in city governance how to provide public services to citizens such as rubbish collection, anti-crime promotions, vaccinations, and so on with strong publicity, small scale, and little cost. But the low profitability of these works causes difficulty of supply. Right after the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai also faced the dilemma of how to realize public welfare(*fuli*) [福利] in neighborhoods(*linong*) [里弄]¹⁾. Studies on Shanghai neighborhood²⁾ suggest that the important features of governing Shanghai in

- 1) Street[街道 *jiedao*] and neighborhood[里弄 *linong*] both are administrative units in grassroot level of City. To be specific, Street is literally roads and neighborhood is alleyway which is branch line of road. So, though it really isn't a big gap in their scales, street is little more upper unit than neighborhood.
- 2) The renowned articles about Shanghai neighborhood in 1950s are written by 郭聖莉[Guo Shengli], 張濟順 [Zhang Jishun], and 楊麗萍[Yang Liping] : Guoshengli 郭聖莉&Gaominzheng 高民政,(2001). "Jinjuochuqi Shanghaishijuminweiyuanhui quangjiande lishikaocha" 建國初期上海市居民委員會創建的歷史考察, *Shanghaixingzhengxueyuanxuebao* 上海行政學院學報, 2001(4), Guoshengli 郭聖莉&Gaominzheng 高民政, (2002). "1952-1957 : Shanghaishijuminweiyuanhui tiaozhengyu wanshanda lishikaocha" 1952-1957 :上海市居民委員會調整與完善的歷史考察". *Shanghaixingzhengxueyuanxuebao* 上海行政學院學報, 2002(2), Guoshengli 郭聖莉 &Gaominzheng 高民政, (2003). "Juminzizhiyu Chengshizhili – Jianguochuqi Chengshijuminweiyuanhui de quangjian" 居民自治與城市治理-建國初期城市居民委員會的創建, *Zhengzhixueyanjiu* 政治學研究, 2003(1), Guoshengli 郭聖莉,(2005), *Chengshishehui zhonggouyu xinshengguojia zhengquanjianshu* 城市社會重構與新生國家政權建設. Fudandaxueboshilunwen 復旦大學博士論文, Guoshengli 郭聖莉, (2006), *Juminweiyuanhui quangjianyu biange : Shanghaishigeanyanjiu* 居民委員會創建與變革 : 上海市個案研究. Beijing : Zhongguoshehuichubanshe 北京 : 中國社會出版社 ; Zhengjishun 張濟順, (1996). "Lunxianshiji Shanghaide Baojiazhidu" 淪陷時期上海的保甲制度. *Lishiyianjiu* 歷史研究, 1996(1), Zhengjishun 張濟順, (2004). "Shanghailinong: Jicengzhengzhi dongyuan yu guojiashehui yitihua zouxian (1950-1955)" 上海里弄 : 基層政治動員與國家社會一體化走向(1950-1955) . *Zhngguoshehuikexue* 中國社會科學, 2004(2), Zhengjishun 張濟順, (2015). "Guojiazhilide zuichu shehuikongjian – Ershishiji wushiniandai qinqide Shanghaishijuminweiyuanhui" 國家治理的最初社會空間 : 二十世紀五十年代前期的上海居民委員會. *Zhonggongdangshiyianjiu* 中共黨史研究, 2015(10), Zhengjishun 張濟順, (2015). *Yuanqude daoshi : 1950niandaide Shanghai* 遠去的都市 : 1950年代的上海, Beijing : Shehuikexuewenxianchubanshi 北京 : 社會科學文獻出版社. ; Yangliping 楊麗萍,(2006). *Congfeidanwei daodanwei : Shanghai feidanweiren qunzuzhizhua yanjiu(1949-1962)* 從非單位到單位:上海非單位人群組織化研究(1949-1962) Huadongshifandaxuexiao Boshixueweilunwen 華東師範大學校博士學位論文, Yangliping 楊麗萍,(2008). "Jianguochuqide zhengzhidongyuan jiqixiaoli - yi Shanghai weizhongxinde kaocha" 建國初期的政治動員及其效力——以上海為中心的考察. *Shanghaidaxue xuebao : zheshiban* 上海大學學報(哲社版), March 2008, Yangliping 楊麗萍, (2010). "Jianguochuqi jicengshehui zuzhihuayu fanzuzhihuade boyi--yi Shanghai jiejuzhide quangshuweili" 建國初期基層社會組織化與反組織化的博弈——以上海街居制的創設為例. *Lishijiaoxuewenti* 歷史教學問題, October 2010, Yangliping 楊麗萍,(2010), "Cong feichu Baojiazhidu Dao jianli juminweiyuanhui – yi XinZhongguo chengliqianhoude Shanghaiweili" 從廢除保甲制度到建立居民委員會——以新中國成立前後的上海為例. *Dangdewenxian* 黨的文獻, September 2010, Yangliping 楊麗萍,(2010). "XingZhongguo

the early stages of the PRC were a combination of welfare and politics(*zhengzhi*) [政治]. Among early researchers, Guo (2006) assumed the unprecedented power of a communist state in cities, which enabled it to interfere in each household realizing mass mobilization for public welfare in neighborhoods.

Researchers take the same view on rectification of Shanghai neighborhood organizations in 1954. Guo and Zhang (2015) determined that rectification provided welfare at the grassroots by eliminating corrupted authorities in neighborhoods, but their perspectives put more stress on the political aspects of the rectification. Anti-revolutionaries such as spies (*tewu*) [特務], and bullies(*tufei*) [土匪] who had infiltrated the leadership of neighborhood organizations were removed by rectification so that at the grassroots level, Shanghai city became more favorable to the Communist regime.

However, Goodman(1995)³⁾ and Xu(2001)⁴⁾'s view about cooperative relationship between state and society in modern China suggest other characteristic of neighborhood rectification in 1954 than political one. The expansion of State Power brought growth of Chinese society which could seek its own interest depending on government and other governmental organizations. Especially in resident's welfare in basic level of Chinese City, Park(2013)⁵⁾ demonstrates the 'governance' system in streets of Beijing in Early PRC where state leads social autonomy and satisfied social need under the state leadership.

