Industrial Engineering and Management Systems

Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers (대한산업공학회)
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Impact of Information Sharing Regarding Customer Returns Ratio on Optimal Sales Strategy under E-commerce

  • Saito, Yuta (Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka Prefecture University) ;
  • Kusukawa, Etsuko (Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka Prefecture University)
  • Received : 2015.01.02
  • Accepted : 2015.04.06
  • Published : 2015.06.30
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Abstract

A correct information of customer returns ratio under e-commerce is not always shared between supply chain (SC) members. Also, it is important issue for SC members to handle the unsold products in a market. This paper discusses the impact of information sharing of customer returns ratio on an optimal sales strategy including resale of customer returns and buyback policy for a SC under e-commerce with a manufacturer and a retailer. A retailer sells a single product and resells the resalable customer returns in the same market. A manufacturer produces the products and buys back the unsold products as to their quality from the retailer. The integrated SC (ISC) determines the optimal product order quantity to maximize the expected profit of the whole SC. The decentralized SC (DSC) makes the optimal decisions for order quantity and the wholesale price of products to maximize the expected profit of each SC member. The effect of information sharing is discussed between SC members under ISC and DSC. The analysis numerically investigates how information sharing of the returns ratio affects the optimal decision and the expected profits under ISC and DSC. Besides, effect of SC coordination to encourage the shift to ISC is discussed.

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References

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