
THE 'BOXER UPRISING' IN CHINA AND THE PAN-ISLAMIC POLICY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

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This article aims to examine European reactions against the Ottoman mission headed by Enver Pasha, who was dispatched to China during the 'Boxer Uprising' in 1901. Based on Western archival documents, we can find reliable and informative correspondence about the attitude of the European countries toward the sultan's mission and its pan-Islamic plans in China. The coming of the Ottoman mission caused great reaction in such European countries as Britain, France, Germany and Russia, who were engaged in a competitive power struggle for an influential political and economic position in China. They kept a close watch on the sultan's envoy to find out his secret mission on the one hand and tried to persuade Enver Pasha not to work against their advantage in China on the other.

From time to time, Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909), the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, sent China an official mission and secret agents, through whom he tried to subjugate Chinese Muslims for his own advantage¹. The significance for the

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¹ Abdul Hamid II came to power at the most critical period in Ottoman history, when he faced a lot of internal and external problems such as economic difficulties, struggles for independence among his minority ethnic groups, and the divide-and-share-out policy of the European powers against the Otto-

Ottoman Empire of any success in penetrating China by way of a pan-Islamic approach cannot be overrated, not only for political advantage but also for commercial and cultural benefit. Like other European countries, Ottomans could retain or gain rights which might bring them opportunities for free trade in opium and in other commodities.²

The sultan believed that they would constitute a great political factor to his advantage, because most of the tens of millions of Chinese Muslims recognized the Ottoman sultan as their caliph and praised him in their Friday sermon (Khutuba).³ Taking these factors into consideration, he decided to dispatch the Enver Pasha mission during the Boxer Uprising (1898-1901),⁴ responding to the suggestion of German Kaiser Wilhelm II. However, when the Ottoman mission arrived in China, the uprising had already been suppressed. This unexpected situation made the envoy initiate meaningful contacts with Chinese Muslims during its stay in China.

Keywords: Boxers Uprising, Ottoman, Enver Pasha, Abdul Hamid II, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Muslims in China

THE BACKGROUND OF THE BOXER UPRISING AND DISPATCH OF THE OTTOMAN ENVOY

The opium question had its origins in the late 18th century when the British attempted to counteract an unfavorable trade balance with China by trafficking Indian opium.

man Empire. In these circumstances, to prevail over the growing threat of the European 'super bloc', the sultan adopted an important pan-Islamic policy to mobilize the Islamic potentiality of his empire. The most articulate advocate of this theory, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, was welcomed to the Sublime Porte. As the head of the Muslim world, including North Africa, Egypt, India and even East Asia, the sultan would have several hundred million Muslims as his subjects. Hee Soo Lee, *The Advent of Islam in Korea: A Historical Survey* (Istanbul: IRICICA, 1997), 137-38.

² Foreign Office (FO). 371/432 No. 23604.

³ There are many contradictory options on the number of the Muslim population in China. *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* (Istanbul, March 6, 1908) mentioned seventy million, *Seyabat-ı Kübra* (St. Petersburg, 1906, 563, by Sulaimân Skukru) showed fifty five million, *Alem-i Islam* (Istanbul: 1909, by Abdurreshid Ibrahim), wrote between seventy and eighty million, FO. 371/432 (No. 31044) reported 16 million.

⁴ The Boxer Rebellion was well-known as the Yihetuan Movement (義和團運動) in China and Korea. It was a violent anti-foreign, anti-colonial and anti-Christian uprising that took place in China between 1899 and 1901, toward the end of the Qing dynasty.