This article try to define 1954 neighborhood rectification as a governing device by associating it with a labor-employment campaign (*laodongjiuyeyundong*) [勞動就業運動]. To be specific, based on public documents preserved in Shanghai's municipal archive, the article intends to reveal that neighborhood rectification (*linongzhengdun*) [里弄整頓] was a sophisticated art that used job placement to attract residents to public service.

chenglichuqide Shanghai linong zhengdun” 新中國成立初期的上海里弄整頓. *Dangdaizhongguoshiyanjiu* 當代中國史研究 September 2010, Yangliping 楊麗萍,(2011), “Jianguochuqi Dangde zhizhengnenglijianshu zaichengshideshijian-yi Shanghaiweizhongxinde kaocha” 建國初期黨的執政能力建設在城市的實踐——以上海為中心的考察. *Sheheikexuezhaxian*, 社會科學戰線, October 2011

- 3) Bryna Godman, *Native Place, City, and Nation : Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937*, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1995
- 4) Xiaoqun, Xu, *Chinese Professionals and the Republican State : the Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912-1937*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001
- 5) Park, Sang-soo, Formation of Urban Basic-level Governance System, Beijing 1949-1954 : State and Society in the Neighborhood(街道) Space, *Journal of Asian Historical Studies* 123th, 2013)

II. The welfare of Shanghai neighborhoods in the 1950s and neighborhood cadres(*linongganbu*) [里弄幹部]

Before the thesis for this article is presented, public services with respect to Shanghai in the 1950s should be defined. The party-state in Shanghai suggested the notion of “welfare”(fuli) [福利] as daily work(*richanggongzuo*) [日常工作] that was closely related to residents’ daily lives. This type of work is different from the central work(*zhongdiangongzuo*) [重點工作] known as campaigns(*yundong*) [運動], which are intensively carried out over short periods based on the state’s need. In organizations(*zuzhi*) [組織] of people, which the CCP heavily emphasized,⁶⁾ residents’ indispensable needs for life(*qieshenwenti*) [切身問題] were key factors in organizing the grassroots. The CCP publicly announced that residents cannot be organized if their daily demands are not satisfied enough.⁷⁾

Though the party defined welfare as residents’ daily needs, the party-state standardized the contents; services for residents were divided into five categories: public order(*zhidan*) [治安], mediation(*tiaojie*) [調解], welfare(*fuli*) [福利], culture and education (*wenjiao*)[文教], benefits for men of national merit(*yofu*) [優撫], and public health(*weisheng*) [衛生]. Each category comprises public services such as patrol, assistance for vaccination, supporting men of national merits, managing water and electricity costs, maintaining public facilities in neighborhoods, unofficial mediation of civil disputes, and public charity for the poor and unemployed.⁸⁾ Most of the services had been provided by nongovernmental organizations in the late 1940s when the government was unable to function because of civil war.⁹⁾ Therefore, even though the party-state fixed the kinds and

6) Organization[*zuzhi*] was one of the most effective method which CCP leads Chinese. In the Chinese city, numerous type of organizations such as resident’s committee[*juminweiyuanhui*], Communist youth league[*gongchengtuan*], women’s federation[*funulianhehui*] are existed. Once state begins its campaign[*yundong*], These organizations played the key role in city politics by delivering the purpose and details of campaign to citizens, mobilizing citizens, persuading citizens to actively participate in and reporting the reaction of citizens to party-state. The mechanism of these ‘organization’ in CCP’s politics was analyzed into details in Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Second Edition)*, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1968

7) Shanghai Municipal archives(hereafter cited as SMA), B168-1-760-157 : 「Shanghai shi minzhengju guanyu Baoyuli gongzuo baogao 上海市民政局關於寶裕里工作情況報告」, 1952

8) SMA, A20-2-44-14 :Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei linonggongzuoweiyuanhui bangongshi guanyu zenyang zuohao juminweiyuanhui gongzuode baogao 中共上海市委里弄工作委員會辦公室關於怎樣做好居民委員會工作的報告. April 1955

9) The representative non-governmental organizations in late 1940s and early 1950s are as below ;

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contents, the services did stem from residents' needs.

Title	members	Job
Fuliweiyuanhui 福利委員會	Linongjumin 里弄居民 (residents)	public health, public order, prevention of epidemics
Gongyihui 公益會	里弄居民	public health, public order, advertisement for purchasing government bond.
Fangkongxiaozu 防空小組	里弄居民	air defense, firefighting, charity, public order, management of water and electricity
Renminfanghudui 人民防護隊	里弄居民	air defense
Zizhihui 自治會	里弄居民	Cultural and educational activities, welfare, advertisement for purchasing government bond
Fangkongweiyuanhui 防空委員會	里弄居民	patrol, air defense, fire fighting, charity,
Fangkongzhianjiuchasunluozu 防空治安糾察巡邏組	里弄居民	air defense, public order
Zhianzu 治安組	里弄居民	public order
Dongfangzuzhi 冬防組織	里弄居民	running night school, fire prevention, public order
Fanghudui 防護隊	里弄居民	purchasing government bond, advertisement for campaign against United States, donating clothes to poor in winter
Dongfangweiyuanhui 冬防委員會	里弄居民	cooperating for anti-counter revolutionaries campaign, payment of taxes
Dongfangbanshichu 冬防辦事處	里弄居民	cooperating for anti-counter revolutionaries campaign, anti-United States activities
Juminhuzuzu 居民互助組	里弄居民	air defense
Sufangemingweiyuanhui 肅清反革命委員會	里弄居民	cooperating for anti-counter revolutionaries campaign
Anquanzu 安全組	里弄居民	cooperating for anti-counter revolutionaries campaign,
Shoutingzhan 收聽站	里弄居民	Study of current affairs
Qingjiezu 清潔組	里弄居民	cleaning, public health
Li nong ju min chou bei wei yuan hui 里弄居民籌備委員會	里弄居民	organization of study for residents
Jieyuechuzuzu 節約儲蓄組	里弄居民	advertisement and mobilization of campaign for saving money
Juminhuzuhui 居民互助會	里弄居民	management of water, electricity, providing welfare benefits
Xueweihui 學委會	里弄居民	studying history of Chinese Communist Party
Zhengzhixuexiban 政治學習班	里弄居民	study of current affairs and politics

