Management Science and Financial Engineering

  • 제19권2호
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  • Pages.1-11
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  • 2013
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  • 2287-2043(pISSN)
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  • 2287-2361(eISSN)
한국경영과학회 (The Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society)
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The Effect of Unobservable Efforts on Contractual Efficiency: Wholesale Contract vs. Revenue-Sharing Contract

  • 투고 : 2013.06.30
  • 심사 : 2013.09.05
  • 발행 : 2013.11.22
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초록

An interesting puzzle in business practices is that although many researchers emphasize the benefits of a revenue-sharing contract, a wholesale contract has remained to be the most common contractual form. By introducing the concept of unobservable efforts, we examine the contractual efficiency of a wholesale contract and a revenue-sharing contract. The multi-task agency model and experimental design approach are used to analyze the relationship between the contractual efficiency and parameters. A major finding of our study is that a wholesale contract coordinates unobservable efforts, while it fails to coordinate the order quantity decision. Because unobservable efforts have mixed effects on the contractual efficiency, the superiority of contract type depends on parameters. This finding implies that a wholesale contract can be a competitive contract, especially when unobservable efforts are heavily involved. Our conclusion is that the current popularity of a wholesale contract is manager's rational response to complex supply chain environments rather than irrational behaviors.

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참고문헌

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피인용 문헌

  1. Revenue-Sharing Contract Models for Logistics Service Supply Chains with Mass Customization Service vol.2015, pp.1563-5147, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/572624