

# A DoS Detection Method Based on Composition Self-Similarity

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## **Abstract**

Based on the theory of local-world network, the composition self-similarity (CSS) of network traffic is presented for the first time in this paper for the study of DoS detection. We propose the concept of composition distribution graph and design the relative operations. The  $(R/S)^d$  algorithm is designed for calculating the *Hurst* parameter. Based on composition distribution graph and Kullback Leibler (KL) divergence, we propose the composition self-similarity anomaly detection (CSSD) method for the detection of DoS attacks. We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Compared to other entropy based anomaly detection methods, our method is more accurate and with higher sensitivity in the detection of DoS attacks.

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**Keywords:** DoS detection, composition self-similarity, composition distribution graph, Kullback-Leibler divergence

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## 1. Introduction

**B**ecause of its becoming the major universal communication infrastructure, Internet is also subject to attacks in growing numbers and varieties, notably, Denial of Service (DoS) attack has become one of the most serious threats to the Internet [1]. It doesn't necessarily damage data directly or permanently, but it intentionally compromises the availability of the resources. *Misuse detection* [2][3] uses the "signatures" of known attacks to identify a matched activity as an attack instance and strictly limited to the latest known attacks. *Anomaly detection* [4] can be effective against new attacks. However, due to the lack of theoretical understandings and useful tools for characterizing the audit data, most *anomaly detection* models are built based solely on "expert" knowledge, which is often imprecise and incomplete given the complexities of today's network environments. *Volume-based detection* schemes have been successful in isolating large traffic changes, but a large class of anomalies do not cause detectable disruptions in traffic volume (e.g., scans or small DoS attacks may have a minor effect on the traffic volume of a backbone link). Moreover, the similarity between DoS traffic and transient bursts of normal traffic makes it difficult to detect DoS attacks accurately.

Leland et al [5] first convincingly demonstrated that actual network traffic is statistically *self-similar* in nature that none of the commonly used traffic models (e.g., pure Poisson or Poisson-related models such as Poisson-batch or Markov-Modulated Poisson processes) is able to capture this *fractal-like* behavior. Following up this prominent discovery, the works by [6][7][8] brought self-similar process to the applications of DoS detection. However, as described in [5], this self-similarity is confined to the traffic *value*. In other words, the statistically self-similar models in these papers only focus on the changes of traffic *value* not considering the impact of distributional aspects of packet (called packet composition). Intuitively, DoS attacks are purposely created by humans they must affect the natural "structure and randomness" of packet under normal conditions [9]. Jiangtao Shi [10] controlled the number of packets with statistically *self-similar* model, however, the generation of IP address and Port is based on probabilities. Moreover, [6][7][8] on DoS detection via self-similarity estimation are based on the assumption that the DoS traffic is not self-similar. However, from the review of existing literature and the analysis of software tools used to mount DoS attack, it can be inferred that these tools are capable of generating a self-similar flow of packets. One question then becomes: if both legitimate and malicious traffic display statistically self-similar characteristics, is detection of DoS still possible? An important challenge therefore is to determine how best to extract *understanding* about the presence and nature of DoS attack from the potentially overwhelming mass of network-wide traffic.

Our work begins with the observation that most traffic anomalies share a common characteristic: they induce a change in distributional aspects of packet header fields. For

example, a DoS attack, regardless of its volume, will cause the distribution of traffic by destination addresses to be concentrated on the victim address. Treating anomalies as events that disturb the distribution of packet *compositions* has more advantages against previous methods (e.g., *volume-based* method). First, such anomalies as scans or small DoS attacks can be better detected by systematically mining for distributional changes instead of volume changes. Second, unusual distributions reveal valuable information about the structure of anomalies. Current research in the traffic composition mainly relies on the theory of entropy [9][11][12][13] by which network anomalies can be detected. However, the flaw of entropy methodology is that it can only reflect the overall trend of traffic and not sensitive to the dynamics of traffic specific composition. Moreover, the entropy of traffic composition is unstable. In the following sections, we will further illustrate the advantages of our presented method compared with the entropy based method, for example, the presented method has higher detecting rate, lower false alarm and higher sensitivity to DoS attacks.