Title	members	Job
Linongxiaozu 里弄小組	Qingnian 青年 (youth)	group studies
Gubaishe 古柏社	青年	cultural activities, study, advertisement of purchasing government bond, public health
Zhongxinuexixiaozu 中心學習小組	青年	organizing rally and study
Xuexitaolunfunuhui 學習討論婦女會	Jiatingfunu 家庭婦女 (women)	educations for illiterate women, education of sewing
Funushenghuohuzhushi 婦女生活互助社	家庭婦女	educations for illiterate women, education of sewing
Fang ke lian yi hui 房客聯誼會	Fangke 房客 (tenant)	management of cost for water and electricity
Fangkefulihui 房客福利會	房客	management of cost for water and electricity, meditations of civil dispute
Fulihui 福利會	房客	management of cost for water and electricity,, adjustment of house rent, maintenance of public facilities
Liu dong zhen liao shi ye wei yuan hui 流動診療事業委員會	Yiwurenyuan 醫務人員 (doctors)	Medical treatment for free

The table was made by author based on materials below ;

「Jiatingfunusibaiyucanjiashenghuohuzhushe 家庭婦女四百余參加生活互助社」, Jiefang ribao 解放日報, Liberation Daily, July 3, 1949., 「Renzen kaihao chengshiqe gejerenmindaibiaohuiyi bing jiaqiang duichengshijuminzuzhide lingdao 認真開好城市區各界人民代表會議并加強對城市居民組織的領導」, Jiefang ribao, December 13, 1951; 「Cong yigenongtang kanyigeshehui, baoxingli huanliao xinmianmao 從一個弄堂看一個社會, 寶興里換了新面貌」, Wenhui bao (文匯報 Wenhui Daily) December 30, 1949, 「Zailun linong fulizuzhi 再論里弄福利組織」 Wenhui bao, April 21, 1951, 「Ganxie gongchandang dailai xingfurizi, linong jumin huanxingyong Dangqing 感謝共產黨帶來幸福日子, 里弄居民歡欣迎黨慶」, Wenhui bao, June 30, 1951, Wangjianping 王建平, 「Wo zenyang zailinong xuanchuan gongzuo 我怎樣在里弄宣傳工作」, Wenhui bao, August 27, 1951; 「Linong xuexixiaozu chenglihoude fushouhuo 里弄學習小組成立後的副收獲」, Xinmin Manbo(新民晚報, Xinmin Evening News) November 4, 1949, 「Gu bai she : fu min lu yigeli nongzuzhi 古柏社 : 富民路一個里弄組織」, Xinmin Manbo, February 22, 1950, 「Fuzade linong youle jianquande zuzhi, jieshao yuqingfanggongyihui 複雜的里弄有了健全的組織, 介紹余慶坊公益會」, Xinmin Manbo, February 23, 1950, 「Beisichuanlu jiji fanhongzha, linong jianli fangkong xiaozu 北四川路積極反轟炸, 里弄建立防空小組」, Xinmin Manbo, February 24, 1950, 「Zhongxingbieyede linongzuzhi, henao jiu yijing youzizhijigou fanhongzhayundong zhong fahuileliliang 中行別業的里弄組織, 很早就已經有自治機構反轟炸運動中發揮了力量」, Xinmin Manbo, February 27, 1950, 「Hongkou renmin jiji fanhongzha, sishiduo linong jumin zuzhiqilai 虹口人民積極反轟炸, 四十多里弄居民組織起來」, Xinmin Manbo, March 1, 1950, 「Linong fuli gongzuo, Baoyuli chengji keguan 里弄福利工作, 寶裕里成績可觀」, Xinmin Manbo, April 21, 1950, 「Youyige linong jumin zuzhiqilai, Hengjifang fulihui dansheng 又一個里弄居民組織起來, 恒吉坊福利會誕生」, Xinmin Manbo, June 13, 1950, 「Gaohaole linongzuzhi, " wufugong" mianmu yixin 搞好了里弄

The main agency responsible for providing these services in 1950s Shanghai was residential committees (*jiedaolinongjuminweiyuanhui*) [街道居民委員會]. The first one was established in April 1951 to carry out projects for neighborhoods' safety and welfare,¹⁰⁾ and by the end of 1952, there were more than 3,800 residential committees in Shanghai with 49,854 members. Based on this rapid expansion, these committees became the only legal and autonomous organizations in neighborhoods when the Government Administrative Council (*zhongang zhengwuyuan*) [中央政務院] passed the Urban Residents Committee Organization Regulations (*chengshi juminweiyuanhui zuzhi tiaoli*) [城市居民委員會組織條例].¹¹⁾

The residential committees are composed of members who are elected by residents; that is, they were not government employees but ordinary citizens. In city segments of approximately 3,000 people, households of 10 to 20 earned one representative, and the representatives gathered annually for resident representation meetings.¹²⁾

The party-state generally called the committee members "neighborhood cadres" (*linongganbu*) [里弄幹部] in state documents; the cadres had to obey party and city government,¹³⁾ so they are basically agents of state. However, because they were civilians who had not been trained either professionally or ideologically, neighborhood cadres were different from party cadres (*dangganbu*) [黨幹部] or government employees. In fact, neighborhood cadres could be distinguished based on a number of characteristics.

組織, "五福公"面目一新, *Xinmin Manbo*, November 11, 1950, 「Gaohao linong dongfang, quanti jumin youli 搞好里弄冬防, 全體居民有利」, *Xinmin Manbo*, December 28, 1950, 「Linongshijian 里弄事件」, *Xinmin Manbo*, March 12, 1951, 「Linong zuzhiqilai, renmin fahui lilian 里弄組織起來, 人民發揮力量」, *Xinmin Manbo*, April 21, 1951, 「Guanche jiedaolinongdaibiao huiyi jingshen, Gequ pubian shenru jinxing chuanda 貫徹街道里弄代表會議精神」, 各區普遍深入進行傳達, *Xinmin Manbo*, April 25, 1951, 「Suqingfangemingweiyuanhui, gequlinongzuzhichengli, 肅清反革命委員會, 各區里弄組織成立」, *Xinmin Manbo*, May 15, 1951, 「Shiqudaibiao jinkai kuodahui, kongsu fangeming eba zuixing, li nong jumin guangfan dongyuan shouting huiyi qingkuang guangbo 市, 區代表今開擴大會, 控訴反革命惡霸罪行, 里弄居民廣泛動員收聽會議情況廣播」, *Xinmin Manbo*, May 30, 1951, 「Shanghai diandi : linong shijian 上海點滴 : 里弄事件」, *Xinmin Manbo*, July 26, 1951, 「Shanghai diandi : linong shijian 上海點滴 : 里弄事件」, *Xinmin Manbo*, August 13, 1951, 「Quanshibaifenzhibashiyishanglinongjuminyouliao zuzhi 全市百分之八十以上里弄居民有了組織」, *Xinmin Manbo*, December 17, 1951, 「Shi zuguo zaori zoushang gongyehuade daolu, linong he gongchang zhankai Aiguochuxu yundong 使祖國早日走上工業化的道路, 里弄和工廠展開愛國儲蓄運動」, *Xinmin Manbo*, January 12, 1953

