

Regime Type and Its Impact on the Identity Crisis of Arab Maghreb Union

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논문요약

이 논문은 북아프리카의 ‘아랍 Maghreb 연합’(AMU) 지역조직의 체제형태가 정체성에 어떻게 영향을 미치는가에 초점을 맞추어 지역주의와 지역조직에 접근하고 재고하기 위한 시도이다. 이 논문의 초점은 지역주의를 연구하는 비전통적인 방법으로서 국내 정치의 중요성에 대해 다를 것이다. 그리고 지역주의에 대한 많은 연구들과 달리, 이 논문은, 일반적으로 보안이나 경제에 오래된 지역주의 패러다임의 결과로 초점을 맞추는 현실주의자들과 자유주의자들이 강조한 것과는 달리, 이 논문은 지역주의를 이해하기 위한 지침으로 국내 정치를 강조할 것이다.

주제어 : 지역주의, 정체성, 지역화, 체제 유형

I . Introduction

Driven mainly by many, and often, interrelated systemic transformations that followed the second world war and the collapse of bipolar system, many states saw in regionalism their way of survival and strength against the biased international institutions like the world Bank and IMF. the North African countries have also been stimulated to work to achieve the integration of the region by establishing the "Arab Maghreb Union"(AMU) in February 17th 1989, and rethinking its functionality after "Arab spring" in 2011.

A great deal of written literature about the integration of North African countries see that *"the obstacles facing the AMU are both economic and political"*(Mortimer 1993) with a taken for granted belief that the region is culturally and ethnically homogenous. For example, Abdel Hamid Ebrahim (Abdel Hamid Ebrahim 1996), undoubtedly, presented MAU's identity as something already chosen to be mono-oriented to Arab is mand Islamism regardless of the challenges this identity is facing from many raising ethnic groups(Abel Hamid Ebrahim 1996). Cuhe and Denys(Denys 2010) tried to discuss the question of identity but inagener always without problem at izingit. They have emphasized the non-integration of MAU economically and politically. They also tried to show the challenge that regional identity is facing with the rise of many political and ethnical groups in the region. However, they failed to explain how this ethnical group challenged MAU's identity. Rodrigo de Rato, on the other hand(L'Economiste 2005), focused only on describing the weak economic integration of MAU as the only explanation of the failure of the organization to maintain the integration of its sates.

It is also believed that the main reason behind the failure of MAU to hold on a strong sense of identity and belonging to the chosen identity "Pan-Arabism" is the "Western Sahara" conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

However, the reason why this issue has received much attention more than other similar issues in the region (Libya and Tunisia dispute over the borders) is because most of this literature see Morocco and Algeria as the only hegemons of the other five members, which give this issue more priority in any analysis of the organization.

The only one who seriously discussed national identity building in North Africa in the region, so far, is Karim Mezranin in his book *"Negotiation and Construction of National Identities"*(2007). He suggested an interesting approach to national identity understanding by focusing on the impact of inter-elite negotiations on the way national identity is finally built. However, what Mezran failed to explain is the factors that lead this leader to choose to negotiate in the first place while others they don't.

It is obvious now that any serious attempt toward understanding MAU's geopolitics requires an analysis that doesn't limit its investigation to the surface ontology (structure), like most of neorealist and liberalists do. However, we need an analysis that goes deeper to touch the deep ontology (agent) in order to explain how the politics are really constructed and stimulated. A one that looks at how domestic politics are built in North Africa before and after the independence of these states and how these domestic politics are challenged during periods of intentions like "Arab Spring".

The two core questions that this paper will attempt to answer, that most of above literature failed to raise is, why does Moroccan Constitution reflect pluralistic identity, which led to the identity crisis of the AMU, while other members maintained mono-oriented identity, Pan-Arabism?' The second question is 'in what ways have Morocco and other members constructed distinctive national identities and how have they operationalized and caused identity crisis in the AMU?'

My argument is that AMU has witnessed identity crisis as different political regimes have constructed distinctive national identity. In particular, Morocco could have pluralistic identity since it has monarchy while others have created mono-oriented national identity because they are authoritarian regime.

