산업경영시스템학회지 (Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering)

  • 제36권4호
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  • Pages.77-83
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  • 2013
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  • 2005-0461(pISSN)
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  • 2287-7975(eISSN)
한국산업경영시스템학회 (Society of Korea Industrial and System Engineering)
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자진신고자 감면제도하의 담합 게임에 대한 균형분석모형 개발

Developing an Equilibrium Analysis Model of Cartel Game under Leniency Programs

  • 박지현 (한양대학교 산업경영공학과) ;
  • 안선응 (한양대학교 산업경영공학과)
  • Park, Jihyun (Department of Industrial and Management Engineering, Hanyang University) ;
  • Ahn, Suneung (Department of Industrial and Management Engineering, Hanyang University)
  • 투고 : 2013.11.07
  • 심사 : 2013.12.06
  • 발행 : 2013.12.31
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초록

This study is to develop a mathematical analysis model to grasp the behaviors of cartels. Cartels are formed tacitly and cause tremendous damage to consumers in modern society which is composed of advanced industry structure. The government authorities have instituted the leniency programs to respond cartels. However, cartels will continue unless there are legal sanctions against cartels based on an accurate analysis of leniency programs. The proposed cartel equilibrium analysis model is a mathematical behavior model which is based on the existing methods and the prison's dilemma of game theory. Therefore, the model has a form of pay off matrix of two players. We use a iterated polymatrix approximation (IPA) method to deduct a Nash equilibrium point. The model is validated by an empirical analysis as well.

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참고문헌

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