10) 「Benshi juxing jiedaolinong daibiaohui 本市舉行街道里弄代表會」, *Jiefang ribao*, April 22, 1951

11) Fanjingsi 范靜思, (2000). *Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志*. Shanghai : Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshi 上海 : 上海社會科學出版社, pp.50

12) SMA A6-2-90-15 : 「Guanyu shiwanrenkou yishang chengshi jianli juminweiyuanhui shixing fangan(caoan) 關於十萬人口以上城市建立居民委員會實行方案(草案)」, December 1952

13) Ibid

First, neighborhood cadre on a residential committee was not a paying job, and thus, residential committee members worked for both their neighborhoods and their workplaces(*danwei*) [單位]. Of course, this does not mean that there were no professionals on the residential committees; one or two members of these committees would be professionals whom the district governments paid to concentrate on “neighborhood business”(*linonggongzuo*) [里弄工作].¹⁴⁾ However, the Shanghai municipal government took a negative view of these professional neighborhood cadres; ideologically, a community’s welfare is everyone’s responsibility, so social welfare should be managed by mobilizing neighborhood residents, not by paying professionals.¹⁵⁾

Second, there was little reward for service as a neighborhood cadre. Residential committee members did not receive wages, and in fact, their only financial support was minimum living expenses, and then only to underprivileged members; these were defined as cadres whose families including themselves earned less than eight yuan(*renminbi*) [人民幣] in a month. The pay was flexible, but it could not exceed 15 yuan per. In addition, cadres were to apply for the money out of necessity, and the district government examined an application before it was paid. In short, this money was a rescue when they needed help, not a reward for their services.¹⁶⁾

Third, it was not the government but the neighborhood cadres who were responsible for paying for neighborhood welfare services. Municipal governments gave residential committees money for office supplies and for mass rallies,¹⁷⁾ and the money for rallies was provided by related government departments; however, this money was intended for costs such as posters, megaphones, and banners.¹⁸⁾ The neighborhood welfare costs, however, such as for electric lights, wastebaskets, and public toilets, were covered through fund-raising, and the neighborhood cadres were responsible for this

14) SMA B160-1-760-189 : 「Shanghaishi minzhengju guanyu Shanghaishi juminweiyuanhui bangongfeiyong ji zhuanzhirenyuan shenghuo jintiede yijian 上海市民政局關於上海市居民委員會辦公費用及專職人員生活津貼的意見」,1952

15) SMA B168-1-760-157 : 「Shanghaishi minzhengju guanyu Baoyuli gongzuo qingkuang baogao」上海市民政局關於寶裕里工作情況報告」, 1952

16) SMA A20-2-42-7 「Zhonggong Shanghaishiwei linonggongzuoweiuyuanhui bangongshi guanyu Guanche juminweiyuanhui jingfei shiyong banfade yijian ji geng 코등 juminweiyuanhui shenghuo buzhu jingfei shenpizhidude tongzhi 中共上海市委里弄工作委員會辦公室關於貫徹居民委員會經費使用辦法的意見及更正居民委員會生活補助經費審批制度的通知」, 1955

17) SMA B160-1-760-189 : op.cit

18) SMA B168-1-30-1 「Zhonggong Shanghaishiwei guanyu Zhonggong Shanghaishiwei zhengzhi gongzuo weiyuanhui, linong gongzuo weiyuanhui」Shanghaishi linong funu daibiao huiyi zuzhi shixing tiaoli”, “Shanghaishi jumin weiyuanhui jingfei shiyong shixing banfa” de pifu 中共上海市委關於中共上海市委政治工作委員會、里弄工作委員會“上海市里弄婦女代表會議組織試行條例”，“上海市居民委員會經費使用試行辦法”的批復」. February 1955

fund-raising.¹⁹⁾

In the early PRC, neighborhood public services were not the job of public officers or subcontractors hired by the party-state: Neighborhood welfare was the responsibility of neighborhood cadres. And given that neighborhood cadres were neighborhood residents, public social services for neighborhoods were in fact the responsibility of neighborhood residents themselves. The main reason for this was the party-state's limited capacities in Shanghai; there were simply too few party cadres and public officers to take care of neighborhood work. *Wenhui Daily* (*wenhuibao*) [文匯報] reported that even if the number of public agents was increased two or three times, that would still be inadequate for the necessary neighborhood services, so residents should be responsible for the welfare of their own communities.²⁰⁾ And, as examined above, the grassroots in Shanghai had organized in the way the *Wenhuibao* suggested.

In short, public social service in 1950s Shanghai fully relied on neighborhood human resources. This caused a serious problem: Services with no reward did not deserve to be performed.

III. The 1954 “rectification” (*zhengdun*) [整頓] of neighborhood organizations in Shanghai

In 1954, the Municipal Committee of Shanghai (*shanghaishiweiyunhui*) [上海市委員會] began what was called the rectification of all residents and their organizations. The targets were over 600,000 residential committee members, unemployed persons, and stallholders (*tanfan*) [攤販].²¹⁾ As the word “rectification” suggests, the goal was to inspect incumbent neighborhood cadres, dismiss unsuitable residential organization members, and elect new leadership.

The head apparatus for the rectification was the municipal government's Neighborhood Work Committee (*linonggongzuoweiyuanhui*) [里弄工作委員會], and the district (*qu*) [區] committee's branch offices (*bangongshi*) [辦公室] directed the every related works in neighborhoods. But the main

19) Ibid

20) 「Lun linong fulihui zuzhi (shang) 論里弄福利會組織 (上)」, *Wenhui bao*, April 20, 1951.