This paper focuses on examining distributional features of packet compositions that produces effective diagnostic power in anomaly detection. The concept of traffic *composition self-similarity* (CSS) is proposed for the first time based on the local-world network, and we validate the existence of CSS feature in network-wide traffic. Then we design a  $(R/S)^d$  algorithm for computing *Hurst* parameter (the degree of self-similarity typically is defined via the *Hurst* parameter). In order to detect DoS attacks, we introduce the concept of *composition distribution graph* and define the relative operations. With the composition distribution graph and KL divergence, we design the *composition self-similarity* anomaly detection (CSSD) method for the detection of DoS attacks. We illustrate and evaluate the proposed method by using some well-known attacks and compare the results with other popular entropy based methods. The results show that our method is more accurate and effective.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the concepts of *composition self-similarity* of traffic and composition distribution graph, and designs a  $(R/S)^d$  algorithm for the estimation of *Hurst* parameter. Section 3 describes the detection principle of CSSD method and gives the algorithm. Section 4 presents the experiment and analysis. Section 5 concludes this paper.

## 2 Composition Self-Similarity

### 2.1 KL Divergence

The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [14] measures the distance between two density distributions. This divergence is also known as information divergence and relative entropy. Consider two discrete probability distributions,  $p_i$  and  $q_i$ , with  $\sum p_i = \sum q_i = 1$ . The KL divergence between these two distributions is defined as:

$$D(P \parallel Q) = \sum_i p_i \log(p_i / q_i) \quad (1)$$

When  $p_i = q_i$  ( $i=1,2,\dots,n$ ),  $D(P||Q)=0$ . The smaller divergence, the more “similar” they are.


## 2.2 Composition Self-Similarity of Traffic

The statistical *self-similarity* feature in [5] shows that the traffic distribution is similar irrespective of the time scale of observation, but it only cares about the *value* changes of traffic. On the contrary, this paper will study the dynamics of traffic composition (i.e., source and destination address and ports) for the detection of anomalies, the intuition of which is that many kinds of traffic anomalies cause changes in the distribution of addresses or ports observed in traffic. The traffic composition here only studies the packet header that includes source IP, destination IP, source port and destination port. [10] points that whatever abnormality appears that will definitely affect the distribution of destination IP. So, taking into account the computational complexity and real-time requirements, we will only focus on the CSS feature of destination IP (denoted *dstIP*).

The set  $S=\{ip_1, ip_2, \dots, ip_L\}$  denotes the *dstIPs* of all packets. First,  $S$  is partitioned and it produces a sequence  $X$ . In order to reduce the impact of sudden network traffic, the partition is based on the number of packets instead of the time series. Take  $C$  consecutive *dstIPs* as a data point (denoted  $X_i$ ) and thus  $S$  is converted into the sequence  $X=\{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_N\}$ , where  $X_i=\{ip_{(i-1)c+1}, \dots, ip_{i*c}\}$  and  $N=ceil(L/C)$ . In the following, we will introduce the concept of composition distribution graph.

**Definition 1** Composition distribution graph  $G$ .  $G$  is a composition distribution graph that illustrates the IP's appearance rate in one or more data points.  $G_i$  is the composition distribution graph of  $X_i$ ,  $G_i=\{(ip^i_1, p^i_1), \dots, (ip^i_k, p^i_k)\}$  means that there are  $k$  *dstIPs* in  $X_i$ ,  $p^i_j$  denotes the appearance rate of  $ip^i_j$ .

**Fig. 1** is the graphical representations of  $G_5$  and  $G_6$  in polar coordinate based on DARPA99 ( $X$  is the outside.dump of March 1 in dataset,  $G_5$  and  $G_6$  are computed through  $X_5$  and  $X_6$  when  $C=2000$ ). In this figure, the radius coordinate consists of the appearance rates of *dstIPs* and the angle coordinate consists of permutation of all the *dstIPs*. The feature of CSS is to study the relationships of composition distribution graphs of all data points and the relationships between local and global composition distribution graph. CSS means that the network traffic displays structural similarity in a very wide time scale from the point of traffic composition distribution. The real networks are mostly complex systems which contain lots of members and connections. These members are abstracted to nodes and connections are abstracted to edges. In [15], a local-world evolving network model is proposed by Li and Chen. The study shows that in the real network, a node can only connect to special group of nodes rather than any node in the whole network. As in a human community, everyone literally lives in a local world: everyone has his local friendships and personal collective information and judgment. The local-world network model will enable us to better understand and describe more real-life complex networks. In a certain period of time, the users and accessing services in a local-world community is stable that makes the traffic composition stable. That is, the network traffic exhibits the CSS feature.



