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굿 거버넌스 전통 공여국 원조와 부패: 아프리카 43개국 분석연구

Traditional Donors in Good Governance and Corruption: Analysis on 43 African Recipients

  • 김다슬 (중앙대학교 정치국제학과) ;
  • 장혜영 (중앙대학교 정치국제학과)
  • Kim, Da Sul (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University) ;
  • Chang, Hyeyoung (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University)
  • 투고 : 2019.10.17
  • 심사 : 2019.12.20
  • 발행 : 2019.12.28

초록

본 연구는 굿 거버넌스 논의에 기반한 원조의 영향에 대한 경험적 분석을 통해 전통공여국 OECD DAC 원조와 수원국 부패 간 관계를 분석한다. 이를 위하여 본 연구는 2000년부터 2014년까지 OECD DAC 원조 데이터, 부패인식 지수, 세계은행 데이터, 민주주의 지수를 중심으로 고정효과모형과 PCSE 모형을 사용하였다. 통계 분석을 시행한 결과 OECD DAC의 원조가 아프리카 수원국의 부패에 부정적 영향을 주고 있음을 확인하였다. DAC의 원조는 아프리카 국가들의 부패 정도를 심화시키는 영향을 주며, 특히 민주주의가 발전한 국가에서 그 영향의 정도가 커짐을 확인할 수 있다. 이는 OECD DAC의 굿 거버넌스 중심의 원조와 수원국 부패 간 관계에 대해 보다 종합적인 후속 연구가 필요하다는 점과 함께, 지역적 특수성을 고려하였을 때에는 일반적으로 인식하고 있는 민주주의 제도 발전의 긍정적 효과가 오히려 역전되어 나타날 수 있다는 점을 제기한다.

This study analyzes the relationship between OECD DAC aid and recipients' corruption based on the good governance discussion. The study applies a fixed-effect model and PCSE model with a dataset of 43 African countries' corruption perception index, World Bank data, Polity IV, and OECD DAC aid statistics between 2000 and 2014. A statistical analysis confirmed that OECD DAC aid has a negative impact on corruption in African countries. DAC's aid affects negatively to corruption in African countries, especially in countries where democracy has matured. This research suggests that a more comprehensive follow-up study of the OECD DAC's good governance-oriented aid. Simultaneously, the general democratic effect on the recipients' institutions could not be applied in African countries, when considering regional peculiarities.

키워드

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