The argument of this paper will be framed under the new regionalists-constructivists' theory. The research will be approached by adopting, first, a historical analysis to explain the way Moroccan national and regional identities were built and negotiated before and after so called "Arab Spring". And by employing discourse analysis to Moroccan king's speech during so called "Arab spring", to prove his emphasis on Morocco's pluralistic national identity rather than a mono-dimensional one.

Since this paper's independent variable lies within domestic politics' level, and since the aim of this paper is to show how this variable, located at the micro-regionalism level, might have an impact on the way regional politics work (macro-regionalism); one then needs to adopt a definition that goes hand in hand with this level of analysis. Therefore, we need to employ a definition that follows one of Bjorn Hettne who sees regionalism to be "*part of global structure in which also a variety of non-state actors were operating at several levels*"(Hettne 2003). According to Bjorn Hettne, "*The new regionalism also presupposes the growth of a regional civil society opting for regional solutions to local and national problems. The implication of this is that not only economic, but also social and cultural networks are developing more quickly than the formal political cooperation at the regional level*"(Hettne 1994).

II. Arab Maghreb Union : Historical Overview and Identity Crisis

Under current rapid world change, regionalism appeared to be growing rapidly. Since the cold war, regional organizations started appearing in different forms and shapes with different aims and working strategies. Efforts of regionalism in North Africa and the Middle East started with so called the Pan-Arabism project in 19th century. After the First World War, and the decline of Turkish\Ottoman rule over many Arab and non-Arab countries, the sentiments of nationalism have led many Arab leaders to the creation of the Arab league, in March 1945, as a first step to establishing a unified Arab state. In their attempts to create this latter, they divided the so called "the Arab world" into three regions. Two of these regions have sub-regional organizations. For example, North Africa established "Maghreb Arab Union" with modest integration and limited gains. The Gulf region to some extent succeeded in creating a more integrated organization, economically and culturally.

Geographically speaking, all members of MAU are located in North Africa; a territory that stretches from Morocco in the west to Egypt in the east. Some of the countries that constitute the region are: Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania, which are also part of MAU. Historically speaking, these five countries share a lot of cultural and political backgrounds that goes back to pre-Islamic dynasty. This shared background has always been a source of their shared political culture, (Joffé 2009) regardless of their radical political system differences. However, this shared political cultural went through many modifications due to each state's political and social experiences during colonial and

post-colonial periods.

All North African countries faced years of western imperialist colonization, especially by France and Spain. After their long fight and resistance against the imperialist powers, the five countries eventually emerged from the shadow but weak economically exhausted socially and divided politically. However, the leaders saw in their unity a way for more economic development and stability.

Therefore, the five countries have pushed successfully for establishing ‘Arab Maghreb Union’(AMU) in 1989 in Marrakech, Morocco. The organization put forward to overcome many challenges to meet many objectives that cover all the aspects of cooperation among its members including economic, defense and international fields.

Regardless of the leaders’ efforts to build a more integrated organization, MAU has ended up in a striking failure. The level of cooperation and integration is decreasing dramatically. In 2003 intra-trade between the members of the union is only 3 per cent. In 2005 Rodrigo Rato, international Monetary Fund, managing director said "throughout the region, economic growth has remained slow. Its potential unemployment is still much too high..."(Weeks 2008). Politically, Morocco and Algerian relations are always at the edge of intention than peace and cooperation. Borders between them are closed which limits the flow of goods and people.

What is more striking and worth noting about the case of MAU is its failure to maintain its members’ integrity regardless of it being a sub-regional organization which emerged from the background of Arab league and motivated by the goals of Pan-Arabism’s united Arab world. Therefore, the question that raises itself here, is to what extent this

adopted Pan-Arabism is the only legitimate national as well as regional identity for the whole people of the region?