It became the direct cause of the first Sino-British clash in 1840, the so called Opium War (1840-1842). The Treaty of Nanking was followed by two supplementary arrangements with the British in 1843 when the Chinese government surrendered to the British Army. With the signing of the treaty, the era of capitulation began. It provided a basis for the powers of tariff autonomy, extra-territoriality (exemption from the application or jurisdiction of local law or tribunals) and the free movement of visitors and would-be settlers.⁵

The post-Opium War arrangements extended foreign privileges and confirmed or legalized developments in the treaty-port system. The worst effects for the Chinese authorities were not those concerning material rights, such as trade, commerce and tariffs, but the privileges that affected the moral and cultural values of China. The right to propagate Christianity threatened Confucian values, the backbone of the imperial system. The permanent residence of foreign representatives in Peking signified an end to the long established dependent relationship that other nations had previously had with China. The Chinese looked on native Christians as lackeys of a foreign power and treated them as traitors to their country.⁶

In 1878, Russia occupied Port Arthur and Dairen on the Liao-tung peninsula and obtained the lease of the two ports and the right to build a railway connecting them to the Chinese Eastern Railway. Britain leased Wei-haixwei in Shantung and Kowloon and forced China to recognize the Yangtze valley as being under British influence. Following suit, Japan put the province of Fukien under its influence, and France leased Kuang-chou Bay and singled out three southwestern provinces for its sphere of influence. Germany, supported by its fleet, advanced to Shantung.⁷

Under such circumstances, the third quarter of the 19th century saw a series of uprisings against increasing foreign penetration and the intruders' attempts to Westernize the Chinese. One of the more violent anti-foreign riots was the Boxer Uprising, which could be directly attributed to such activities. The riot was staged by a band of people called *Yihetuan* (義和團: Righteous and Harmonious Fists), who believed that a mysterious boxing art rendered them invulnerable to harm. The Boxers, as they were called in the West, increased their membership by playing on the strong anti-foreign

⁵ Rifat Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih* (Istanbul: DR Yayinlar, 1978), 224.

⁶ Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 19.

⁷ Kenneth Latourette, *A Short History of the Far-East* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), 369-73; Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, 226.

sentiment aroused by the German advance, particularly in Shantung. The Boxers, who were composed of peasants, unemployed Grand Canal bargemen and local militiamen, started the uprising in 1900 and sought the violent destruction of all things foreign. Many foreigners including Baron (1853-1900), the German Ambassador to Peking, were massacred.⁸

As the violence of the riots increased, the European powers, whose advantageous positions were being seriously threatened, decided on an expedition at the suggestion of German Kaiser Wilhelm II. Waldersee (1823-1904), a veteran German marshal, was appointed the commander of an international force to suppress the riots. With the cooperation of a Chinese army lead by General Li Hung-chang (1823-1901), a national hero of China, international troops comprising 19,000 men marched to Peking and suppressed the uprising within a short period.

In the meantime, to pre-empt the possibility of Muslims' participation in the Boxer Uprising, the German kaiser requested the Ottoman sultan send an extraordinary envoy to China on a mission to advise Chinese Muslims not to join in the uprising. Abdul Hamid II did not want to reject the request of his friend the kaiser. Furthermore he recognized that he was being presented with the opportunity to play an unexpected role in the affairs of the great powers and possibly to play a part on the international stage. As such, even the dispatch of an army was seriously discussed in the palace. However, the sultan decided not to send an army whose function would be to suppress the riot because the riot was not against Muslims or Turks, but against Christian powers. Instead, the Ottoman government decided to send a special delegation to China in order to make contact with Chinese Muslims.⁹

The official and ostensible duty of the mission was to give a message from the sultan to the Chinese Muslims, in which he advised them not to cooperate with the anti-foreign rioters. Accordingly the sultan's special envoy headed by Enver Pasha,¹⁰ a brigadier general, was appointed.¹¹ The leading members of the delegation were as follows:¹²

⁸ Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, 226; Wofram Eberhart, *Cin Tarihi* (Istanbul: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1947), 332.

⁹ Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, 226.

¹⁰ For his biography, see Taha Toros, "Gecmiste Turk-Cin Iliskileri," *Milliyet Gazetesi*, June, 1972, 8-22. Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres Francais (AMAEF), N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37.

