Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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Corruption and Government Expenditure Volatility

부패와 정부지출의 변동성

  • Received : 2010.11.23
  • Accepted : 2011.01.13
  • Published : 2011.01.31
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Abstract

Using cross-section of 83 countries, this paper empirically examines the relationship between corruption and government expenditure volatility. A country's corruption is denoted by either control of corruption, compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2008), or corruption perceptions index, provided by Transparency International. In addition, a country's government expenditure volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the change ratio of government expenditure from 1990 to 2005. Regression results suggest that a country's control of corruption and corruption perceptions index (higher ratings signifying more transparency) are significantly and negatively associated with the volatility of government expenditure. However, the estimated coefficients of corruption perceptions index show somewhat reduced statistical significances. The results are robust to the sub-sample of countries excluding European OECD countries. Therefore, the regression results suggest corrupt bureaucrats are able to periodically change economic rules of the game, which results in the possibility of a higher variance in government expenditure.

본 연구에서는 83개 국가 간 통계자료를 이용해 부패와 정부지출의 변동성 간의 관련성을 검토했다. 한 국가의 부패의 정도는 Kaufmann et al.(2008)에서 제공한 부패의 통제와 국제투명성기구에서 제공한 부패인식지수로 나타내며, 정부지출의 변동성은 1990~2005년 기간의 연도별 정부지출 변동률의 표준편차를 이용한다. 실증분석 결과한 국가의 부패의 통제와 부패인식지수(높은 수치일수록 투명함)는 정부지출의 변동성에 통계적으로 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 추정됐다. 그러나 한 국가의 부패의 정도를 부패인식지수로 나타낼 경우 그 추정계수의 통계적 유의성은 다소 감소했다. 이상의 결과는 유럽의 OECD 국가를 제외한 작은 수의 표본에 대해서도 여전히 성립했다. 그러므로 본 연구의 실증분석 결과는 부패한 국가의 정부관리 혹은 정치인은 경제운영과 관련된 규칙을 불규칙적으로 변동시켜 자신들의 영역을 강화시키려는 경향이 있기 때문에 정부지출의 변동성이 상대적으로 크게 나타날 가능성을 시사한다.

Keywords

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