Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
권호 표지
DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

The determinants of family firm's debt structure

가족기업의 부채구조 결정요인 분석

  • Gong, Jaisik (College of Business & Economics, Daegu University) ;
  • Kim, Choong-Hwan (College of Industrial Science, Kongju National University)
  • Received : 2012.10.17
  • Accepted : 2013.01.10
  • Published : 2013.01.31
Download PDF
⟨ Previous Next ⟩

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the impact of family ownership mechanism on the firm's debt policy. Our results show that family firms tend to have a lower debt level, compared with non-family firms. Foreign investors are found to lead to a reduction in the firm's debt level through their monitoring incentives for dominating large shareholders. The firm's profitablily is related to a lower level of debt, whereas higher tangible assets and firm size are positively associated with high debt ratios due to the possibility of large collateral assets. Some implications are that foreign investors can reduce the agency costs of dominating large shareholders in family firms through monitoring activities, thus enhancing the efficiency of business decision-makings.

본 연구는 기업의 지배구조에서 가족기업 형태가 부채구조에 어떠한 영향을 미치는가에 대해 실증분석을 실시하였다. 분석결과, 가족기업은 비가족기업에 비해 부채비율을 낮게 유지하고 있는 것으로 확인되었다. 외국인 투자자는 대리인문제에 대한 모니터링 활동으로 기업 부채수준을 크게 낮추고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 수익성이 좋은 기업은 부채수준을 낮게 유지하고 있으며, 유형자산이 많고 기업규모가 큰 기업은 담보가능 자산이 커서 채권자들의 자금제공 가능성이 높으므로 부채수준을 높게 유지하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 시사점으로는, 외국인 투자자는 우리나라의 많은 기업들이 유지하는 가족기업에 대한 대규모 주식 보유를 통해 가족기업의 지배대주주의 전횡을 견제함으로서 외부감시주체로서 경영의사 결정 효율화에 크게 기여할 수 있다는 것을 보여준다.

Keywords

References

  1. Byung-Gon Kim, Dong-Wook Kim, "The effects of corporate governance and capital structure on firm value in Korean firms: an analysis of panel 2SLS", Korean Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol.22, No.4, pp.1593-1620, 2009.
  2. Hyung-Cook Kim, Ki-Suk Park, "The determinants of corporate debt policy", Journal of Management Education, Vol.63, pp.351-368, 2010.
  3. Bong-Han Yoon, "A long-term analysis on the capital structure of the Korean listed companies: A comparison of the static model with the pecking order model", Korean Journal of Management, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.973-1000, 2005.
  4. J. S. Ang, R. A. Cole, J. W. Lin, "Agency costs and ownership structure", Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp.81-106, 2000. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00201
  5. J. H. Astrachan, S. B. Klein, K. X. Smyrnios, "The F-PEC scale of family influence: A proposal for solving the family business definition problem", Family Business Review, pp.45-54, 2002. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2002.00045.x
  6. J. A. Barach, J. B. Ganitsky, "Successful succession in family business", Family Business Review, Vol.8, pp. 131-155, 1995. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1995.00131.x
  7. M. Bennedsen, K. M. Nielsen, F. Perez-Gonzalez, D. Wolfenzon, "Inside the family firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance", European Corporate Governance Institate (ECGI), Working Paper No.132, 2006.
  8. S. Claessens, S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, L. H. P. Larry, "Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings", Journal of Finance, Vol.57, pp.2741-2771, 2002. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00511
  9. Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang, "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.65, pp.365-395, 2002. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0
  10. Milton Harris, Artur Raviv, "The theory of capital structure", Journal of Finance, Vol.46, pp.297-355, 1991. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x
  11. M. C. Jensen, W. H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3, pp.305-360, 1976. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
  12. R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, "Corporate ownership around the world", Journal of Finance, Vol.54, pp.471-518, 1999. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115
  13. Danny Miller, Isabelle Le Breton-Miller, Richard H. Lester, Albert A. Cannella Jr., "Are family firms really superior performers?", Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.81, pp.411-439, 2007.
  14. F. Modigliani, M. H. Miller, "The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment", American Economic Review, Vol.48, pp.261-297, 1958.
  15. Stewart C. Myers, "Determinants of corporate borrowing", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.5, pp.147-175, 1977. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0
  16. F. Perez-Gonzalez, "Inherited control and firm performance", American Economic Review, Vol.96, pp. 1559-1588, 2006. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1559
  17. Rashuran G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales, "What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data", Journal of Finance, Vol.50, pp.1421-1460, 1995. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x
  18. Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, "A survey of corporate governance", Journal of Finance, Vol.52, pp.737-783, 1997. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
  19. M. P. Smith, "Shareholder activism by institutional investors: Evidence from CalPERS", Journal of Finance, pp.227-252, 1996. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05208.x
  20. R. Stulz, "Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20, pp. 25-54, 1988. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90039-6
  21. Sheridan Titman, Roberto Wessels, "The determinants of capital structure choice", Journal of Finance, Vol.43, pp.1-19, 1988. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x
  22. B. Villalonga, R. Amit, "How do family ownership, management, and control affect firm value?", Journal of Financial Economic, Vol.80, pp.385-417, 2006. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005