Abstract
While existing literature has focused extensively on the strengths and weaknesses of the Chaebol and their ownership and governance, there have been few studies of Korean non-Chaebol firms. However, Lee, Lee and Pennings (2001) did not specifically investigate the competitive strategies that non-Chaebol firms use to survive against the Chaebol in the domestic Korean market. The motivation of this paper is to document, through four exploratory case studies, the successful competitive strategies of non-Chaebol Korean companies against the Chaebol and then offer some propositions that may be useful to other entrepreneurial firms as well as public policy makers. Competition and cooperation as conceptualized by product similarity and cooperative inter.firm relationship respectively, are major dimensions of firm.level marketing strategy. From these two dimensions, we develop the following $2{\times}2$ matrix, with 4 types of competitive strategies for non-Chaebol companies against the Chaebol (Fig. 1.). The non-Chaebol firm in Cell 1 has a "me-too" product for the low-end market while conceding the high-end market to a Chaebol. In Cell 2, the non-Chaebol firm partners with a Chaebol company, either as a supplier or complementor. In Cell 3, the non-Chaebol firm engages in direct competition with a Chaebol. In Cell 4, the non-Chaebol firm targets an unserved part of the market with an innovative product or service. The four selected cases such as E.Rae Electronics Industry Company (Co-exister), Intops (Supplier), Pantech (Competitor) and Humax (Niche Player) are analyzed to provide each strategy with richer insights. Following propositions are generated based upon our conceptual framework: Proposition 1: Non-Chaebol firms that have a cooperative relationship with a Chaebol will perform better than firms that do not. Proposition 1a; Co-existers will perform better than Competitors. Proposition 1b: Partners (suppliers or complementors) will perform better than Niche players. Proposition 2: Firms that have no product similarity with a Chaebol will perform better than firms that have product similarity. Proposition 2a: Partners (suppliers or complementors) will perform better than Co.existers. Proposition 2b: Niche players will perform better than Competitors. Proposition 3: Niche players should perform better than Co-existers. Proposition 4: Performance can be rank.ordered in descending order as Partners, Niche Players, Co.existers, Competitors. A team of experts was constituted to categorize each of these 216 non-Chaebol companies into one of the 4 cells in our typology. Simple Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in SPSS statistical software was used to test our propositions. Overall findings are that it is better to have a cooperative relationship with a Chaebol and to offer products or services differentiated from a Chaebol. It is clear that the only profitable strategy, on average, to compete against the Chaebol is to be a partner (supplier or complementor). Competing head on with a Chaebol company is a costly strategy not likely to pay off for a non-Chaebol firm. Strategies to avoid head on competition with the Chaebol by serving niche markets with differentiated products or by serving the low-end of the market ignored by the Chaebol are better survival strategies. This paper illustrates that there are ways in which small and medium Korean non-Chaebol firms can thrive in a Chaebol environment, though not without risks. Using different combinations of competition and cooperation firms may choose particular positions along the product similarity and cooperative relationship dimensions to develop their competitive strategies-co-exister, competitor, partner, niche player. Based on our exploratory case-study analysis, partner seems to be the best strategy for non-Chaebol firms while competitor appears to be the most risky one. Niche players and co-existers have intermediate performance, though the former do better than the latter. It is often the case with managers of small and medium size companies that they tend to view market leaders, typically the Chaebol, with rather simplistic assumptions of either competition or collaboration. Consequently, many non-Chaebol firms turn out to be either passive collaborators or overwhelmed competitors of the Chaebol. In fact, competition and collaboration are not mutually exclusive, and can be pursued at the same time. As suggested in this paper, non-Chaebol firms can actively choose to compete and collaborate, depending on their environment, internal resources and capabilities.
现有的文献广泛的关注财阀以及他们的所有权和支配权的优点和弱点, 但是几乎没有关于韩国非财阀公司的研究. 然而, Lee, Lee and Pennings (2001)并没有特别的探讨在韩国国内市场非财阀公司为求生存而对抗财阀公司的具有竞争力的战略. 本文的研究动机是通过四个探索性案例的研究, 韩国非财阀公司对抗财阀公司的成功的竞争战略和提出的建议可能会对其他的企业以及公共政策制定者有所帮助. 从产品相似性和公司内的合作关系分别定义竞争和合作的概念. 从这两个方面, 我们开发了以下$2{\times}2$ 矩阵, 为非财阀公司对抗财阀公司提供四种竞争战略. 在小组1的非财阀公司在高端市场对财阀公司让步, 但在低端市场有 "我也是在低端市场" 的产品, 同时承认在高端市场的财阀. 在小组2, 非财阀公司以供应商或互补企业的身份成为财阀公司的合伙人. 在小组3, 非财阀企业从事与财阀直接竞争. 在小组4, 非财阀企业的目标, 以产品创新或服务填补目标市场空白点. 我们选择的4个公司分别是E‐Rae电子企业公司(共存方), Intops(供应商), Pantech(竞争对手)和Humax(小众市场成员). 通过分析这4个案例, 相互提供更丰富的洞察力战略. 基于我们的概念框架, 提出下列假设 : 假设1 : 与财阀公司有合作关系的非财阀公司比没有合作关系的公司表现得更好. 假设1a: 共存方会比竞争方表现得更好. 假设1b: 合伙方会比小众市场成员表现得更好. 假设2: 与财阀公司的产品没有相似性的公司比有相似性的公司表现得要更好. 假设2a: 合伙方比共存放表现得更好 假设2b: 小众市场成员会比竞争方表现得更好. 假设3: 小众市场成员应比共存方表现得更好. 假设4: 按绩效的降序排列依次是合作者, 小众市场成员, 共存方, 竞争方. 一组专家按照我们4组的分类把216家非财阀公司分类. 用SPSS统计软件中的简单方差分析来检验假设. 结果发现. 与财阀公司有合作关系的以及提供与财阀公司不同的产品或服务比较好. 很明确的一点是, 平均来说, 若要对抗财阀公司中获利, 其战略是成为合伙人(供应商或组成部分). 直接与财阀公司硬碰硬的竞争是要付出极高代价的战略, 而这种代价不是非财阀公司能负担得起的. 避免与财阀公司迎面竞争的战略是用不同的产品服务于利己市场, 或是服务于被财阀公司忽视掉的低端市场. 些战略是比较好的生存战略. 本文说明在财阀环境中, 韩国的中小型非财阀公司有一些方法可以生存, 尽管不是没有风险. 根据不同的竞争组合, 合作的公司可以根据产品相似性以及合作关系的维度来选择定位从而制定自己的竞争战略. 例如共存方, 竞争对手, 合伙人, 小众市场成员. 根据我们的探索性案例分析, 合伙人对非财阀公司来说可能是最好的战略, 而竞争者则是有很大风险的. 小众市场成员和共存方处于中间, 但前者比后者要好. 很多中小型企业的管理者只是用简单的, 不是合作就是竞争的观点来审视市场的领导者‐典型的就是财阀. 结果. 很多非财阀公司变成被动的合作者或被自己的竞争对手财阀所击败. 事实上, 合作和竞争并不是互相排斥的, 是可以同时被追求的. 正如本文所建议的, 非财阀公司可以根据他们的环境, 内部资源和能力灵活的选择合作和竞争.