The effect of auction frequency and transaction volume on auction performance in internet auction

인터넷 경매에서 경매빈도와 거래규모가 경매 성과에 미치는 영향

  • 박종한 (한국과학기술원 경영대학원 및 온라인전기 자동차 사업단) ;
  • 김현우 (한국과학기술원 EEWS)
  • Received : 2011.03.24
  • Accepted : 2011.07.26
  • Published : 2011.10.31

Abstract

In procurement auctions, auction frequency and transaction volume per auction have been analyzed as important factors in determining auction performance. However, there is no empirical study on the effect of auction frequency and transaction volume in procurement auction. Current studies mainly focus on bidder behavior analysis and new system design in procurement auction. In the study, we analyze the effect of two factors on relative winning price empirically by using real auction data from MRO procurement outsourcing company in Korea. From the results, we find the winning price is lower when the frequency of auction with same item category is lower. The low frequency of auctions means participating bidders have limited information of previous auctions and they bid their best price to win the current auction due to less opportunity of reopening the auction in near future. The larger purchase amounts of MRO items didn’t results in lower winning price, contrary to our hypothesis. The possible reason is that the price of MRO items already reflects the economy of scales and the increased volume per auction do not cause the further discount of MRO items from the auction.

구매 물량이 많고 구매 시점이 분산되어 있는 기업간 구매경매에서 경매빈도와 한번 경매 시 거래되는 거래규모에 대한 결정은 구매경매 성과에 중요한 영향을 미치는 것으로 조사되었다. 하지만 이제까지 구매경매 연구에서는 새로운 시스템을 만들거나, 참여자들의 행위 분석 위주의 연구가 이루어지고, 경매빈도와 거래규모의 영향에 대한 실증적 연구는 없었다. 본 연구에서는 MRO 구매대행 업체의 실제 경매 데이터를 이용하여 경매빈도와 거래규모가 경매의 성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석결과 같은 대하여 경매빈도가 낮을수록 입찰자들이 경매시장에 대한 사전 정보가 부족하고, 상대적으로 적은 판매기회를 잡기 위해 낮은 가격으로 입찰하여 낙찰가격이 낮아지는 것으로 분석되었다. 거래규모는 가설과 달리 거래규모가 증가하여도 낙찰가격이 낮아지지 않았다. 대상 제품인 MRO 제품이 표준화되어 대량 생산되는 제품이므로 규모의 경제에 의한 가격 할인이 이미 반영된 것으로 파악되고, 특정 경매에서 거래규모의 크기가 추가적인 가격인하에 미치는 영향이 없고 오히려 거래규모가 적을 때, 상대적 낙찰가격이 더 낮아지는 것으로 분석되었다.

Keywords

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