Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society (대한수학회보)

Korean Mathematical Society (대한수학회)
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NOTE ON PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MATRIX GAMES

  • Ma, Weidong (Institute of Applied Mathematics AMSS Chinese Academy of Sciences)
  • Received : 2011.01.13
  • Published : 2012.11.30
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Abstract

Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a "sufficient condition" for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.

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References

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  2. J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. (2) 54 (1951), 289-295.
  3. G. Owen, Game Theory, Academic Press, 1982.
  4. J. H. Wang, The Theory of Games, TsingHua University Press, 1988.
  5. T. Yoon and O. Kwon, On pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games, Bull. Korean Math. Soc. 37 (2000), no. 2, 377-385.