**Fig. 1.** Examples of composition distribution graph ( $G_5$  and  $G_6$ )

**Definition 2** The CSS feature of network traffic is structural similarity in the composition ratio across all time and spatial scales. It can be described by the composition skeleton graph (denoted  $G_M$ ).

**Definition 3** Composition skeleton graph  $G_M$ . The feature of CSS means that traffic exhibits a stable structure over different scales, in this paper this stable structure is called composition skeleton and denoted as  $G_M$ .

With this in mind, the feature of CSS can be viewed that the composition distribution graphs of traffic are similar among each other over different scales and they are all similar with  $G_M$ . *Hurst* is an important index to measure the similarity of series  $X$ . When  $0.5 < Hurst < 1$  it means that  $X$  is self-similar. As *Hurst* increases, the degree of self-similarity is increasing. For  $Hurst = 0.5$  and  $Hurst > 1$ , there is almost no self-similarity.

### 2.3 (R/S)<sup>d</sup> Algorithm for Hurst Estimation

The R/S method in [16] is a traditional method for *Hurst* estimation of one-dimensional data that only can analyze the value changes of traffic. In order to analyze the similarity of the traffic spatial composition distribution, in this paper, we present an extensional method called (R/S)<sup>d</sup>. The reason that (R/S)<sup>d</sup> is used to analyze the feature of similarity is that (R/S)<sup>d</sup> can calculate the multi-dimensional data.

The operating rules of composition distribution graph are defined as follows: for each  $(ip_i, p_i)$ , all operations are carried on  $p_i$ ,  $ip_i$  is the operation object.

**Definition 4** Addition of composition distribution graphs  $G_{i,j} = G_i + G_j$ . For each  $(ip^{i,j}, p^{i,j})$  in  $G_{i,j}$ ,  $p^{i,j} = p^i + p^j$ ,  $p^i$  and  $p^j$  are the appearance ratios of *dstIP* in  $G_i$  and  $G_j$ , respectively.

**Definition 5** Union of composition distribution graphs  $GE_{i,j} = G_i \cup G_j$ . The union operation will combine  $X_i$  and  $X_j$  to form a new IP address series  $X_{i,j}$ . All the IP addresses and their appearance ratios in  $X_{i,j}$  are denoted by  $GE_{i,j}$ .

**Corollary 5.1**  $GE_{i,j} = (1/2)G_{i,j}$ .  $(1/2)G_{i,j}$  means that each  $p$  in  $G_{i,j}$  will be multiplied by 0.5, and  $GE_{i,j}$  can be viewed as the mean of  $G_i$  and  $G_j$ .

**Proof** From Definition 4, any IP that appears in  $GE_{i,j}$  must be in  $G_{i,j}$ . For any  $(ip_k, p_k)$  in  $GE_{i,j}$ ,  $p_k = c_k / 2C$ ,  $c_k$  is the occurrence number of  $ip_k$  in  $X_{i,j}$ . The data pair  $(ip_k, p^{i,j})$  in  $G_{i,j}$  is

corresponding to  $ip_k$ , where  $p^{ij}=p^i+p^j= c_i/C+ c_j/C$ ,  $c_i$  and  $c_j$  are the occurrence numbers of  $ip_k$  in  $X_i$  and  $X_j$ . So,  $c_k= c_i+ c_j$ ,  $p^{ij}= c_k/C= 2p_k$ , and  $GE_{ij}=(1/2)G_{ij}$ .

**Corollary 5.2**  $G_{i,j,k}=G_i+G_j+G_k$  and  $GE_{i,j,k}=(1/3)G_{i,j,k}$ .

**Proof**  $G_i+G_j+G_k= G_{i,j}+G_k= G_{i,j,k}$ .  $GE_{i,j,k}=(1/3)G_{i,j,k}$ , the proof process is similar to Corollary 5.1.

**Definition 6** Subtraction of composition distribution graphs  $G_i-G_j=D(G_i||G_j)$ . The computation process refers to formula (1), the result of subtraction is the difference of  $G_i$  and  $G_j$ .