In the case of MAU, the question of regional identity has always been a complicated issue, particularly in Morocco and Algeria. Ideologically speaking, North Africa is seen by many Arab nationalists as part of "the Arab world". Constitutionally speaking, most of North African states are Arab-Islamic states, with Arabic as the sole official language, except Morocco. But historically speaking, North Africa has never been an Arab area. According to Shafer, The Berbers have existed, at least in name, as a recognized ethnic group for over 3,000 years(Shafer 1959). The word Berber is, in fact, a derivation of the ancient Greek word *barbaroi*—barbarian. people were already established in North Africa since 1000BC. In this research I will keep using both of the terminologies but still referring to same native people of North Africa. what is more striking though about North Africa is that even with these years of assimilation and Arabization since the 7th century, the Amazigh still present 40% to 50% in Morocco, more than 20% in Algeria and with smaller communities in Libya (approximately 8 to 9 percent), Tunisia (approximately 1 to 2 percent) For more details about the number of Amazigh people in North Africa see : **Arabization and Its Discontents: The Rise of the Amazigh Movement in North Africa**, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman ersion of record first published: 12 Dec. 2012 and small minorities stretching from Mali to Egypt. For some, these figures are very low and don't represent the real number of Amazigh people, the percentages may be much higher. For more details, see Salah Shakir Aujourd'hui L Harmatten Paris, 1989.

The questions I need to answer now are: first, to what extent these

Amazigh people could challenge these states' mono-oriented Arabism identity? And if they do, how do they manage to do it? And what is the outcome of their challenge in each state? And what did lead to that out come?

When Pan-Arabism started spreading as an ideology during colonialism and immediately after the independence of these countries, many people including Amazigh people have blindly embraced it without even questioning its hidden agendas. It seemed in its first years that it will never be challenged as long as it is used as a way to enhance peoples' nationalism against western imperialists. However, years after the independence and with the growth of peoples' consciousness toward their own mother language, Pan-Arabism started facing the challenge of Amazigh movement and *"The central demands of this movement are recognition of the existence of the Amazigh people as a collective, as well as of the historical and cultural Amazighite of North Africa"* (Maddy-Weitzman 2012).

There are many levels where MAU's regional identity (Pan-Arabism) has been challenged by the new born Amazigh movement. This challenge has obviously started domestically to shape the whole structure of national identity building in some countries like Morocco and Algeria, to eventually spread to many other countries, especially after the strong wave of Arab spring, like Libya and Tunisia. And this challenge clearly appears in the socio-political, legal and international forms.

As far as the international level is concerned, Arabism has been challenged by the evolvment of Amazigh activism internationally. In other words, the Amazigh consciousness and fight for their rights went beyond

the borders of Morocco and Algeria to reach all other MAU's states. This was very significant when activists from many parts of MAU and many other activists from Europe and North America got together in 1997 to hold their first, but not the last, World Amazigh Congress in Canary Islands. Holding an activity like this one shows that the impact of Amazigh Movement is not just limited to what is domestic but it even exceeded to impact foreign policy. This transnational consciousness, developed by Amazigh activists, shows clearly, and unlike what Pan-Arabism claims, that Pan-Arabism is no longer the only legitimate ideology that exist in North Africa but it is just one of many. And that "Amazighism", so to speak, is not just an identity for some of North African citizens but a big challenge to Pan-Arabism.

Socio-politically speaking, the awareness of Amazigh people to their heritage is no longer a matter of people in rural areas. The question of self-awareness has started empowering many young educated people in big cities. This awareness is quickly translated to practical social and cultural associations that put protecting and promoting Amazigh culture in the core of its activities. Many other associations with the same goals have appeared, especially in Morocco and to some extent in Algeria while they are very limited in both Tunisia and Libya. These associations have succeeded to build an international network of Amazigh associations all over the world. According to Hagan, *"Representatives of TAMAYNUT have acted on the international level, and are active in an international Amazigh Coalition, which includes number of associations from various countries of Africa, such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, the Canary Islands, Mali, and Burkina-aso. (C.A.I.D.D.H) The international coalition, including*

the TAZZLA INSTITUTE of the United States as one of its members, is headed by bdenourBenyahya, and is an NGO working out of Geneva, Switzerland. Representatives of AMAYNUT are equally active with the World mazigh Congress, (C.M.A.)"(Hagan 2015, 31).

Accordingly, one can say that the challenge of these civil societies to AMU's regional identity is not just limited to what is cultural but it is even now a political and legal challenge. moreover, this challenge is not just happening at the national level nor at the regional level but it is now even an international challenge.