21) SMA A20-1-124-73 : 「Shanghaishi linong gongzuo weiyuanhui bangongshi bianyinde < Linong zhengdun qingkuang > 1955nian di 32qi 上海市里弄工作委員會辦公室編印的<里弄整頓情況>1955年第32期」, March 1955

agents of rectification in each neighborhood were work teams (*gongzuodui*) [工作隊], temporary units formed to complete the rectification by government orders. Work team members were recruited from street offices (*jiedaobanshichu*) [街道辦事處], police stations (*paichusuo*) [派出所], and professional cadres (*tuochanganbu*) [脫產幹部] in women's federations (*fulian*) [婦聯].²²⁾

Under the leadership of the work teams, rectification took place in three stages, each of which comprised multiple steps. Stage one was mobilizing the masses, which consisted of training neighborhood cadres and activists (*jijifenzhi*) [積極分子] who would support the Communist regime, to clearly understand the purpose and meaning of rectification. The first step in stage one was three mass meetings: The first was a mass report meeting (*baogaodahui*) [報告大會] to inform residents of the importance of rectification and to appeal to them to actively participate. The second mass meeting was for recollection–contrast (*huiyi duibi qifa baogao*) [回憶對比啓發報告]; at this meeting, residents were to compare their miseries under the Nationalist regime with their current happy lives under the Communist regime. The third mass meeting was for citizens to express distress (*suku wa gen dahui*) [訴苦挖根大會]; the aim was to identify people who had been exploited by the ancient regime (*kuzhu*) [苦主] so they could make accusations (*kongsudahui*) [控訴大會]. The second step in stage one of the rectification process was confession (*jiaodai*) [交代]; at this stage, cadres confessed their past crimes. In the third step of stage one, work teams identified qualified and trained activists as neighborhood core leaders [骨幹]. And the teams also identified suspects with dubious histories (*zhongdianfenzhi*) [重點分子] and spoke with them privately to persuade them to confess their sins.

The second stage of rectification was based on mass mobilization, and the first step in this stage was also mass mobilization and report meetings (*dongyuanbaogaohui*) [動員報告會]. At these meetings, the work teams attempted to provoke residents' hatred of the ancient regime (*jiushehui*) [舊社會] encouraging them actively to join in the accusation and prosecution of anti-revolutionaries (*fangemingfenzhi*) [反革命分子] and corrupted cadres. The second step of the second stage was the accusation meeting; one person from each household attended the meetings, and some attendees were chosen as blowers to expose the crimes of problematic cadres. The third step in this stage was to disclose cadres' crimes to everyone in the neighborhood and to give clemency to those who voluntarily confessed their crimes.

The third stage in the party-state's rectification process was reorganizing neighborhood leadership through democratic elections. In the first step of this final stage, expanded cadre meetings (*ganbukoudahuiyi*) [幹部擴大會議] were held to evaluate the result of rectification, and the second

22) Ibid

step was the democratic elections. Each small residents' group (*xiaozu*) [小組], composed of 10 or 20 neighboring families, elected a group leader (*xiaozuzhang*) [小組長] and group representatives (*jumindaibiao*) [居民代表], and then the representatives then delegated individual members of the residential committees. In the final step, the work teams announced the new neighborhood leaders.²³⁾

It cannot be denied that rectification was highly political; it was in essence an extension of the antirevolutionary campaign right after 1949 that aimed to eliminate cadres whose histories or backgrounds were not ideologically desirable. The primary difference between the two processes was only that rectification had a much broader target: Rectification aimed to identify not only anti revolutionaries but also corrupted or ill-behaved cadres. The process began with persuading residents that the charged were not eligible to be cadres, followed by coercing the charged to confess their crimes or bad behaviors in front of crowds. At the end, the charged lost their seats by reelection because all community had learned that they were unsuitable as leaders. Based on these features, it can be said that previous views on the politics of the 1954 neighborhood rectification which focused on its political features were essentially correct.

IV. The loss of human resources for public services: Guaming[掛名]

However, rectification had meanings beyond previous researchers identified: The rectification in 1954 not only was a political tool but became a social strategy for making the unemployed work for their communities. At this point, it is advisable to remind the reader of what was discussed in Chapter 2 of this article. Specifically, members of residential committees were not paid, and in fact, they themselves were responsible for raising the money to provide for community welfare.

Furthermore, in the 1950s in Shanghai, the neighborhood cadres had too much work. In addition to the neighborhood public services they had to provide, cadres had to perform tasks sent from bureaus (*ju*) [局], departments (*ke* or *chu*) [科 or 處], mass organizations (*dazhongzuzhi*) [大眾組織], and work units (*danwei*) [單位]. Members of all of these organizations regarded the residential committees as government subcontractors and ordered the committee members to do their tasks.

23) SMA A20-1-126 : 「Shanghaishi linonggongzuoweiyuanhui guanyu Nanyongjili(shizhangwode shidian) zhengdun gongzuode qingkuang baogaozongjie 上海市里弄工作委員會關於南永吉里(市掌握的試點)整頓工作的情況報告總結」, June 1954

Many of the staff members at these organizations even forced the cadres to complete their work first: A certain street office reported that staff from over 30 departments such as those of civil affairs (*minzhengju*) [民政局], public security (*gonganju*) [公安局], trade unions (*gonghui*) [工會], women's federations (*fulian*) [婦聯] and public schools, state-owned bookstores, water and power resources corporations (*shuidiangongshe*) [水電公社] had commanded neighborhood cadres to serve them. For example, Hsinhua Book Store ordered residential committee to mobilize residents to buy calendars and yearbooks and also to transport the goods. And the national movie theater required the committee to sell movie tickets to residents.²⁴⁾

Eventually, the neighborhood cadre position was no longer considered worth doing; when their burdens increased dramatically, cadres began to refuse public service. The phenomenon was called *guaming* [掛名], which referred to residential committee members who performed no work at all; the phenomenon was a type of boycott of neighborhood public service. Of course, *guaming* did not always take the shape of not working; some neighborhood cadres simply abandoned their residential committee posts by moving to other areas.