The (R/S)<sup>d</sup> algorithm is described as: first, according to  $C$ ,  $S$  produces the sequence  $X=\{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_N\}$ , where  $X_i$  can be represented as  $G_i$ ; second, divide  $X$  into  $M$  sub-sequences  $Y_m=\{X_{(m-1)d+1}, X_{(m-1)d+2}, \dots, X_{md}\}$  ( $m=1, 2, 3, \dots, M$ ), where  $M=N/d$ . Different  $(R/S)_d$  can be computed according to different  $d$  ( $d=1, 2, 3, \dots, M/2$ ); last, fitting the R/S line with all the  $(R/S)_d$  values in order to get the *Hurst* parameter.

Compute  $GE_m$  (the mean of sub-sequence  $Y_m$ ) as formula (2).

$$GE_m = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{i=(m-1)d+1}^{md} G_i \tag{2}$$

$GE_m$  is the mean composition distribution graph of all IP addresses in  $Y_m$ ; Compute the standard deviation of  $Y_m$  as (3), which is denoted as  $S_m$ .

$$S_m = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{i=(m-1)d+1}^{md} (G_i - GE_m)^2 \tag{3}$$

According to Definition 3, (3) can also be expressed,

$$S_m = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{i=(m-1)d+1}^{md} (D(G_i || GE_m))^2 \tag{4}$$

Compute the cumulative deviation  $S_{i,m}$  as (5).

$$S_{i,m} = \sum_{j=1}^i G_j^m - iGE_m \tag{5}$$

Where  $i$  and  $m$  denote the  $i$ -th element in  $Y_m$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, d$ ). The complete representation of  $G_j^m$  in  $X$  is  $G_{(m-1)d+1+j}$ , which is the composition distribution graph of  $X_{(m-1)d+1+j}$ . The range  $R_m$  is computed based on the cumulative deviation.

$$R_m = \max\{S_{1,m}, \dots, S_{d,m}\} - \min\{S_{1,m}, \dots, S_{d,m}\} \tag{6}$$

Compute  $(R/S)_d$ , which is the average value of  $R_m/S_m$  of all subsequences,

$$\left(\frac{R}{S}\right)_d = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{R_m}{S_m} \tag{7}$$

Different  $d$  corresponds to different  $(R/S)_d$ , from a statistical point of view, the relation between them can be represented by  $(R/S)_d \sim cd^H$ , taking the log of both sides,

$$\log\left(\frac{R}{S}\right)_d = \log c + H \log d \tag{8}$$

Where,  $\log c$  is a constant. Depict all the points  $(\log d, \log(R/S)_d)$  in the logarithmic coordinates and get the slope  $H$  by linear fitting, which is the *Hurst* parameter. As shown in Fig. 2.




Fig. 2. *Hurst* parameter in  $(R/S)^d$  algorithm

In Fig.2, each node represents a  $(R/S)_d$  based on different  $d$ . The two dotted lines represent  $Hurst=0.5$  and  $Hurst=1$ , respectively. The series  $X$  holds the CSS feature when the calculated slope is within the limits of 0.5 and 1.

### 3. Detection Principle and Algorithm

#### 3.1 Detection Principle

From the composition distribution point of view, the traffic exhibits a stable structure over different scales that can be represented with  $G_M$ . In this paper, we assume that if the network is normal at  $t_{i-1}$  time and no great changes happen at  $t_i$  time, we consider that the network is also normal at  $t_i$  time. To facilitate presentation, we define  $CM_i = D(G_i||G_M)$  that represents the difference between  $G_i$  (at  $t_i$  time) and  $G_M$ .  $CM_i$  is also represented by  $CM$  with no ambiguity. In the same way,  $CP_i = D(G_i||G_{i-1})$  that is used to represent the difference between the adjacent composition distribution graphs. Also,  $CP_i$  is denoted as  $CP$  used to identify if mutations occur between the adjacent time intervals.

