Korean Journal of Logic (논리연구)

Korean Association for Logic (한국논리학회)
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Can Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem be a Ground for Dialetheism?

괴델의 불완전성 정리가 양진주의의 근거가 될 수 있는가?

  • Received : 2017.01.09
  • Accepted : 2017.06.05
  • Published : 2017.06.30
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Abstract

Dialetheism is the view that there exists a true contradiction. This paper ventures to suggest that Priest's argument for Dialetheism from $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ theorem is unconvincing as the lesson of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ proof (or Rosser's proof) is that any sufficiently strong theories of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. In addition, a contradiction is derivable in Priest's inconsistent and complete arithmetic. An alternative argument for Dialetheism is given by applying $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence to the inconsistent and complete theory of arithmetic. We argue, however, that the alternative argument raises a circularity problem. In sum, $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ and its related theorem merely show the relation between a complete and a consistent theory. A contradiction derived by the application of $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence has the value of true sentences, i.e. the both-value, only under the inconsistent models for arithmetic. Without having the assumption of inconsistency or completeness, a true contradiction is not derivable from the application of $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence. Hence, $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ and its related theorem never can be a ground for Dialetheism.

양진주의는 참인 모순이 존재한다는 입장이다. 필자는 이 글에서 괴델 정리가 양진주의의 근거라는 프리스트의 논변이 설득력이 없음을 논할 것이다. 이는 괴델 증명이 우리에게 주는 교훈은 임의의 충분히 강한 산수에 관한 이론이 완전하면서 일관적일 수 없다는 것이기 때문이다. 다음으로 필자는 프리스트의 비일관적이고 완전한 산수에서 모순이 도출될 수 있음을 설명할 것이다. 그리고 괴델 문장이 비일관적이고 완전한 산수이론에 적용되어 양진주의에 관한 대안논변을 제시할 수 있음을 소개하고 이 경우에는 순환성의 문제가 있음을 논할 것이다. 요약해서, 필자는 괴델 정리 및 그와 관련된 정리는 완전한 이론들과 일관적인 이론들 간의 관계를 보여줄 뿐임을 주장할 것이다. 괴델 문장의 적용을 통해 도출된 모순이 중간값과 같은 참인 문장의 값을 지닐 수 있는 것 역시 산수에 관한 비일관 모형에서일 뿐이다. 비일관성이나 완전성에 관한 가정을 하지 않는다면, 괴델 문장의 적용이 참인 모순을 이끌어 낼 수 없으며 그렇기에 괴델 정리 및 그와 관련된 정리는 양진주의의 근거가 될 수 없다.

Keywords

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