¹¹ Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 5-7; FO 78/5122, No. 178.

¹² Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 6; AMAEF N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37.

*Ambassador: Brigadier General Enver Pasha

*Assistant: Lieutenant Commander Omar Nazim Bey, aide-de-camp

*Religious Affairs: Mustafa Shukru Efendi, Teacher of Bayezit Mosque and School (Madrassa)

Haji Tahir Efendi, Kadi, Official of the Fatwa Bureau

*Guards: Humuslu Mahmut (Sar l Zuhaf Regiment)/Hasan (Sar l Zuhaf Regiment)

*Translator: Vichincho Kinyoli and his daughter Hortans

The Ottoman delegation started from Istanbul on April 18, 1901, in a Russian ship. They went by way of the Suez Canal after which they continued their voyage to China in a German ship. On May 4, they arrived in Colombo, where they met a group of local Muslims and visited mosques. On May 10, they reached Singapore. The mission of Enver Pasha as instructed by the Sublime Porte¹³ was to contact the German consulate representatives for cooperation whenever they landed at ports during the voyage. However, Enver Pasha could not meet the German consul in Singapore, so he utilized the time in making a wide range of contacts with local Muslims. Muslim Turks were also there as well as Chinese Muslims. Muslims constituted one-third of the total population of Singapore. They had seven mosques. Enver Pasha sent a report in which he informed the sultan of the situation of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and he suggested that an Ottoman consular office should be opened to afford closer links with Istanbul.¹⁴

When the Ottoman mission arrived in China at the end of May 1901, the Boxer Uprising had already been suppressed. That is why the mission was not well received by Marshal Wandersee, for whom the duties of Enver Pasha no longer had relevance to the situation on the ground. As an alternative, therefore, the delegation, whose purpose had been subsumed, made contact with European representatives and Muslims in China. After a twenty-one day stay in China, they returned to Istanbul via Nagasaki, Japan – Pusan, Korea - Vladivostok - Siberia - Odessa on August 5, 1901.¹⁵

¹³ The Sublime Porte is a metonym for the central government of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁴ Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 7.

¹⁵ Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 7.

THE MISSION'S ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

The Ottoman delegation lost its main function of helping the European powers counter difficulties occasioned by the Boxer Uprising with its arrival in China after the subjugation of the riot.¹⁶ In particular, Germany, which had encouraged the sultan to send the mission, now suddenly adopted a different attitude towards Enver Pasha and stopped assisting him in his activities in China. Enver Pasha was “betrayed in an unexpected manner by the Germans,” as he put it, and this led to his having to face a serious situation with little guidance, finance, and assistance. This situation ensured that the mission’s activities in China had limited effect. Despite all these negative factors, the delegation of Enver Pasha attempted religious and political activities toward Chinese Muslim leaders.¹⁷

A number of Chinese Muslims in Shanghai gathered around the sultan’s ambassador and briefed him on the situation of the Chinese Muslims. They emphasized that they were ready to be the supporters of the sultan and his policy. They also informed Enver Pasha that there were many Muslim officials or high civil officers in local and central government. In particular, about fifty persons from Jewish and Middle Eastern groups who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire and were under French patronage in China came to attend the sultan’s ambassador to pay their respect and show obedience.¹⁸

Meanwhile, Mustafa Shukru and Haji Tahir, who were in charge of religious affairs in the delegation, distributed leaflets which contained the messages of Mehmet Cemaleddin Efendi, Sheikh al-Islam (the highest rank of Islamic jurisprudence), and Sultan Abdul Hamid II to the Chinese Muslims. The leaflets had been prepared in Chinese to strengthen the solidarity between Muslims in China and the Sublime Porte.¹⁹

In addition, during his stay in Shanghai, where there were 3,700 Chinese Muslims and two mosques, Enver Pasha solved a problem between Christians and Muslims. During the turmoil of the Boxer Uprising, France illegally occupied the area of the Muslim cemetery on the pretext of having identified Muslims’ involvement in the

¹⁶ FO 78/5122, No. 178.