In the following, we will demonstrate the application of KL divergence and  $G_M$  to detect DoS attacks. The schematic diagram of composition self-similarity detection (CSSD) in this paper is shown in Fig. 3, which is composed of the skeleton distribution graph extraction module and the KL divergence calculation module. The former is an off-line analysis module that extracts  $G_M$  by analyzing the traffic, and the latter is an on-line real time analysis module for calculating  $CP$  and  $CM$ . There are basically four steps involved from the observation of traffic stream to raise an alarm. The first is to gather information from streaming traffic. The traffic monitoring module observes packet's headers and collects information in order to calculate  $G_M$ . The accuracy of  $G_M$  is greatly affected by abnormal traffic. In this paper, we first calculate multiple  $G_{Mi}$  ( $i=1,2,\dots,n$ ) and compute its mean  $G_{EM}$ , from which select  $MIN(G_{Mi}-G_{EM})$  as the traffic composition skeleton graph, that is,  $G_M = MIN(G_{Mi}-G_{EM})$ . The second step is to quantify variations observed in the composition distribution. The third is to

set a threshold that can clearly differentiate DoS attacks from normal behaviors. The fourth step is to gather all the information and identify the attacking source.




Fig. 3. CSSD schematic diagram

The detection result of CSSD is shown in Fig. 4, in which  $x$ -axis and  $y$ -axis represents  $CP$  and  $CM$ , respectively. The thresholds  $\delta_M$  and  $\delta_N$  divide the coordinate into  $Z_1, Z_2, Z_3$  and  $Z_4$  sub-regions. The points in  $Z_1$  are normal because the values of  $CP$  and  $CM$  are in a certain range. The points in  $Z_2$  have mutations, but it is also normal because  $CM$  is still in a certain range.  $Z_3$  represents the abnormal, in which not only mutations occur but also  $CM$  is greater. When the anomaly occurs, the abnormal points would fall into  $Z_3$ . With the anomaly continuing, the points would fall into  $Z_4$ . For example, when the network is subjected to DoS attacks, the current  $G_i$  will have so big differences with both  $G_{i-1}$  and  $G_M$  that the points would fall into  $Z_3$ . As DoS attacks continue,  $CP$  is small, but  $CM$  is still large so that all the points would fall into  $Z_4$ .




Fig. 4. The detection principle of CSSD

### 3.2 The Detection Algorithm

The core of CSSD method is the on-line anomaly detection. The online study of traffic composition distribution is a difficult task mainly due to vast amount of data and limited



computational resources. To overcome these problems, our method introduces two techniques: (1) The network traffic compositions are aggregated at a very coarse level. In this paper, we only take into account the destination IP. (2) The variations of traffic composition distribution are measured using simple and efficient KL divergence algorithm.

The jobs of KL divergence calculation module are: (1) calculates  $CP$  and  $CM$ ; (2) backtraces IPs of the points in  $Z_3$  in order to find the main IP that leads to the changes of traffic composition distribution. This module is a stepping cycle calculation process. In each cycle, it first completes calculating the current  $G_i$  with  $G_{i-1}$ , and then calculating  $CP$  and  $CM$ . If it detects the abnormal, it will enter into the IP backtracing process.  $G_i$  will be the input in the next cycle, and the algorithm is described as follows:

Step1. Initialize the parameters. Set  $C$  and  $i$ , and obtain the value of  $G_M$ ;

Step2. Set the current  $C$   $dstIPs$  as a data point, compute  $G_i$ ;

Step3. Compute  $CP$  and  $CM$ ;

Step4. If  $CP > \delta_N$  and  $CM > \delta_M$ , mark the current data point as attack. Otherwise, go to Step6;

Step5. Backtrace IP and compute  $IP_{G_{i-1}}$  and  $IP_{G_m}$  ;

Step6.  $i=i+1$ , go back to Step2;

$G_i$  and  $G_{i-1}$  are needed in the computation of  $CP$ . However,  $G_{i-1}$  is obtained in the last cycle so that it reduces the complexity. The IP backtracing in Step5 is described as follows, taking the computation of  $IP_{G_{i-1}}$  as an example:

Step1. Assume  $G_i$  contains  $k$  IP, then  $G_i = \{(ip^i_1, p^i_1), \dots, (ip^i_k, p^i_k)\} (j=1)$ ;

Step2. If  $j \leq k$ , set  $p^j$  in  $G_i$  as the ratio of  $ip^j$  in  $G_{i-1}$ , and we get a new  $G_i^{*j}$ ;

Step3. Compute  $D(G_i^{*j} || G_{i-1})$ ;

Step4.  $j=j+1$  and go to Step2;

Step5.  $D = \max\{D_1, D_2, \dots, D_j\}$ , the IP that makes  $D$  reach the maximum is  $IP_{G_{i-1}}$ . The

algorithm is over.

