DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

A Scoping Review of Components of Physician-induced Demand for Designing a Conceptual Framework

  • Mohammadshahi, Marita (Department of Health Management and Economics, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences) ;
  • Yazdani, Shahrooz (Department of Cardiology, School of Medicine, Alborz University of Medical Sciences) ;
  • Olyaeemanesh, Alireza (National Institute of Health Research, Group of Payment and Financial Resources of the Health System, Tehran University of Medical Sciences) ;
  • Sari, Ali Akbari (Department of Health Management and Economics, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences) ;
  • Yaseri, Mehdi (Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences) ;
  • Sefiddashti, Sara Emamgholipour (Department of Health Management and Economics, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences)
  • Received : 2018.10.13
  • Accepted : 2018.12.10
  • Published : 2019.03.31

Abstract

Objectives: The current study presents a new conceptual framework for physician-induced demand that comprises several influential components and their interactions. Methods: This framework was developed on the basis of the conceptual model proposed by Labelle. To identify the components that influenced induced demand and their interactions, a scoping review was conducted (from January 1980 to January 2017). Additionally, an expert panel was formed to formulate and expand the framework. Results: The developed framework comprises 2 main sets of components. First, the supply side includes 9 components: physicians' incentive for pecuniary profit or meeting their target income, physicians' current income, the physician/population ratio, service price (tariff), payment method, consultation time, type of employment of physicians, observable characteristics of the physician, and type and size of the hospital. Second, the demand side includes 3 components: patients' observable characteristics, patients' non-clinical characteristics, and insurance coverage. Conclusions: A conceptual framework that can clearly describe interactions between the components that influence induced demand is a critical step in providing a scientific basis for understanding physicians' behavior, particularly in the field of health economics.

