Nuclear Engineering and Technology

Korean Nuclear Society (한국원자력학회)
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Securing a Cyber Physical System in Nuclear Power Plants Using Least Square Approximation and Computational Geometric Approach

  • Received : 2016.06.25
  • Accepted : 2016.10.17
  • Published : 2017.06.25
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Abstract

In industrial plants such as nuclear power plants, system operations are performed by embedded controllers orchestrated by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) software. A targeted attack (also termed a control aware attack) on the controller/SCADA software can lead a control system to operate in an unsafe mode or sometimes to complete shutdown of the plant. Such malware attacks can result in tremendous cost to the organization for recovery, cleanup, and maintenance activity. SCADA systems in operational mode generate huge log files. These files are useful in analysis of the plant behavior and diagnostics during an ongoing attack. However, they are bulky and difficult for manual inspection. Data mining techniques such as least squares approximation and computational methods can be used in the analysis of logs and to take proactive actions when required. This paper explores methodologies and algorithms so as to develop an effective monitoring scheme against control aware cyber attacks. It also explains soft computation techniques such as the computational geometric method and least squares approximation that can be effective in monitor design. This paper provides insights into diagnostic monitoring of its effectiveness by attack simulations on a four-tank model and using computation techniques to diagnose it. Cyber security of instrumentation and control systems used in nuclear power plants is of paramount importance and hence could be a possible target of such applications.

Keywords

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