Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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An Empirical Study on Debt Financing of Family Firms : Focused on Packing Order Theory

가족기업의 부채조달에 관한 실증연구 : 자본조달순위이론을 중심으로

  • Jung, Mingeu (Department of Venture Business, Gyeongnam National University of Science and Technology) ;
  • Kim, Dongwook (Research and Analysis Team, Busan Economic Promotion Agency) ;
  • Kim, Byounggon (Department of Business Administration, Changwon National University)
  • 정민규 (경남과학기술대학교 벤처경영학과) ;
  • 김동욱 (부산경제진흥원 경제동향분석센터) ;
  • 김병곤 (창원대학교 경영학과)
  • Received : 2017.12.11
  • Accepted : 2018.03.09
  • Published : 2018.03.31
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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of Korean family firms and the impact of debt financing. The analysis period was 10 years from 2004 to 2013, and the sample consisted of 4,008 non-financial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. For the analysis, the unbalanced panel data with time - series, cross - section data were formed and analyzed using panel data regression analysis. The results are as follows. First, Korean family firms use relatively less debt than non - family firms. It can be understood that family firms in which the dominant family owns and dominates the corporation are less likely to increase their debt because the agent problem is alleviated and the need for the control effect of Jensen (1986) is lowered. Second, in the verification of the packing order theory using the model proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), family firms have higher compliance with the packing order theory than non-family firms do. When financing is needed, debt is preferred over equity issuance. However, for Korean family firms, 24.38% of the deficit funds are financed through the issuance of net debt, which is relatively low compared to the 75% shown in the analysis of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). These results reveal the limit to the strong claim that the Korean family firms follow the packing order theory.

본 연구는 한국 가족기업의 기업특성과 부채조달의 영향관계를 분석하기 위해 가족기업의 부채사용 정도와 자본조달 순위이론의 순응여부를 실증분석 하였다. 분석기간은 2004년부터 2013년까지 총 10개년이고, 표본기업은 한국거래소 유가증권시장에 상장되어 있는 비금융업종 기업 총 4,008개를 사용하였다. 분석을 위해 횡단면 자료를 시간적으로 연결한 불균형 패널자료를 형성하고 패널자료회귀분석법을 사용하여 분석하였다. 실증분석 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 한국의 가족기업은 비가족기업에 비해 상대적으로 적은 부채를 사용한다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 지배가족이 기업을 소유 지배하는 가족기업은 대리인문제가 완화되어, Jensen(1986)이 제시한 부채의 통제효과의 필요성이 낮아지기 때문에 부채 증가 유인이 감소하는 것으로 이해할 수 있었다. 둘째, Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)가 제시한 모형을 이용한 자본조달순위이론의 검증에서는 가족기업이 비가족기업에 비해 자본조달순위이론의 순응도가 높다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 즉 자금조달이 필요할 때에는 주식발행보다 부채를 선호하는 결과이다. 다만 한국 가족 기업의 경우 부족한 자금의 24.38%를 순부채 발행을 통해 조달하는 것으로 나타나서, Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)의 분석에서 제시된 75%에 비해 상대적으로 낮게 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 한국 가족기업이 자본조달순위이론을 따른다고 강하게 주장하는 데는 다소 한계가 있음을 의미하는 것으로 이해되었다.

Keywords

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