Keywords

References

  1. Amporfu E. Private hospital accreditation and inducement of care under the ghanaian national insurance scheme. Health Econ Rev 2011;1(1):13. https://doi.org/10.1186/2191-1991-1-13
  2. McGuire TG. Physician agency and payment for primary medical care. In: Sherry Glied S, Smith PC, editors. The Oxford handbook of health economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011, p. 503-517.
  3. Folland S, Goodman AC, Stano M. The economics of health and health care. 8th ed. New York: Routledge; 2017, p. 195-207.
  4. Munkerud SF. Decision-making in general practice: the effect of financial incentives on the use of laboratory analyses. Eur J Health Econ 2012;13(2):169-180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-010-0295-6
  5. Iversen T. The effects of a patient shortage on general practitioners' future income and list of patients. J Health Econ 2004; 23(4):673-694. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.10.001
  6. De Jaegher K, Jegers M. A model of physician behaviour with demand inducement. J Health Econ 2000;19(2):231-258. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00029-6
  7. Liao CC. Evidence of physician (supplier) induced demand and physician altruism [dissertation]. Detroit: Wayne State University; 2009.
  8. Arrieta A. Over-utilization of cesarean sections and misclassification error. Health Serv Outcomes Res Methodol 2015;15(1): 54-67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10742-014-0132-y
  9. Shigeoka H, Fushimi K. Supplier-induced demand for newborn treatment: evidence from Japan. J Health Econ 2014;35:162-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.003
  10. Ma KZ. Fertility rate, use of cesarean delivery, and the role of information gap: evidence from Taiwan [dissertation]. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina; 2007.
  11. Xirasagar S, Lin HC. Physician supply, supplier-induced demand and competition: empirical evidence from a single-payer system. Int J Health Plann Manage 2006;21(2):117-131. https://doi.org/10.1002/hpm.836
  12. Busato A, Kunzi B. Primary care physician supply and other key determinants of health care utilisation: the case of Switzerland. BMC Health Serv Res 2008;8:8. https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-8-8
  13. Grytten J, Carlsen F, Skau I. Primary physicians' response to changes in fees. Eur J Health Econ 2008;9(2):117-125. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-007-0049-2
  14. Dai T. Incentives in U.S. healthcare operations. Decis Sci 2015; 46(2):455-463. https://doi.org/10.1111/deci.12136
  15. Mooney G. Challenging health economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009, p. 35-49.
  16. Garber AM, Sox HC. The U.S. physician workforce: serious questions raised, answers needed. Ann Intern Med 2004;141(9): 732-734. https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-141-9-200411020-00018
  17. Wilensky GR, Rossiter LF. The relative importance of physician-induced demand in the demand for medical care. Milbank Mem Fund Q Health Soc 1983;61(2):252-277. https://doi.org/10.2307/3349907
  18. Welch WP, Miller ME, Welch HG, Fisher ES, Wennberg JE. Geographic variation in expenditures for physicians' services in the United States. N Engl J Med 1993;328(9):621-627. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM199303043280906
  19. Hemenway D, Fallon D. Testing for physician-induced demand with hypothetical cases. Med Care 1985;23(4):344-349. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005650-198504000-00006
  20. Grytten J. Supplier inducement--its relative effect on demand and utilization. Community Dent Oral Epidemiol 1992;20(1): 6-9. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0528.1992.tb00664.x
  21. Grytten J, Sorensen R. Type of contract and supplier-induced demand for primary physicians in Norway. J Health Econ 2001; 20(3):379-393. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00087-4
  22. Labelle R, Stoddart G, Rice T. A re-examination of the meaning and importance of supplier-induced demand. J Health Econ 1994;13(3):347-368. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(94)90036-1
  23. Arksey H, O'Malley L. Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework. Int J Soc Res Methodol 2005;8(1):19-32. https://doi.org/10.1080/1364557032000119616
  24. Bentham J. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation; 2017 [cited 2018 Dec 20]. Available from: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/bentham1780.pdf.
  25. Tussing AD, Wojtowycz MA. Physician-induced demand by Irish GPs. Soc Sci Med 1986;23(9):851-860. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(86)90213-3
  26. Chari VV, Kehoe PJ, McGrattan ER. New Keynesian models: not yet useful for policy analysis. Am Econ J Macroecon 2009;1(1): 242-266. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.1.1.242
  27. Feldman R, Sloan F. Competition among physicians, revisited. J Health Polit Policy Law 1988;13(2):239-261. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-13-2-239
  28. Sekimoto M, Ii M. Supplier-induced demand for chronic disease care in Japan: multilevel analysis of the association between physician density and physician-patient encounter frequency. Value Health Reg Issues 2015;6:103-110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vhri.2015.03.010
  29. Busato A, Matter P, Kunzi B. Factors related to treatment intensity in Swiss primary care. BMC Health Serv Res 2009;9:49. https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-9-49
  30. Rochaix L. Information asymmetry and search in the market for physicians' services. J Health Econ 1989;8(1):53-84. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(89)90009-X
  31. Delattre E, Dormont B. Fixed fees and physician-induced demand: a panel data study on French physicians. Health Econ 2003;12(9):741-754. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.823
  32. Mathes T, Pieper D, Mosch CG, Jaschinski T, Eikermann M. Payment methods for hospitals. Cochrane Database of Syst Rev 2014;6:CD011156.
  33. McKinlay JB, Potter DA, Feldman HA. Non-medical influences on medical decision-making. Soc Sci Med 1996;42(5):769-776. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(95)00342-8
  34. Hadley J, Reschovsky JD. Medicare fees and physicians' medicare service volume: beneficiaries treated and services per beneficiary. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 2006;6(2):131-150. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-006-8143-z
  35. van Dijk CE, Verheij RA, te Brake H, Spreeuwenberg P, Groenewegen PP, de Bakker DH. Changes in the remuneration system for general practitioners: effects on contact type and consultation length. Eur J Health Econ 2014;15(1):83-91. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-013-0458-3
  36. Kinder K. Assessing the impact of payment method and practice setting on German physicians' practice patterns. J Ambul Care Manage 2001;24(2):11-18. https://doi.org/10.1097/00004479-200104000-00003
  37. van Dijk CE, van den Berg B, Verheij RA, Spreeuwenberg P, Groenewegen PP, de Bakker DH. Moral hazard and supplier-induced demand: empirical evidence in general practice. Health Econ 2013;22(3):340-352. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.2801
  38. Kim B. Do doctors induce demand? Pac Econ Rev 2010;15(4): 554-575. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2010.00515.x
  39. Rice TH. The impact of changing medicare reimbursement rates on physician-induced demand. Med Care 1983;21(8): 803-815. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005650-198308000-00004
  40. Carlsen F, Grytten J. Consumer satisfaction and supplier induced demand. J Health Econ 2000;19(5):731-753. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00044-8
  41. Gosden T, Forland F, Kristiansen IS, Sutton M, Leese B, Giuffrida A, et al. Impact of payment method on behaviour of primary care physicians: a systematic review. J Health Serv Res Policy 2001;6(1):44-55. https://doi.org/10.1258/1355819011927198

Cited by

  1. Hospital-based health technology assessment in Brazil: current experiences and challenges vol.37, pp.1, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266462321000581
  2. Longitudinal Association of Salaries for Medical Staff With Medical Service Utilization and Expenditure in China, 2007-2016 vol.9, 2019, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.767541
  3. Appropriateness of angiography for suspected coronary artery disease vol.73, pp.3, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ihj.2021.04.004
  4. Policy Analysis of Gastrointestinal Cancer Prevention in Iran: A Framework Based on a Qualitative Study vol.13, pp.3, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1002/wmh3.389