However, one might still doubt the real ability of this Amazigh movement to Shake Arabism ideology in North Africa. It did for sure stand against this ideology; and identity landscape has for sure known radical changes in many AMU states. However, for a more serious and scientific research, one needs to consider the realpolitik side of the issue not just the moral and ideological side of it.

The turning point in the state of identity crisis of North Africa in general and AMU in particular started with the big change that happened at the level of Moroccan realpolitik. In other words, the real change happened after "Arab spring" when Morocco, as the only AMU country, recognized Amazigh language in its new constitution as an official language beside Arabic language. And as long as the realpolitik in the region is also challenged. Therefore, Arabism failed to keep and maintain its ideology in all its aspects. Its failure is proven now ideologically and politically with the rise of Amazigh movement and it is much more proven, legally with the recognition of Amazigh language in the constitution.

The question I have now to answer, in order to put the whole puzzle

together to link my independent variable with its dependent variable, is the reason that led Moroccan realpolitik to give up its already agreed upon mono-oriented identity of Pan-Arabism and embrace a more pluralistic one. What is the mechanism that played a great deal in generating this outcome and failed to do so in the case of other states of MAU, given the fact that these MAU states almost share the same historical and cultural background and have also experienced the same challenge of Amazigh movement? In the other words, I need to explore, more empirically, the bottom-up process of regionalization in Morocco. And I need to justify the claim that Moroccan civil society's regionalization process could have an effect on MAU's identity crisis.

III. Morocco's Regime Type and Identity Shift during Arab Spring

For many political observers and social scientists, "Arab Spring" was nothing but just an iceberg of how people in North Africa and Middle East have been really suffering under a group of patrimonial authoritarian regimes that took control of every aspect of their peoples' lives. However, this long lasted suffrage of people was just about to reach its end when a wave of protests, that started in Tunisia after the Mohamed El Bouazizi immolated himself in December 2010, have inspired millions of people in many parts of the "Arab world" to go out to express their discontent with their regimes, and to demand their political and cultural rights. The result was different from one regime to another. Some of these revolutions ended up in a total disaster like Syria and Libya, others are still struggling to bring peace and stability like Egypt and Tunisia and just

few of them have partially succeeded to bring some political reformations like the case of Morocco and Jordan.

As far as North Africa in generally and Morocco particularly is concerned, the wave of the protests was almost covering the whole country. The situation in Morocco is not also promising. Despite of many efforts the young king Mohamed VI has already done to improve the life of Moroccans, the economical situation is still lagging behind. The widespread of poverty and unemployment among young people is very high.

What is still interesting about the different outcomes of this snowball revolution isn't in the way it started nor in the countries that reached but in the fact that many countries have experienced regime change, as an aftermath of it, while others have succeeded to maintain their regimes regardless of the similarity of the socio-economic and political motives that sparked these revolutions. And also in the different ways these regimes reacted to this challenge.

This paper argues that the answer lies within the political and institutional features of each regime. In other words, what actually led Morocco to avoid any regime change and quickly responded to demands of the protesters, especially Amazigh movement, is basically related to this regime type and its institutions. But with the fact that most countries in North Africa and Middle East are categorized either as authoritarian regimes or dictatorships and non of them so far has yet built a real democracy, one might confidently ask what makes Morocco's regime type special and different than other regimes in North Africa?

It is hard to answer this question without comparing Moroccan regime type with its counterparts in MAU. Therefore, a general description of

Moroccan regime type in comparison with other MAU's member states regimes is necessary. Besides, what interests is not the regime type change per se, but rather how these regimes behaved and reacted, during the challenge of Arab Spring, toward their peoples' demands, particularly the Amazigh movement demands. And what is the impact of these regime types on the way identity was rebuilt during and after the Arab Spring.

