Journal of the Korean Institute of Gas (한국가스학회지)

The Korean Institute of GAS (한국가스학회)
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Is HAZOP a Reliable Tool? What Improvements are Possible?

  • Park, Sunhwa (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering Texas A&M University, College Station) ;
  • Rogers, William J. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering Texas A&M University, College Station) ;
  • Pasman, Hans J. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering Texas A&M University, College Station)
  • Received : 2017.09.27
  • Accepted : 2018.04.05
  • Published : 2018.04.30
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Abstract

Despite many measures, still from time to time catastrophic events occur, even after reviewing potential scenarios with HAZID tools. Therefore, it is evident that in order to prevent such events, answering the question: "What can go wrong?" requires more enhanced HAZID tools. Recently, new system based approaches have been proposed, such as STPA (system-theoretic process analysis) and Blended Hazid, but for the time being for several reasons their availability for general use is very limited. However, by making use of available advanced software and technology, traditional HAZID tools can still be improved in degree of completeness of identifying possible hazards and in work time efficiency. The new HAZID methodology proposed here, the Data-based semi-Automatic HAZard IDentification (DAHAZID), seeks to identify possible scenarios with a semi-automated system approach. Based on the two traditional HAZID tools, Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study and Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), the new method will minimize the limitations of each method. This will occur by means of a thorough systematic preparation before the tools are applied. Rather than depending on reading drawings to obtain connectivity information of process system equipment elements, this research is generating and presenting in prepopulated work sheets linked components together with all required information and space to note HAZID results. Next, this method can be integrated with proper guidelines regarding process safer design and hazard analysis. To examine its usefulness, the method will be applied to a case study.

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References

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