The *guaming* expanded rapidly. Even in the 35 demonstration areas (*shidian*) [試點] that had been estimated to be ideologically stable—residential committees had been established earlier in these areas than in others—719 neighborhood cadres, 35% of all cadres, boycotted the work or fled their neighborhoods.²⁵⁾ The situation did not differ in the ordinary areas. The district of Luwan for instance self-reported that among its 78 residential committees, two thirds had been paralyzed by the losses of members.²⁶⁾ In one residential committee in Beizhan district, out of 40 cadres on the list, only seven or eight of them actually did their jobs.²⁷⁾ In May 1953, Xuhui's residential committees had 73 members, but 76% did no work at all.²⁸⁾

Guaming was in particular caused by the primary clash between neighborhood cadres' residential

24) SMA B2-1-22-58 「Guanyu muqian linong gongzuo qingkuang ji cunzai wentide baogao 關於目前里弄工作情況及存在問題的報告」, December 1955

25) SMA A6-2-78 「Shanghaishi minzhengju guanyu guanche dierci quanguo min zhenghuiyi jueyide zhuyao gongzuo qingkuang baogao ji youguan shengchan ziji zuzhi junlieshu shengchan, juweihui zhengdundeng wentide youguanwenjian 上海市民政局關於貫徹第二次全國民政會議決意的主要工作情況報告及有關生產自救組織軍烈屬生產、居委會整頓等問題的有關文件」, 1954

26) SMA B168-1-14-70 「Shanghaishi linong zhengdun zuzhi jianshu gongzuo zongjie(caogao) 上海市里弄整頓組織建設工作總結(草稿)」, 1954

27) SMA B2-1-22-95 「Shanghaishi juminweiyuanhui zuzhi gongzuo qingkuang 上海市居民委員會組織工作情況」, May 1955

28) SMA B168-1-788-56 「linongdiaochaogao(xuhuiqu 里弄調查報告(徐匯區)」, 1954

Sohn, Jang-Hun, How could make people work for everyone?

services work and their own paid work; cadres had to complete their paying jobs and then return home to accomplish free tasks for their neighborhoods. The Civil Affairs Bureau reported that neighbor cadres who already had jobs easily found themselves too busy to carry out services for residents. For example, a timber mill laborer worked 10 hours a day in his factory and then had to assume a position as the chief of his residential committee. Another rickshaw driver and the chief of his meditation committee, had a serious problem because he earned no money at all providing meditation service to residents.²⁹⁾

The Civil Affairs Bureau also concluded that the primary trigger of *guaming* was that laborers had been elected as residential committee members; the bureau admitted that laborers had no way to take the burdens of their jobs and provide public services for their community at the same time. Statistic that nearly all 12,700 neighborhood cadres in work units were *guaming* supported this conclusion.³⁰⁾

One of the solutions for this problem was to make neighborhood party-state organs find qualified men and develop them to be neighborhood cadres. However, these neighborhood government organs put far more energy into promoting campaign (*yundong*) [運動] than into cultivating residential committee members.³¹⁾

The shortage of human resources that resulted from *guaming* led to poor delivery of public services to residents; the Neighborhood Work Committee of the Shanghai municipal government found that too few cadres responsible for too many services only worked hard during campaign and did not care welfare of their community. For instance, a vice chief of the women's committee under a residential committee rebuked a resident who asked her to solve the problem of water costs: "It is not worthy to hold meetings just for your petty penny. You are really annoying. (*weiniyi, erqian kaicihui zhenbujia de, nimen zhenhui fan*) [爲你一,二錢開次會真不值得, 你們真會煩]"³²⁾

Besides, because large numbers of cadres who were from the ancient regime or who were corrupted had been expelled from the neighborhood leadership committees during rectification,³³⁾

29) SMA B168-1-773-1 「Shanghaishi minzhengju guanyu Shanghaishi juminweiyuanhui de diaocha zhonghe baogao 上海市民政局關於上海市居民委員會的調查綜合報告」, 1953

30) SMA A6-2-78, op.cit.

31) SMA B2-1-22-95 「Shanghaishi juminweiyunhui zuzhi gongzuo qingkuang 上海市居民委員會組織工作情況」, May 1955

32) SMA A20-1-124-9 「Shanghaishi linong gongzuo weiyuanhui bangongshi bianyinde <linong zhengdun qingkuang> 1954 nian di 5qi 上海市里弄工作委員會辦公室編印的<里弄整頓情況>1954年第5期」, September 1954

33) The achievement of neighborhood rectification in 1954 was as below : 3574 anti-revolutionaries were exposed and 2217 of them were executed. 17 pieces of gun and 2000 rounds of ammunition were attached. In the neighborhood organization, 1888 counterrevolutionaries faced judicial action and 43764 corrupted cadres lost their seats. Cadres who

it was necessary to identify how to supply the needed neighborhood human resources. In particular in the third step of the rectification process, reorganizing neighborhood committees by election, required nominating people to be members of residential committee. One effective way to address this deepening problem was to attract the unemployed to be neighborhood cadres using employment as an inducement.

V. The labor-employment movement as inducement

In July 1950, the Shanghai municipal government began to register unemployed workers so they could receive job offers and pensions. When the labor-employment movement began in Shanghai in August 1952, followed by the State Council's decision on labor and employment issues (*guanyu laodongjiuyewentidejueding*) [關於勞動就業問題的決定], 670,000 unemployed were registered.³⁴⁾ The municipal Labor-Employment Committee established neighborhood registration committees (*linongdengjiweiyuanhui*) [里弄登記委員會] to organize unemployed residents.³⁵⁾

Here it should be noted that the municipal government repeatedly emphasized the union between the labor-employment movement and neighborhood rectification. The party-state in Shanghai ordered that new neighborhood leadership should be established when labor-employment work was completed.³⁶⁾ Regarding the labor-employment movement in the North-Sichuan Road district (*beisichuanluqu*) [北四川路區], the Civil Affairs Bureau said that district work had failed because it had only addressed the current state of the unemployed but had not been tied to neighborhood rectification. The municipal government also instructed street offices across all of Shanghai to ensure

lost their seats had the guilty of guaming[掛名不起作用, just take the post and do not work at all] and rest had political problem. ; 8455 had bad or suspicious career and 2217 had really bad work style[zuofeng 作風]. SMA B2-1-22-95 「Shanghaishi juminweiyuanhui zuzhi gongzuo qingkuang 上海市居民委員會組織工作情況」, May 1955