¹⁷ Ihsan Süreyya Sirma, “Sultan II Abdülhamid’in Çin’e Gönderdiği Enver Paşa Heyeti Hakkında Bazı Bilgiler,” *Atatürk Üniversitesi İslami İlimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 4 (1980): 168; AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37, 26-27; T. Toros, “Gecmiste Turk,” 8.

¹⁸ I. S. Simar, *Enver Paşa*, 170; Toros, “Gecmiste Turk,” 8.

¹⁹ Toros, “Gecmiste Turk,” 9.

riot. To solve this problem, Enver Pasha visited the French consulate in Shanghai and discussed it with the French representative. He explained to the French consul general that he had come to China to investigate the real facts of the Boxer Uprising as an extraordinary envoy of the caliph at the suggestion of the European powers. He criticized the attitude of France against Muslims in China and warned the consul general he would report the case to the sultan if there was evidence of any injustice. Enver Pasha requested that the French restore deprived Muslim rights and asked that the Islamic cemetery be given back to the Muslims to protect them against the atheist Chinese. The French representative, realizing that he had little option, agreed to give the Islamic cemetery back to the Muslims.²⁰

Here, the right of patronage of the Ottoman subjects in China was given to the French representative. At that time, a number of Ottoman subjects – Greeks, Jews and Armenians – were staying in Shanghai. Under these circumstances, Enver Pasha realized the importance and necessity of establishing an Ottoman consulate or a kind of political bureau in Shanghai. He thought the Ottoman sultan would win the allegiance of Chinese Muslims to his empire under his own banner. This would ensure that Chinese Muslims would be an asset in the Ottoman's penetration of Chinese territory, where European powers were enjoying the advantages of commercial and political privileges.

Unexpected events, however, prevented the sultan's delegation from reaching its goals. The delegation was only able to contact some Chinese Muslims in Shanghai. However, the coming of the sultan's mission to China gave a valuable opportunity not only for local Muslims but also for Enver Pasha to demonstrate the potential future advantages of cooperation between the caliph and East Asian Muslims in the days to come.

EUROPEAN REACTIONS AGAINST THE OTTOMAN MISSION

The co-operation between the Ottomans and Germany evinced by the dispatch of the Enver Pasha mission to China frightened the other European powers who were

²⁰ Suleiman Shukru, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, (St. Petersburg: TBMM Kütüphanesi Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu, <http://hdl.handle.net/11543/1656>, 1907), 546-47; AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37, 10-13; Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 8.

engaged in a competitive power struggle with Germany and China. The Europeans regarded the envoy's contacts with Muslims as part of a pan-Islamic overture to China. They followed very circumspectly and with caution every movement of Enver Pasha because many Muslims were to be found in their spheres of influence. Such European powers as Britain, France and Russia kept a close watch on the sultan's envoy to find out his secret mission which might threaten their advantage in China. The Western archival documents clearly illustrate the attitude of the Western powers toward the sultan's mission and its religious and political activities in China.

Britain

Britain had enjoyed extraordinary advantages in China since the late 18th century when she established a stronghold for the opium trade. The appearance of the sultan's envoy in China, of course, gave rise to serious anxiety for Britain, which had colonized Muslim territories worldwide, e.g. Egypt, India, and Chinese Turkistan. Therefore, under the leadership of General Treagh, a British commander in China, Britain tried to minimize the envoy's influence on Chinese Muslims to obviate any kind of anti-British movement.