The IP that leads to the greatest changes of the composition distribution graph will cause anomaly. If the values of multiple IPs are similar and do not have a clear maximum, it means that multiple hosts appear abnormal.

## 4. Experiment Analysis

We extracted five weeks (25 days) of data from DARPA99 datasets, in which the first three weeks of data are training data and the other two weeks are testing data. The first and the third weeks contained no attacks, and the other three weeks are abnormal traffic. We compute every day's self-similarity parameter  $Hurst$  that is plotted as a dot in **Fig. 5**.  $desHurst$  and  $souHurst$  denote the  $Hursts$  of  $dstIP$  and  $srcIP$ , respectively. It can be seen that

the *Hursts* of source and destination are both greater than 0.5 in the attack-free network environment and these two *Hursts* are close. The result shows that the CSS feature exists in the local-world network traffic.




Fig. 5. Hurst curves of CSS

The *Hurst* values in the first and the third week are stable; however, *Hurst* changes a lot in the presence of attacks. The three lowest points in *desHurst* curve are  $Hurst_{3,10}=0.6881$ ,  $Hurst_{3,29}=0.4668$  and  $Hurst_{4,5}=0.5821$ . The two lowest points in *souHurst* curve are  $Hurst_{3,29}=0.4802$  and  $Hurst_{4,5}=0.6277$ . It can be seen that the anomalies in the network will affect *Hurst*, but not all anomalies can cause the change of *Hurst* because *Hurst* describes the overall property of traffic. For example, if attack does not cause the entire anomaly in network or the time period of anomaly is very short, *Hurst* will not be greatly affected.

Studying the traffic of March 1 from outside.dump, different *Hurst* is computed according to different *C* (from 2000 to 20000) as shown in Fig. 6. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 are the composition distribution graphs when  $C=2000$  and  $C=20000$ .






Fig. 6. Hurst curve corresponds to C

Fig. 6 shows that *Hurst* increases with *C* increasing and gradually stabilizes that makes the overall CSS feature increase and finally tends to a certain value  $H_F$ . The relation between *C* and  $H_F$  are relative to the size of local-world network (number of hosts). The CSS feature is

stronger when  $C=2000$ , similarly, in a larger network, the reflection of CSS feature depends on greater  $C$ .




**Fig. 7.** The composition distribution graph ( $C=2000$ )



**Fig. 8.** The composition distribution graph ( $C=20000$ )


In **Fig. 7**,  $G_{22}$ ,  $G_{23}$  and  $G_{24}$  are similar. In **Fig. 8**, the similarity of  $G'_2$ ,  $G'_3$  and  $G'_4$  is further enhanced because  $C$  and  $Hurst$  are greater. From **Fig. 6**, **Fig. 7**, and **Fig. 8**, it shows that the greater  $C$  the stronger CSS feature of traffic. However, the detecting effect does not depend on greater  $C$ . Because greater  $C$  will definitely increase the time span of  $G$ , and with longer computation, that will lead to a larger detection delay. Moreover, greater  $C$  could lead to an increment in false negative. On the contrary, smaller  $C$  could produce more false positive (because  $G$  could not accurately reflect the feature of traffic composition distribution). In this paper, we choose a greater  $C$  when we extract  $G_M$ . When computing  $CP$  and  $CM$ , in order to achieve a better detection effect, we appropriately adjust  $C$ ,  $\delta_N$  and  $\delta_M$  according to the real network environment.

In the skeleton distribution graph extraction module,  $G_M$  can be obtained from the historical data. As shown in **Fig. 9**,  $G_M$  in the first and the second week are basically same, which does not mean that any  $G_M$  in the second week can be used as the network composition skeleton graph. The accuracy of  $G_M$  is greatly affected if more abnormal traffic is contained. As described in 3.1,  $G_M = MIN(G_{M_i} - G_{EM})$ . The CSSD method is noise immunity because it does not require completely pure data in the training process. In the real network,  $G_M$  can be updated periodically, for example, we can choose the appropriate  $G_M$  in different times when the traffic composition changes with time periodically.