34) SMA A36-2-102 「Zhonggong Shanghaishiwei guoyingongyebu guanyu gongrenjieji shenghuo qingkuang he cunzai wenti zhuanli diaocha baogao 中共上海市委國營工業部關於工人階級生活情況和存在問題專題調查報告」, 1956

35) SMA B131-1-11-38 「Shanghaishi laodongjiuye weiyuanhui guanyu zuzhi linong dengji shiye gongren zhunbei gongzuode tongzhi 上海市勞動就業委員會關於組織里弄登記失業工人準備工作的通知」, May 1953

36) SMA B168-1-760-82 「Shanghaishi minzhengju guanyu gequ jiehe laodongjiuye zhengdun juminweiyuanhui gongzuode qingkuang baogao 上海市民政局關於各區結合勞動就業整頓居民委員會工作的情況報告」, December 1952

that rectification went hand in hand with the labor-employment movement.³⁷⁾

To meet governments' demand, each district's labor-employment committee dispatched work teams to neighborhoods to register unemployed.³⁸⁾ In registering the unemployed, work teams and committee members identified the activists in unemployed who were willing to participate in neighborhood work and examine whether they are qualified to be neighborhood cadres. Through this path, the work teams and the committee aimed to complete the link between labor-employment work and staffing the residential committees.³⁹⁾

In short, unifying neighborhood rectification with labor-employment work meant appointing the unemployed as neighborhood cadres. In the labor-employment work, work teams identified the unemployed with (a) good reputations, (b) clean records, and (c) political activism. In the third step of neighborhood rectification, reorganizing neighborhood leadership, unemployed residents who had been identified as appropriate were appointed residential committee members by district governments or meetings of residents' representatives. Unemployed residents who had good reputation, good class, good ability, and clean records were appointed the chiefs or vice chiefs of residential committees; those who were reliable and politically active were assigned to committees of public order (*zhianbaoweiyuanhui*) [治安保衛委員會]; and those who had reputations for being impartial were assigned to mediation committees (*tiaojieweiyuanhui*) [調解委員會]. Those well educated were assigned to culture and education committees (*wenjiaoweiyuanhui*) [文教委員會]; women were assigned to public health committees (*weishengweiyuanhui*) [衛生委員會]; and those who usually expressed activism for neighborhood work were assigned to welfare committees (*fuliweiyuanhui*) [福利委員會].⁴⁰⁾

Combining labor-employment and rectification was based on two factors. First, the party-state, specifically the Labor Bureau (*laodongju*) [勞動局], had the power of job placement and gave priority to the registered ones during neighborhood labor-employment work: For instance, in one Labor Bureau report, it was written that people in Shanghai city firmly believed that the most effective

37) SMA B1-2-509-33 「Shanghaishi renminzhengfu minzhengju guanyu gequ jiehe laodongjiuye zhengdun juminweiyuanhui gongzuode qingkuang baogao 上海市人民政府民政局關於各區結合勞動就業整頓居民委員會工作的情況報告」, November 1952

38) SMA B1-2-509-27「Shanghaishi renminzhengfu minzhengju guanyu jiehe laodongjiuye gongzuo jinxing zhengli juminweiyuanhui zuzhi ji diaocha youguan minzhen gongzuo qing kuangde gongzuo jihua 上海市人民政府民政局關於結合勞動就業工作進行整理居民委員會組織及調查有關民政工作情況的工作計劃」, November 1951

39) SMA B168-2-772-50「Shanghaishi minzhengju guanyu gequ jiehe laodongjiuye zhengdun juminweiyuanhui gongzuode qingkuang huibao 上海市民政局關於各區結合勞動就業整頓居民委員會工作的情況匯報」, 1953

40) SMA B168-1-760-82 : op.cit

way to find work was to visit the Labor Bureau; when the unemployed saw job advertisements, they came to the bureau and demanded letters of introduction to work units rather than going directly to units and interviewing.⁴¹⁾ The Labor Bureau thus came to use job placement as leverage in the labor-employment movement. For example, when the *weihaibieshu* [威海別墅] residential committee requested permission to give jobs to unemployed neighborhood activists during the fourth plenary session of the Second People's Congress of Shanghai City (*erjiesicirenmindai biaohuiyi*) [二屆四次人民代表會議], the Labor Bureau promised to give priority of job placement to activists and neighborhood cadres who had been registered.⁴²⁾

Second, people generally relied on the party-state when looking for work. The Labor Bureau reported citizens' strong dependence on governments' job placement; Most of petitions to the party-state, whether in writing (*laixin*) [來信] or in visits to government offices (*laifang*) [來訪], were demands for job placement. In the first plenary session of the People's Congress (*quanguorenmindai biaodahui*) [全國人民代表大會], the peoples' representatives appealed that the party-state must provide solutions for the unemployment problem because the unemployed residents were as desperate as if they had been thrown into burning fire.⁴³⁾ The municipal Labor Bureau in Shanghai regarded the dependency of the jobless as a serious ideological problem and suggested that citizens who is seeking work blindly demand job placement from the party-state because the municipal government had provided this service for a long time. Even the unqualified, the elderly and unskilled believed that the government was going to arrange work for them, and those who were refused for job placement panicked and even developed strong dissatisfaction with the party-state.⁴⁴⁾

With these reliable bases as a background, the policy developed of merging labor-employment with neighborhood rectification: One hundred thousand people found work in Shanghai city in one year⁴⁵⁾, and many activists were elected as residential committee members. In April 1955, when

41) SMA B4-2-77 : 「Shanghaishi laodongju deng danwei guanyu shiye gongren donglingjiuji, laodongjiuye, laozizhengyi, gongshiwentide baogao qingkuang zongjie laiwang wenshu 上海市勞動局等單位關於失業工人冬令救濟,勞動就業,勞資爭議,工時問題的報告情況總結來往文書」, November 1954

42) SMA L1-1-34-74 「Shanghaishi laodongju guanyu zhaogu linongshiyede jijifenzi gongzuo zuohao laodongjiuye gongzuo fangmian deng tian chuli qingkuang dihan 上海市勞動局關於照顧里弄失業的積極分子工作做好勞動就業工作方面等提案處理情況的函」, November 1952