General Treagh searched for a way, if possible, of making Enver Pasha change his attitude towards his own side. To this end, General Treagh summoned Enver-Pasha and told him it would be very dangerous to security if the sultan's mission should enter the Muslim areas of Chinese Turkistan, where Britain was vying with Russia economically and politically.²¹

The appearance of the Ottoman flag and the sultan's ambassador in Turkistan was calculated to bring about a great sea swell in Muslims' obedience to the Porte. The British did not want any deleterious results to flow from the presence of the sultan's special envoy in Muslim Turkistan. On the contrary, the British attempted to use the envoy for their own benefit in India. General Treagh now suggested to Enver Pasha that the British government safeguard the return of the envoy to Turkey in the event of his passing through Muslim territory in India.²²

The British were always apprehensive about the secret movement of pan-Islamism, which was calculated to have an adverse effect on their interests in India. Britain for her part, therefore, by showing her closeness and co-operation with the

²¹ Sirma, "Enver Paşa Heyeti," 162; AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 6-8.

²² AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 6-8.

sultan's delegate to the Muslims there, expected more effective colonial occupation, thus counteracting increasing anti-British campaigns. In particular, the sultan's envoy could be a useful ally to the British in their quest to control the Afghan amir who claimed himself to be the Islamic protector of the Muslim territory in India that was under British influence. A British archive document contends as follows that Sheikh Ali Khan, the Afghan amir, was an enemy of the British:

He had for many years past entertained the greatest admiration for the English, with whom it had been his earnest desire to maintain the most friendly relations for reasons which he considered as highly advantageous to the interests of his country and to those of Islamism in general, since England was the only power from which the Mahommedan state could expect support and protection in view of Russia's designs on it. But the unjustified occupation of Kelat and Swat (Suetta) by British troops had so antagonized and offended him that he could not now possibly treat the English otherwise than as the aggressive enemies whom he had every reason for distrusting hereafter.²³

In this situation, the British government asked the Sublime Porte to send a special mission with the sultan's personally signed letter to the amir of Afghanistan calling upon him to come to terms with Britain. At the request of the British, the sultan, who was convinced that such an appeal from him as caliph would have an effect upon the Muslim ruler, had ordered the letter to be written in Arabic with a quotation from the Qur'an pointing out that the duty of all Muslims was to listen to the advice and to obey the commands of their spiritual head.²⁴

The sultan's letter was sent to the Afghan amir by Ahmet Hulusi Efendi, an ambassador extraordinary of the sultan. According to the request of the British, Hulusi Efendi made contact with the amir for the normalization of strained British-Afghan relations. He warned also of the danger of Russian expansion in Central Asia, where she was strengthening her military position. The Afghan amir, however, who professed the greatest veneration and respect for the sultan as head of the Muslim world, deeply regretted not being able to comply with his command respecting his future attitude and policy toward the British government in India. As such, the mission of Hulusi Efendi could not bring about the desired results anticipated not only by the

²³ FO 78/2804, Confidential Memorandum, Nov. 1, 1878.

²⁴ FO 78/2804, No. 1372, Secret.

Ottoman government, but also by the British one.²⁵

Taking these strained relations between Britain and Afghanistan into consideration, the British attempt to invite Enver Pasha, the sultan's envoy, to visit Muslims in India was probably intended to have him arrange contacts with the Afghan amir, as a result of which, the British government in India looked forward to creating a positive effect on the amir in changing his anti-British attitude. However, as Enver Pasha returned to Istanbul through Vladivostok and Moscow under the patronage of Russia, the British plan came to naught.

France

France regarded the coming of Enver Pasha as an envoy to China as a part of the pan-Islamic activities in China. Owing to the fact that there were many Muslims in China, located just near the Indochina peninsula, French colonial territory, France had special concern at the activities of the sultan's mission. As we understand within the framework of some Western archive documents, France once attempted a certain political co-operation with the Ottoman Empire to utilize the great potential of Muslims in China.²⁶

An article written in the *L'Echo de China* newspaper, published by the French in China, encouraged Muslims to be subject to their caliph, not the British king. Interestingly enough, the article emphasized that every Muslim should owe allegiance to his or her head, the caliph, not to the Chinese emperor or British king; otherwise, they would not be regarded as Muslim.²⁷ Moreover, the French representative in Shanghai showed intimate interest in the Ottoman mission and arranged for their convenience and their accommodation in a hotel located in the French sphere of influence. The Ottoman flag was hoisted in front of the hotel.²⁸

