DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

The Proportional Method for Inventory Cost Allocation

재고비용할당을 위한 비례적 접근법

  • Lee, Dongju (Industrial & Systems Engineering, Kongju National University)
  • 이동주 (공주대학교 산업시스템공학과)
  • Received : 2018.10.24
  • Accepted : 2018.12.21
  • Published : 2018.12.31

Abstract

The cooperative game theory consists of a set of players and utility function that has positive values for a subset of players, called coalition, in the game. The purpose of cost allocation method is to allocate the relevant cost among game players in a fair and rational way. Therefore, cost allocation method based on cooperative game theory has been applied in many areas for fair and reasonable cost allocation. On the other hand, the desirable characteristics of the cost allocation method are Pareto optimality, rationality, and marginality. Pareto optimality means that costs are entirely paid by participating players. Rationality means that by joining the grand coalition, players do not pay more than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of players. Marginality means that players are charged at least enough to cover their marginal costs. If these characteristics are all met, the solution of cost allocation method exists in the core. In this study, proportional method is applied to EOQ inventory game and EPQ inventory game with shortage. Proportional method is a method that allocates costs proportionally to a certain allocator. This method has been applied to a variety of problems because of its convenience and simple calculations. However, depending on what the allocator is used for, the proportional method has a weakness that its solution may not exist in the core. Three allocators such as demand, marginal cost, and cost are considered. We prove that the solution of the proportional method to demand and the proportional method to marginal cost for EOQ game and EPQ game with shortage is in the core. The counterexample also shows that the solution of the proportional method to cost does not exist in the core.

Keywords

References

  1. Bernstein, F., Kok, A.G., and Meca A., Cooperation in assembly systems : The role of knowledge sharing networks, European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, Vol. 240, No. 1, pp. 160-171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.013
  2. Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., Garcia-Jurado, I., Meca, A., and Mosquera, M.A., Cooperative game theory and inventory management, European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, Vol. 210, No. 3, pp. 459-466. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.06.025
  3. Hartman, B.C. and Dror, M., Cores of Inventory Centralization Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 26-49. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0732
  4. Hartman, B.C. and Dror, M., Cost Allocation in Continuous-Review Inventory Models, Naval Research Logistics, 1996, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 549-561. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6750(199606)43:4<549::AID-NAV7>3.0.CO;2-7
  5. Kim, D.H. and Lee, K.B., A Method of Profit Allocation for Sharing Economy among Companies Considering The Transaction Costs, Journal of the Korea Industrial Information System Research, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 111-126. https://doi.org/10.9723/jksiis.2015.20.4.111
  6. Lee, D.J. and Lee, C.Y., Cooperative Game Theory Approach for Inventory Cost Allocation, Journal of the Korean Institute of Plant Engineering, 2018, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 35-44.
  7. Lee, D.J., VMI with Upper Limit of Inventory for Vendor and Retailer, Journal of Society of Korea Industrial and Systems Engineering, 2017, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 105-111.
  8. Lee, S.J. and Lee, W.J., Shapley-Value Decomposition Analysis of Income and Asset Inequality in South Korea, Analysis of Korean Economy, 2017, Vol. 23, No. 10, pp. 57-109.
  9. Meca, A., Garcia-Jurado, I., and Borm, P., Cooperation and competition in inventory games, Mathematical Methods Operations Research, 2003, Vol. 57, No.3, pp. 481-493. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200253
  10. Meca, A., Timmer, J., Garcia-Jurado, I., and Borm, P., Inventory games, European Journal of Operational Research, 2004, Vol. 156, No.1, pp. 127-139. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00913-X
  11. Muller, A., Scarsini, M., and Shaked, M., The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core, Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 118-126. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0854
  12. Owen, G., Game Theory, Academic Press, San Diego, 1995.
  13. Park, S.Y., Fair Revenue Sharing for Public Transportation System in Seoul Metropolitan Area, Korean Journal of Public Finance, 2011, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 135-162.
  14. Shin H.J. and Ahn, B.J., Collaborative Vendor Managed Inventory Models for Managing 2-Echelon Supply Chains with the Consideration of Shortage in Demand, Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society, 2008, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 556-563. https://doi.org/10.5762/KAIS.2008.9.2.556
  15. Straffin, P.D., Game Theory and Strategy, The Mathematical Association of America, Washington, 1993.

Cited by

  1. 3단계 공급사슬게임을 위한 협조적 게임이론의 적용 vol.42, pp.3, 2019, https://doi.org/10.11627/jkise.2019.42.3.015