It is unquestionable that neither Morocco nor any other MAU's member state have yet build a "real democracy", at least in its western sense. It is quite hard to easily classify MAU's regime types under certain categories. But as the general description goes, all the regimes in MAU are authoritative. Geddes "classifies *countries as military regimes, single-party dictatorships, personalist regimes, and hybrids of these types*" (Weeks 2008). And based on classification, we can specifically describe MAU's member states, before and during Arab spring, as either military regime type like in Algeria and Mauritania, personalist regimes like in Libya and Tunisia, or hybrids of these types like in Morocco.

The regime change that took place in both Libya and Tunisia and ended up in the downfall of some of the most authoritarian and old regimes in the region surprised not only to the people of these countries but even for many political scientists. The Tunisian and Libyan personalist regimes, as Geddes calls it, should have avoided easily any challenge of their existence. However, their fall showed clearly that these regimes weren't standing on a very solid social base nor organized political systems to make them stand still during the wave of Arab Spring. Tunisia, as Ata Anbarani describes it before Arab spring, was "*the Arab world's best educational system, largest middle class, and strongest*

organized labor movement for a long time"(Anbarani 2013).

Politically, Ben Ali was ruling the country with an iron hand. He completely controlled all the sensitive institutions of the country especially security services. Neither political parties nor social associations had a voice in deciding on the features of national politics. Although Tunisia was among the only Arab countries with multi-party system, however, Ben Ali controlled all these parties' legislations which made them weak and not effective. The regime completely ignored their participation in the political life of Tunisia (Alianak 2014), simply because it wasn't depending that much on them to survive. The case of Libya is not that different from Tunisia. As Ben Ali did, the Libyan dictator Qaddafi was also leading the country as his personal firm. He was the central of decision making without discussion. He didn't have a clear ideology as a basis for the country's national identity (Anderson 1986). His main goal was to root out any challenging political group that might oppose him (Sandbakken 2006). And regardless of being one of the richest countries of oil, the regime failed to utilize the support of the corrupted elites and tribe leaders that benefited from the revenues of this oil during the challenge of Arab Spring.

What is interesting in both of Libya and Tunisia, as far as Amazigh identity is concerned, is the total marginalization of this component of their culture, either before or even after the Arab spring, from any political or constitutional establishment. Both of these authoritarian regimes have either systematically and institutionally assimilated Amazigh identity like in the case of Tunisia, or politically oppressed anyone who calls for the recognition of this identity, like in the case of Libya. What is more, this situation is still the same even after the revolutions of "Arab Spring".

These new elected governments still insist on the Arabism as the only representative identity of their countries.

The Algerian case might spark many controversies. The country is not less authoritarian than Tunisia and Libya. It was under the control of the Algerian army since 1990s. The Army controls all aspects of life including the police and the intelligent system. To insure their long ruling of the country and the support of public opinion, the army successfully used its war against Islamist to justify its oppressive policies. And regardless of this misery conditions, the regime has survived the wave of Arab Spring without losing its control over the country. For many observers, the reason doesn't lie within the regime type per se but because of many inter-related considerations.

Firstly, and as Laryssa Chomiak and John P. argue, the conditions of corruption and unemployment among young people, that sparked the protests in many Arab countries, have existed in Algeria for a long time. Therefore, these challenges didn't profoundly threaten the Algerian regime. secondly, unlike the regimes in both Libya and Tunisia, the regime in Algeria encircled the anti-regime calls by announcing a series of constitutional changes which both of Ben Ali and Qaddafi failed to do. Thirdly, the memories of years of bloody civil war in 1990s prevented people to go violent during Arab spring and call for any regime change. However, and regardless of all these constitutional referendums, Amazigh language and identity have not yet been granted its position as an official language in the constitution(Laryssa Chomiak and John P. 2011).

Before stating the case of Morocco, it is necessary to mark some basic elements that distinguish Moroccan regime type from other regimes

of MAU in order to capture the reason why these regimes function differently. First of all, Morocco is the only monarchy among 4 republics in the whole North Africa. it is the only regime among the MAU member states' regimes which was established hundred years ago and still continuous till modern days. This historical legacy has led Moroccan regime to generate a very complex political system that combines to two dissimilar structures. The first one is an outcome of the modern state system. It is more bureaucratic and institutional while the second one is more traditional and patrimonial it is known as Makhzan(Daadaoui 2011) in Morocco and it is deeply rooted in the history of the country, especially the Islamic part of it. It is mainly an organized system of palace elites, high ranked officers, businessmen and tribe notables on whom the monarch or the king has relied on for many years to survive. this traditional system represents the king's religious charismatic power he received from the prophet which evokes fear and respect in Morocco. Unlike other MAU's member states regimes which their traditional side already melt in the modern sate systems, Moroccan Makhzan has survived and adopted itself within today's modern state system.