One of the factors leading to the French assisting the envoy, who had been betrayed by the Germans, probably arose from the feeling that positive gestures should be made toward Abdul Hamid II, who could at any time initiate an anti-French campaign for those now under French occupation. However, the real object of the French was to gain the Ottoman sultan as their friend by whose influence on Muslims in Chi-

²⁵ BOA, IH. No. 16873-1, M. Saray, Osmanlı – Türkistan Hanlıkları Münasebetleri, 110-11.

²⁶ FO 17/1475, No. 258, Secret.

²⁷ Sirma, "Enver Paşa Heyeti," 201.

²⁸ Sirma, "Enver Paşa Heyeti," 169.

na, she hoped to penetrate into inner China, where no other powers could establish their spheres of influence. If a well-planned Turkish mission in collaboration with French experts could be dispatched to inner China where Muslims were prosperous, it would be a great opportunity for the French to secure a stronghold for the further expansion of her interests in China. Taking the opportunity of the coming of Enver Pasha as envoy, the French planned an undercover operation to occupy the area of the Yangtse valley with the help of the Ottoman sultan.²⁹

Concerning this, a confidential letter which was sent to Monsieur de Marteau, general manager of the Société Française d'Explorations Ministres en China in Shanghai, by M. Rudolph, the French representative in Brussels, gives interesting information as follows:

Brussels/ May 10, 1901

Mahommedan Affairs in China

I approach you in an absolutely private and confidential capacity (for the situation is too indefinite for me to be able to mention it yet to my friends even at a distance) to ask you to furnish me with certain information concerning the condition of the Mohammedan population in China.... You know how the Sultan is protected by the Emperor of Germany. This protection joined to the character of the Sultan, somewhat inclines the latter to play with the great Powers and meddle in international questions.

...In fact (and always from the source I vouch for) there is in Shansi and in a word in all those regions where Chinese resistance seems to be most energetic, a tolerably dense Mahommedan population. This population which is absolutely Orthodox is also particularly unruly being at any rate ungovernable by means of coercion: whilst one is led to believe that it will readily obey any order issuing from Constantinople.

I am assured that the Emperor of Germany has requested the Sultan to send an extraordinary mission to China with various ostensible motives but with only one real purpose, to convey to the Mahommedan population a message of peace from the Caliph in order to put an end to the resistance which has become alarming to the European Powers who really desire to see the Chinese question settled and to withdraw their troops.

²⁹ FO 17/1475, No. 258, Secret.

...At the same time my friend would tell the Sultan that he proposed to submit to him not without a certain delay which would however be curtailed as much as possible a carefully studied scheme showing the manner in which - thanks to the Imperial intervention in our affairs - the positive conquest of the Yangtze Valley and development of Mahomedan influence could be obtained and realized.

...It is perfectly possible that if in a work which you will have done carefully and which should contain precise and interesting details of statistics, of the views of the Mohammedans, you demonstrate by means of a more or less considerable sacrifice of money and principally by means of a partial or total acquisition of concessions, their value and so forth, the Sultan who is personally as rich as his country poor, would not hesitate for a moment to make the attempt. And, if it is so, we both know what share one could get out of it and what things one would prepare with a co-operation as secret as it would be powerful.

I expect to be sure on this point in about a fortnight's time.

