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해상에서의 우발적 조우 시 신호 규칙(CUES)의 제한점과 개선을 위한 제언

Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES): Its Limitation and Recommendations for Improvement

  • 투고 : 2018.11.30
  • 심사 : 2018.12.26
  • 발행 : 2018.12.31

초록

Adopted in Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS) 2014, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES) has been the most valuable output of WPNS history. Written and suggested by Australian Navy in 1999, the goal of CUES is to decrease the possibility of the naval conflict by establishing the code among international navies in the Western Pacific region. Facing many oppositions and requirement of People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) in WPNS 2012 and 2013, but it finally adopted in WPNS 2014, with many changes in detailed provisions. From then, navies in the Western Pacific region have followed CUES to prevent maritime conflicts in the region, CUES, however, sometimes does not work correctly. Contents of CUES is the mixture of the parts of Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book(MTP) and International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972(CORLEGs). There are means of radio communications such as frequency and signals, instructions for maneuvering and so on. Thus, it is not a new document for the U.S. Navy and its allies, but it requires training to implicate at sea for navies other than U.S. allies, like PLAN. Lots of provisions in CUES were changed because of the opposition of PLAN, and CUES has many shortcomings and practical limitations. First, since CUES is non-legally binding, and there are no methods to force the naval assets on the sea to follow. Second, CUES is only applied to naval assets; naval ships - warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines - and naval aircraft. Third, the geographical scope in CUES is not clear. Fourth, there is no provision for submerged submarines. Finally, CUES has no time-based framework or roadmap for training. In this regard, there would be six recommendations for improvement. First, CUES should be reviewed by WPNS or other international institutions, while keeping non-binding status so that WPNS could send signals to the navies which do not answer CUES on the sea. Second, the participation of Maritime Law Enforcements(MLEs) such as coast guard is inevitable. Third, navies would use full text of MTP rather than current CUES, which extracts some parts of MTP. Fourth, CUES needs provisions with respect to submerged submarines, which recognizes as offensive weapons themselves. Fifth, the geographic scope of CUES should be clear. Since there are some countries in which claim that a rock with a concrete structure is their territory, CUES should be applied on every sea including EEZ and territorial seas. Finally, the detailed training plan is required to implicate CUES at sea. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a good exercise to train CUES, because almost all WPNS member countries except six countries are participating in RIMPAC. CUES is a meaningful document not only for navies but also for nation-states in the region. To prevent escalation of conflict in the region, potentially caused by an unplanned collision at sea, CUES should be applied more strictly. CUES will continue to be in subsequent WPNS and therefore continue to improve in the effectiveness as both an operational and diplomatic agreement.

키워드

참고문헌

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