Regime type	Monarchy (hybrid regime)	Authoritarian
Political Actors	-King -Political parties -Civil society (Amazigh Associations)	President
Identity	Negotiated (pluralistic)	Not negotiated (mono-oriented)

1-This figure shows the relation between regime types and identity building

Therefore, it sounds more accurate if we describe Moroccan regime type as a hybrid regime that combines autocratic and democratic institutions (Levitsky and Lucan A. Way 2002). However, this description shouldn't be understood as a general applicable feature on any monarchy in the region of so called Arab World. Unlike James Bill and Robert Springborg's model that emphasizes the autocratic side of monarchies in the Middle East (Bill and Springborg 1990), the Moroccan hybrid monarchy on the other side, unlike the republics in MAU and the monarchs of Middle East, is a combination of the state-centric model that successfully co-operated the patrimonial leadership of the king, who in his turn, has profitably employed other mechanisms like Islam and democracy to justify the authoritarian side of his regime. However, we shouldn't understand by this that the regime in Morocco is less oppressive and more democratic than other regimes. Morocco, like other regimes, utilized harsh methods of oppression and persecution, especially during the king Hassan II. But unlike other regimes, it allowed more space to negotiation.

To sum up, what makes Moroccan hybrid regime different from other regimes, not just in North Africa but even in the whole "Arab World" is the following characteristic. First, the Moroccan regime is the only old but still continuous regime in the region of North Africa. Second, it is the only regime that maintained and cooperated the heritage of its patrimonial period since the establishment of Alawis' dynasty 350 years ago up to modern days. Third, all Moroccan kings, starting from Mohamed 5 up to his grand son Mohamed VI (the current king) have employed their religious mechanism power as the descent of the prophet of Islam family, which other regimes didn't use. And this helped to gain the acceptance of the people. This mechanism also helped the kings to be the central of power decision in the

county. Finally, the unique system of Makhzan, that Morocco has, combines within it a group of competitive and pluralistic, ethnically and socially, elites and tribal notables on which the whole monarchy depends to survive. This elite groups have always been the backbones of the monarchy's survival. All the kings have depended on them and allied with them, especially the Amazigh tribes. These elites compose what Weeks argues to be the autocratic audience cost. In other words, the hybrid Moroccan regime, similarly like the democratic ones but unlike other regimes in MAU, has an audience cost which the regime takes in consideration in any decision making.

The question now is to what extent has this audience cost affected the regime's decision making during Arab Spring. What are the impacts of the Arab Spring on the realpolitik of the country, especially the constitution, and how did this affect the identity building in general and the Amazigh one particularly?

IV. Identity shifts during "Arab spring"

On 20 February 2011, the cross-national Arab spring snowball has already reach Morocco. Thousands of people, mainly young, across the country marched in the street calling for their rights in a decent life, democracy and change.

The presence of Amazigh Movement during this revolt was very significant. Many of Amazigh activists joined the wave through their participation in February-the-20th movement. The movement insisted on a clear and urgent recognition of Amazigh identity and language not just in education and media but even in the constitution. So how did this

movement really challenged the regime? and what are the changes they brought to national identity building in the new adapted constitution, as an aftermath of Arab spring?

Morocco, like many other North African countries, has a complex identity that include Arabs, Amazigh, Jewish, Hassanie, African, and European cultures, which gives this country a mysterious beauty but is also a source of disorder and identity crisis. Therefore, if language is one of the foundations of any national identity, then describing Moroccan national identity under one single component, Arab-Islamic, is elusive and miss-leading.