(SN) Rudolph Laundaur³⁰

Germany and Russia

In 1897, Germany sent a warship to the Far East on some pretext or other. It succeeded in obtaining a naval base and a concession for the construction of a railway in Chiao-chou on the Shantung peninsula as a result of a pact with China in 1898.³¹

German pressure on the Chinese government and its increasing influence was one of the reasons for the Boxer Uprising in Shantung. The latter in Shantung had a more adverse effect on the Germans than it did on any other European power. Moreover, it was widely contended that Muslims were involved in the riot. That was why Kaiser Wilhelm II requested the Ottoman sultan to send an extraordinary mission to China. The main duty of the mission was to convey to Muslims a message from the caliph calculated to bring about an end to resistance. In addition, Wilhelm II suggested that part of the travel expenses of the sultan's envoy could be covered by the German government and that the envoy would be received by German representa-

³⁰ FO 17/1475, No. 258, Secret.

³¹ Latourette, *History of the Far-East*, 373.

tives wherever he visited during his trip to China.³²

In case the Ottoman envoy realized the main goal as planned by the Germans, the latter proceeded to the next step to secure a position superior to that of the British and French by expanding their influence on regions dominated by Muslims in China with the support of the Muslims' head, the caliph.

With this in mind, the Enver Pasha envoy was dispatched to China. When the envoy arrived in China, however, the riot had already been suppressed by a joint-European army. Germany thus regained its advantageous position. Accordingly, the Germans suddenly changed their attitude toward the sultan's envoy and now withdrew their co-operation from the envoy who had previously enjoyed their support.³³

At the beginning, Russia was opposed to the dispatch of the sultan's mission to China, but when the sultan's intention became clear, promptly changed position and arranged a ship to carry the delegation to China. She always showed friendliness to Enver Pasha and invited the mission to visit the Russian Empire. As a result of the efforts of Colonel Dessio, a military attaché in Shanghai, Enver Pasha and his entourage left China to return to Turkey via Russian territory.³⁴

CONCLUSION

Against the background of the political and financial crisis of the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the 20th century, Sultan Abdulhamid II, to ensure his survival, initiated a pan-Islamic movement which aimed at unifying the strength of Islam to resist Western encroachments. Under the pan-Islamic policy, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire attempted to extend his influence as the caliph of the Muslim world even to China. This is why the Sublime Porte decided to send the Enver Pasha mission to China under the pretext of the suppression of the Boxer Uprising. Meanwhile, the Boxer Uprising which was basically advocating an anti-foreign, anti-colonial and anti-Christian campaign, had a negative effect on Christian missionary activities in Korea as well.³⁵

³² Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 5; AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37, 6-8.

³³ Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 8; AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37, 26-27.

³⁴ Toros, "Gecmiste Turk," 9-11; AMAEF, N.S. Chine (1901-1911), No. 81, 26-37, 10-13; FO 17/1475, No. 258.

³⁵ Under the influence of the Yihetuan Movement (義和團運動), which mainly targeted foreigners and Christians in China, certain nationalistic religious group initiated anti-Christian campaigns in Korea as well. Hyewon Lee, "The Influence of Yihetuan Movement to the Christian Missionary Activities

Although the mission was not able to attain the goal expected, it made the Ottomans aware of the great potentiality of Chinese Muslims which had not yet been exploited by other powers. The experience of the envoy offered an opportunity to the Porte in the establishment of a new Chinese policy. The policy was to give importance to unofficial contacts with Chinese Muslims under secret plans.

Based on information from and the report of the Enver Pasha mission, the Ottoman sultan sent official and private emissaries (*ulama*, personal agents) to China who furnished him with certain information concerning the circumstances of the Muslim population in China and he made contacts with Chinese Muslim leaders. In addition, the sultan invited such Chinese Muslim leaders as Wang Kuan (Abdul Rahman) and discussed ways of bringing Chinese Muslims under the banner of the Islamic caliphate. At Chinese request, the sultan also sent teachers with Islamic books to China. As a result of these efforts, in 1908, the Peking Hamidiye College, which signified the authority and power of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, was opened in Peking by Chinese Muslims. In a word, the pan-Islamic policies initiated by Abdul Hamid II in China achieved quite remarkable success even when judged by reference to the few instances available to us.

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