**Fig. 9.** Comparison of choosing  $G_M$

In this experiment, we choose the traffic of April 5 that contains more DoS attacks, and compare the CSSD with the method in [12]. As shown in Fig. 10, the four curves represents  $CM$ ,  $CP$ , IP entropies of destination and source from top to bottom, respectively.



**Fig. 10.** Comparison of IP entropy and CSS difference

$A$  represents the Smurf attack broken out at 19091 second, which makes the innocent hosts receive a great deal of ICMP messages from others in a short period of time. From the entropy point of view, Smurf attack can cause the  $dstIP$  concentrated so that the entropy decreases (value of  $ipDesE$ ), however, the  $srcIP$  will be divergent that leads to the entropy increase (value of  $ipSrcE$ ). From the CSS point of view, the distribution of traffic composition will change a lot at this moment. Table 1 is the comparisons between  $T_p$  and  $T_c$  ( $T_p$  represents the previous moment and  $T_c$  represents the moment when attack starts).

**Table 1.** Comparison between CSS difference and entropy

	$ipSrcE$	$ipDesE$	$CP$	$CM$
$T_p$	3.1623	1.4114	1.2840	1.7793
$T_c$	5.9200	0.3374	3.2749	4.1916


Based on the backtracing algorithm, the IP 172.16.114.50 that makes the biggest changes in  $CM$  is the victim host.  $B$  represents the Udpstorm attack happened in 43225 second. UdpStorm is a bandwidth consumption attack that makes the innocent host sends data from each other continuously by forging the UDP packets. The entropy has no significant changes because both source and destination IP have no obvious concentration or divergence

phenomenon when the attack happens. From the CSS point of view, though IP has no great changes, the proportion of each IP changes a lot when compared with the previous or normal moment. **Table 2** lists the IP changes and the parameters.

**Table 2.** IP changes and comparisons among the parameters

	<i>IP number</i>	<i>Same IP</i>	<i>ipSrcE</i>	<i>ipDesE</i>	<i>CP</i>	<i>CM</i>
$T_p$	25	22	1.8545	1.8674	0.3713	2.3728
$T_c$	27		2.1190	2.1328	2.6592	3.3539

The essential difference between CSSD and entropy method is that the CSSD method not only considers the macro distribution but also cares about the changes of each composition. The detection result of outside.dump on April 5 is shown in **Fig.11**.



**Fig. 11.** CSS based DoS detection result


In **Fig. 11**, the detection effect is the best when  $\delta_N=1.9$  and  $\delta_M=2.7$  so that they can be used in the DoS detection. Repeat each one of 17 attacks 10 times to form a DoS dataset, and insert them into the first and the third week normal traffic randomly. Then verify the CSSD and entropy methods, respectively, the results are shown in **Table 3**.

**Table 3.** Comparison of CSSD and entropy based methods

	<b>Attack number</b>	<b>Detection rate</b>	<b>False negative</b>	<b>False alarm</b>
CSS	170	95.8%	4.2%	1.7%
Entropy	170	70.6%	29.4%	4.2%

The results show that the CSSD method has a higher detection rate and lower false alarm. In order to compare their detecting sensitivities, we inject the Smurf traffic into the normal traffic successively with an increment of 10%. Compare the changes of *CM*, *CP* and *ipDesBE* as shown in **Fig. 12**. In the detecting process,  $\delta_N=1.9$ ,  $\delta_M=2.7$  and  $\delta_E=1.3$ . It can be seen that the CSSD method can detect the attack when the abnormal traffic is less than 40%

of overall traffic. However, the entropy method requires more than 60% of traffic. That is, the CSSD method has a higher sensitivity.



**Fig. 12.** CSSD based DoS detection result

## 5. Conclusion

This paper studies the characteristics of traffic composition in the local-world network environment, and presents an effective method for detecting DoS attacks. The main innovations are: (1) first presents the CSS feature of network traffic; (2) defines the composition distribution graph  $G$  and the relative operations, designs  $(R/S)^d$  algorithm for calculating parameter  $Hurst$ ; (3) presents the CSSD based detection method for detecting DoS attacks.

The experiment shows that the CSSD based method not only has a higher detection rate, but also has a lower false alarm and more sensitivity compared with the entropy based method. This paper only considers the DoS attacks. The next step, we will study the effects of other attacks on the CSS feature, and further on which construct an anomaly model.

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