A quick look at how identity was generated and constructed along Moroccan history, will show us that national identity under "Arabism" or "Amazighism" was never officially embraced in any legal document. Moroccan national identity, during the king Mohamed V was basically the one that put Islam as the core element that unites both Arabs and Amazigh. And as I already mentioned before, all Alawis kings tried not to adapt a clear cut definition of national identity to avoid being trapped with one side against the other. Therefore, they tried always to emphasis the Moroccanism side of national identity. The king Mohamed V in one of his speeches said *"Our people, who are situated in the shadow of Islam, who do not accept any discrimination between Arabs and Berbers, and who have only their love for fatherland as their ideal, is an example of solidarity and fraternity"*(ASLAN 2007). As we see in this speech neither Arabism nor Berberism (Amazighism) was emphasized. Hassan Ilin his turn tried to adopt the same strategy when it comes to the issue of deciding on Moroccan national identity. He himself emphasized the pluralistic side of Moroccan national identity in one of his speeches when he said *"We have to hold to the language of the Quran, but not at the expense of*

our authenticity and dialects, especially since there is not one of us who cannot be sure that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a small or large amount of cells which came from an origin which speaks one of Morocco's dialects"(Maddy-Weitzman 2011). Looking at his speech closely, one can see how Hassan II emphasized the importance of Arabic not as a language like any other language but rather as a one that is related to Islam or the language of the Quran. And beside that he also mentioned the importance of preserving Moroccan dialects by which he meant first Moroccan dialect and Amazigh language with its three dialects.

As we can see here, both of Mohamed 5 and his son Hassan II tried to avoid as much as they can to lean toward one identity component of his Makhzan's backbone elites against another one. Therefore, they decided to choose the safe side by adapting more general and ambiguous Moroccanism as an identity.

However, this safe game the monarchy has played for many years has to be changed. Immediately after the Moroccan independent in 1954, pan-Arabist gained the mainstream of Moroccan politics which lead them to emphasize one-sided version of Moroccan identity over the other sides. This didn't happen easily but it was an outcome of many political changes that followed the two failed coups d'états against Hassan II. And as an aftermath of them the Amazigh elites lost their strong alliance with the king because of being accused by Istiqlal party of being behind these coups. As a result, the Arabist took the ground from them. Istiqlal party took advantage of this by manipulating Morocco's national identity in the way that fitted their ideology, and this was also clearly shown the way the 1962 Morocco's first constitution and 1996's was constructed.

As far as the 1962 constitution is concerned, Lehtinen (Lehtinen 2003, 127) argued that regardless of how hard Alla Alfassi, the head of Istiqlal party, had pushed toward adopting the name "Arab Kingdom" in the 1962 constitution, however, the king refused his proposal. The 1996 constitution, on the other hand, described Moroccan national identity as "an Islamic, and fully sovereign state whose official language is Arabic, the kingdom of Morocco constitutes a part of great Maghreb"(Ruchti 2011). And as we can clearly see in this description, the constitution adopts Arabic as the only official language of the country but it doesn't strictly admit that Morocco is part of Maghreb Arab, but instead as part of the great Maghreb.

Nonetheless, this version of Moroccan nationalism has faced sever opposition, particularly from the Amazigh movement over the course of the last four decades. And the calls for promoting Amazigh identity sprang up around North Africa, especially in Algeria and Morocco. The Amazigh activists mainly call for a more inclusive pluralistic identity. They refuse the calls of Pan-Arabism since it doesn't present them. Ahmed Dgherni, the chef of the Moroccan Amazigh Democratic Party said "I oppose Arabist movements such as the UMA"(Hagan 2015).

The call of Amazigh actors for promoting their identity has never stopped. During the Arab spring their voice was raised again with a more determinant call. It was actually the right moment for the movement to put forward their demand to see Amazigh language recognized in as an official language in the constitution.

The call was once again heard by the king. Under the pressure of the "Arab spring" the king of Morocco Mohamed VI decided to meet some of the demands raised by the protesters, among them the reconstruction

of Moroccan identity and the recognition of Amazigh language beside other components of Moroccan identity officially in the constitution.