43) SMA B4-2-77 : op.cit

44) SMA A38-2-356-66: 「Shanghaishi renminzhengfu laodongju guanyu Guanche laodongjiuye xinfangzhenzhong jieshao jiuye yu zixingjiuye xiangjiehe banfade fangan 上海市人民政府勞動局關於貫徹勞動就業新方針中介紹就業與自行就業相結合辦法的方案」, March 1954

45) SMA B127-1-321-1 「Shanghai laodongju Wangke tongzhi zai Shanghaishi disan jiecici renmindai biao dahuishangde

the third step in the last stage of rectification, the neighborhood reelections, had largely proceeded, 47,364 cadres had lost their seats and 139,131 people had been newly elected.⁴⁶⁾ Thus it can be said that the neighborhood cadres as the leading forces of public welfare services in the Shanghai grassroots had been successfully supplemented.⁴⁷⁾

And it can be said that people began to recognize the position of neighborhood cadre as an opportunity for job after neighborhood rectification was over, as reported in documents from government organs and mass organizations. Unemployed persons who had been newly elected as members of residential committees in 1954 believed that they would have priority in job placement, and they complained when the government emphasized conducting their own job search efforts: “Everything we do for the neighborhood is useless! (*qiangongjinqi*)[前功盡棄]” and “We don’t have rights, only duties!(*youzhiwuquan*)[有職無權]”⁴⁸⁾

In addition to the unemployed, local housewives took charge as cadres of the public services in their communities in return for their services as residential committee members, and as soon as they learned that their hopes were to be dashed for a number of reasons, they were strongly dissatisfied: “[The party-state] always puts us in the front line of working for the neighborhood but not in the front line of getting a job! (*linonggongzuo yangyangyaodaitou, jiuyezebuyawomendaitou*)[里弄工作樣樣要帶頭,就業則不要我們帶頭]” They also rushed their Women’s Federation street and district offices, even as they never considered whether they were qualified for job placement or not.⁴⁹⁾

Filling the cadre posts demonstrated the efficiency of the party-state’s strategy in 1954: Through neighborhood rectification, the possibility of employment was a powerful inducement to residents to work for their neighborhood communities. However, after 1955, the party-state inevitably decreased its proportions of placements for neighborhood residents as businesses and factories in Shanghai employed workers with high skills or raised the productivity of laborers they already had.⁵⁰⁾ In that

fayangao : shinianlai Shanghai laodongjiuye gongzuo 上海市勞動局王克同志在上海市第三屆二次人民代表大會上的發言稿：十年來上海勞動就業工作，June 1959

46) SMA B168-1-760-185 「Shanghaishi juminweiyuanhui zuzhi gongzuo qingkuang 上海市居民委員會組織工作情況」, 1952

47) SMA B2-1-22-95「Shanghaishi juminweiyuanhui zuzhi gongzuo qingkuang 上海市居民委員會組織工作情況」, May 1955

48) SMA A38-2-356-43「Shanghaishi Putuoqu disan banshichu guanyu xuanchuan Guanche laodongjiuye xinfangzhen shidian gongzuo baogao 上海市普陀區第三辦事處關於宣傳貫徹勞動就業新方針試點工作報告」, June 1954

49) SMA C31-1-168 「Shanghaishi fulian diaoyanshi guanyu funu laodongjiuye wentide gongzuoyijian, diaocha baogao ji xuanchuan tigang 上海市婦聯調研室關於婦女勞動就業問題的工作意見,調查報告及宣傳提綱」, 1956

50) SMA A20-2-59-14「Zhonggong Shanghaishi weilinong zhengfeng lingdao xiaozu bangongshi guanyu zhuanfa

sense, it was more of an outcome than an achievement of the party-state's governing technique using employment to facilitate grassroots public service during neighborhood rectification that Shanghai residents came to consider neighborhood cadre a post that gave advantage in job placement.

VI. Conclusion

The 1954 neighborhood rectification was a heritage of the CCP's Zhengfeng [整風] campaign. In the major aspect of targeting a wide range of enemies and denouncing them in public, ultimately driving them from community leadership, it faithfully followed the Zhengfeng campaign that was established at 1940s Yen-an, and this is why the politics of the rectification have entered the spotlight. However, this article suggests that the 1954 neighborhood rectification had important meanings in other areas. It directly related to one of the major dilemmas in governing a city: How do leaders make residents do what is undesirable but necessary for their communities even with no reward and harsh working conditions? The 1954 rectification aimed to supplement human resources in the name of combination between labor-employment campaign and neighborhood reorganization. Using job placement as an inducement, the party-state in Shanghai led residents to take charge of public services at the grassroots of society. In the 1954 neighborhood rectification, the party-state combined labor-employment policy with the rectification process by nominating the unemployed who registered with the government as candidates for neighborhood cadre positions; in turn, the party-state gave job placement priority to person who responded positively to the measure. And, through neighborhood rectification, residents began to regard becoming a neighborhood cadre and providing public service to the community as a chance for job placement. The result was that the final step of the rectification process was completed: In combination with the labor-employment policy, rectification succeeded at securing sufficient numbers of neighborhood cadres.

In 1954, the government's efforts met the need for public welfare in the grassroots of Shanghai. The government's efforts warranted focus because its methods differed from traditional governance under the Communist regime. The process was not coercion by a totalitarian state, but it was also not

Zhonggong Shanghai shi laodongju Dangzhu guanyu linong zhengfengzhong laodongjiuye wentide xuanchuan jiaoyu cankao tigangde tongzhi 中共上海市委里弄整風領導小組辦公室關於轉發中共上海市勞動局黨組關於里弄整風中勞動就業問題的宣傳教育參考提綱的通知, March 1958

under the standard functions of bureaucracy that were common in modern cities. The neighborhood rectification process did not even adhere to the moral persuasion that the CCP had always used to govern society. Attracting residents to public welfare provision in service to their communities during the neighborhood rectification of 1954 could be considered a sophisticated governing strategy based on people's desires and mentality, specifically using job placement as an inducement. This process also defined an unusual type of communication and trade between the state and society in a socialist city.

Ethical considerations

Ethical issues (including plagiarism, informed consent, misconduct, data fabrication and/or falsification, double publication and/or submission, and redundancy) have been completely observed by authors.

Conflict of Interests

The authors have no conflict of interests to declare.

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