DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

The empirical study on relationship between agency problem and beneficiary's performance

대리인문제가 R&D지원사업 수혜기업성과에 미치는 영향에 관한 실증연구

  • Yang, Dong-Woo (Department of Venture Management, Graduate School of Venture, Hoseo University) ;
  • Choi, Woo-Seok (Department of Venture Management, Graduate School of Venture, Hoseo University)
  • 양동우 (호서대학교 벤처전문대학원 벤처경영학과) ;
  • 최우석 (호서대학교 벤처전문대학원 벤처경영학과)
  • Received : 2016.03.07
  • Accepted : 2016.04.07
  • Published : 2016.04.30

Abstract

This study examines whether there is agency cost in a public R&D subsidy program by applying agency theory. If there is agency cost, the composition ratio of the government subsidy and the firm's own R&D fund would have a significant (-) effect on technological performance. Companies that received a public R&D subsidy in Korea from 2000 to 2009 were selected as a sample. Frequency analysis and multiple regression analysis were used. The independent variables was the ratio of public R&D subsidy cost to the Firm's own R&D cost, and the dependent variables were the number of patent applications and the number of patents registered. The control variables were firm size and R&D cost. The results show that there are agency problems in the government-sponsored R&D system. A future study is needed to examine how much agency problems deteriorate the efficiency of the system.

본 연구는 정부R&D지원과제에서 정부R&D지원비율이 높을수록, 기업의 R&D행위와 의지에 도덕적 해이(moral hazard) 또는 대리인문제(agency cost)가 발생하여 지원단위당 기술적 성과가 낮게 산출되지 않을까 하는 의문에서 출발하였다. 본 연구에서는 정부입장에서 수혜기업의 모든 정보를 다 알 수 없어 정보비대칭이 발생하고, 기업입장에서는 총 R&D비용에서 정부지원비중이 커질수록 기업의 도덕적 해이가 발생하여 이로 인해 지원단위당 기술적 성과가 낮아질 수도 있는 개연성을 검증키 위해 정부 R&D지원과제에서 [정부R&D지원금/자기R&D비용] 비율이 기술적 성과에 유의적인 (-)의 영향을 미칠 것인가를 검증하고자 한다. 표본기업은 한국에서 '00-'09년까지 "지역공공기술개발지원사업" 수혜기업이며, 분석방법은 회귀분석 등을 사용하였다. 독립변수는 총R&D비용에서 [정부R&D지원금/자기R&D비용]비율을 사용하였고 종속변수는 출원특허건수, 등록특허건수를 사용하였다. 통제변수로 기업규모 및 총 R&D비용을 사용하였다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 정부 R&D지원비율이 높을수록, 지원단위당 기술적 성과와 유의적인 (-)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 정부 R&D지원제도에서 수혜기업들의 R&D활동에서 대리인문제(도덕적 해이)가 발생할지도 모른다는 것을 의미하며 정부 R&D지원제도의 개선시, 이를 고려할 필요가 있다는 것이다.

Keywords

References

  1. Oh, Youn-jung, An, Byeong-Min, Jeong, Go-Eun, "KISTEP Statistic Brief", Vol.24, p. 3, KISTEP, 2014.
  2. Caerteling, C.S. et al., "How Relevant Is Government Championing Behavior in Technology Development?", Journal of Product Innovation Management, 30(2), pp.349-363, 2013. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5885.2012.01003.x
  3. Shu, C, et al., "Firm Patenting, Innovations, and Government Institutional Support as a Double-Edged Sword", Journal of Product Innovation Management, 32(2), pp. 290-305, 2015. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpim.12230
  4. Sungmin Park, "Evaluating the efficiency and productivity change within government subsidy recipients of a national technology innovation research and development program", R&D Management, 45(5), pp.549-568, 2015. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/radm.12097
  5. Hong, J. et al., "Government grants, private R&D funding and innovation efficiency in transition economy", Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 27(9), pp. 1068-1096, 2015. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2015.1060310
  6. Monica Merito, Silvia Giannangeli, Andrea Bonaccorsi, "Do incentives to industrial R&D enhance research productivity and firm growth? Evidence from the Italian case", International Journal of Technology Management, 49(1-3), pp. 25-48, 2010. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJTM.2010.029409
  7. Ming Feng Tang, Jaegul Lee, Kun Liu, Yong Lu, "Assessing government-supported technology-based business incubators: evidence from China", International Journal of Technology Management, 65(1-4), pp.24-48, 2014. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJTM.2014.060956
  8. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Fimr: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 305-360, October, 1976. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
  9. Fama, E. and Jensen, M., "Seperation of ownership and control", Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 301-326, June, 1983. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467037
  10. Zajac, E.J. and Westphal, J.D., "The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large U.S. corporations: When is more not better?", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 121-142, 1994. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250150909
  11. Bilter, M.P., T. J. Moskowitz, and A. Vissing-Jorgensen, "Testing Agency Theory with Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth", Jounal of Finance, 90(2), pp. 539-576, 2005.
  12. Demsetz, H., "The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm", Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 375-393, June, 1983. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467041
  13. Stulz, R., "Managerial control of voting rights, financing policies and the market for corporate control", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 25-54, 1998. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90039-6
  14. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishnny, R., "Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp.293-315, 1988. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7
  15. Mc Connell, John and Henri Servaes, "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 595-612, 1996. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90069-C
  16. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance", Financial Management Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 101-112, 1991. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3665716
  17. Busom, I., "An Empirical Evaluation of the Effects of R&D Subsidies", Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 9(2), pp. 111-148, 2000. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10438590000000006
  18. Gonzalez, X. & C. Pazo, "Do Public Subsidies Stimulate Private R&D Spending?", Research Policy, Vol. 37. pp. 371-389, 2008. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.10.009