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Analysis of the Cause of the 2008 Financial Crisis using the Supervisory Control Theory

관리제어이론을 이용한 2008년 금융위기의 원인 해석

  • Park, Seong-Jin (Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ajou University)
  • 박성진 (아주대학교 전자공학과)
  • Received : 2014.07.28
  • Accepted : 2014.09.12
  • Published : 2014.10.01

Abstract

In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, while numerous members of the general public lost their homes and jobs, many of the largest banks held responsible for the crisis have been successfully rescued by bailouts. In this paper, through the analysis of income inequality, unemployment, tax cuts, and bailouts, we show that the interests of the general public are different from the interests of politicians and bankers. While the small elite group of politicians and bankers could set the deregulation policies with inordinate power based on full information, most people were ignorant and unconcerned about the policies, and hence did not oppose them. Specifically, we model the credit change in the financial markets of the United States by a finite state machine, and design three local supervisors representing three groups with different interests. It is then shown that the deregulation policies were adopted according to the difference of the supervisors' powers.

Keywords

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