대한산업공학회지 (Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers)

  • 제32권3호
  • /
  • Pages.172-179
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  • 2006
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  • 1225-0988(pISSN)
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  • 2234-6457(eISSN)
대한산업공학회 (Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers)
권호 표지

인공에이전트를 이용한 교섭게임에 관한 연구

Analysis on the Bargaining Game Using Artificial Agents

  • 장석철 (동부정보기술 컨설팅사업부) ;
  • 석상문 (특허청 정보심사팀) ;
  • 윤정일 (한국전자통신연구원 전파방송연구단) ;
  • 윤정원 (경상대학교 기계항공공학부, 항공기부품연구소) ;
  • 안병하 (광주과학기술원 기전공학과 시스템통합 연구실)
  • Chang, Seok-cheol (Dongbu Information Technology Co., Ltd.) ;
  • Soak, Sang-moon (Korean Intellectual Property Office, Gov.Complex Daejeon Bldg.) ;
  • Yun, Joung-il (Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Radio & Broadcasting Research Division, Broadcasting System Research Group) ;
  • Yoon, Jung-won (School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering and ReCAPT, Gyeongsang National University) ;
  • Ahn, Byung-ha (Mechatronics Department, GIST)
  • 발행 : 2006.09.30
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초록

Over the past few years, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on modeling the bargaining game using artificial agents on within-model interaction. However, very few attempts have been made at study on between-model interaction. This paper investigates the interaction and co-evolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents in the bargaining game. We present two kinds of the artificial agents participating in the bargaining game. They play some bargaining games with their strategies based on genetic algorithm (GA) and reinforcement learning (RL). We compare agents' performance between two agents under various conditions which are the changes of the parameters of artificial agents and the maximal number of round in the bargaining game. Finally, we discuss which agents show better performance and why the results are produced.

키워드

참고문헌

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