In his nationally televised speech, on March 2011, the king said *"First: a constitutional enshrinement of the varied character of the unified Moroccan identity, rich in its diversity and variety, with the Amazigh component as a core element residing within all Moroccans"* (Berntson 2014). From this speech we can see how the king himself admits the pluralistic side of Moroccan national identity. Amazigh language now isn't just part of the constitution but it is recognized as the core component of it. What is more, the way the king described identity wasn't just limited to the most represented components of Moroccan identity Amazigh and Arabic languages but it went beyond that to include other elements which have also been neglected for many years like Jewish and Hassani components.

After this speech the king publically ordered for a new revised constitution with a significant change that emphasizes on regional, cultural, linguistic and religious pluralism. Therefore, and unlike all previous constitutions, the article 5 of the new constitution embraces a more pluralistic and divers version of Moroccan national identity by stipulating first that *"Amazigh constitutes an official language of the state"*(Ruchti 2011) and second by emphasizing *"the Arab-Islamic, Amazigh, Sahrauan(Hassaniyya) components"*(Ruchti 2011). Besides, it also emphasized how these components are *"nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebrew, and Mediterranean influences"*(Ruchti 2011). The most important part that interests most this paper is the constitution's emphasis on that *"the Kingdom of Morocco, [a] united State, totally sovereign, belonging the Grand Maghreb"*(Ruchti 2011). The use of "Grand Maghreb" instead of

"Arab Maghreb" is very significant for the failure of Arabism officially as a uniting mechanism for Moroccan identity with other MAU member states.

The long Amazigh movement fight has eventually ended with a great victory by adopting Amazigh language in the constitution alongside Arabic. Therefore, MAU is experiencing a real identity crisis. Historically speaking, the region was not a solely an Arab land as pan-Arabists have claimed for many years. Ethnically and culturally speaking, North Africa is more pluralistic and it sounds miss-leading to describe it as a homogeneous region. Legally speaking, and as an aftermath of Arab spring, some countries have already adapted a new pluralistic constitution like Morocco, while others, like Algeria, are heading to do the same. And even politically speaking, the Arabism of MAU was challenged in 2003, when Saad Eddine El Othman, the Moroccan foreign minister, suggested to rename the organization as "The Maghreb Union" instead of "Arab Maghreb Union" www.moroccotomorrow.org.

V. Conclusion

This paper assumed that the deep ontology of domestic politics, like regime types, can have an effect on states strategic choices domestically, which might be carried into the systemic level. To prove this hypothesis, I empirically focused on the case of regional organizations identity building, MAU as an example, to prove the importance and the effect of domestic politics on the way identity is formed regionally. I first claimed that MAU, as an organization, is experiencing an identity crisis. I proved then that North African identity is much more plural than what

Pan-Arabism believed it to be. I explained how the Amazigh movement as one aspect of pluralism, in Algeria and Morocco, has strongly challenged Pan-Arabism ideology and proved itself to be a real political force that shouldn't be ignored. I concluded that, with the challenge of Amazigh Movement, Pan-Arabism failed ideologically and politically to be a unifying identity for MAU. I found out that Morocco, as a case study, showed more willingness to negotiate its national identity building than other states in the region did. I eventually explained the impact of MAU states regime types on the way their domestic politics conducted, the construction of their national identity, and its impact on the regional politics, the construction of the regional identity.

All in all, the question of identity integration of MAU might seem obvious and even unquestionable if it is approached by old regionalism. However, looking at the matter from the new regionalism perspective proves that regional identity is not only the concern of the state but also the concern of domestic politics, non-state actors.

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<Abstract>

Regime Type and Its Impact on the Identity Crisis of Arab Maghreb Union

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This paper is mainly an attempt to approach and rethink regionalism and regional organizations, as a new political phenomenon of our modern world politics, by focusing on the way regime types influence the identity building of Maghreb Arab Union regional organization in North Africa. The focus of this paper will be on the importance of domestic politics as a non-conventional way of studying regionalism. And unlike many studies of regionalism, generally emphasized by realists and liberalists that focus either on security or economy as an outcome of the old regionalism paradigm, this paper will emphasize domestic politics as a guiding line to understand the regional one.

Key Words : Regionalism, identity, regionalization, regime type.