Design On Secure Messenger Mechanism Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography and IPSec

  • Published : 2004.03.01

Abstract

When most of existing instant messengers log on server, they transmit to sever in encoding password to RC5. but RC5 don't be secured because it has been known many of password cracking tools. Also, messengers don't have any protection on the transmitted information with communicating two hosts since loging on, endangering the privacy of the user. As a counter measure, messengers need to provide security service including message encryption. In this paper, we designed a key exchange method of password representing fast, effective and high security degree, using ECC(Elliptic Curve Cryptography) that being known the very stronger than another public key cryptography with same key size. To effectively improve data transmission and its security using IPSec protocol between users, tunnel mode is introduced. Tunnel mode transmits Host-to-Host data through virtual pipelines on the Internet.

Keywords

References

  1. RFC 2778('A Model for Presence and Instant Messaging'), http:// www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2778.txt
  2. RFC 2779('Instant Messaging/Presence Protocol Requirements'), http:// www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2779.txt
  3. 'Common Presence and Instant Messaging Message Format', http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-impp-cpim-msgfmt-O3.txt
  4. 'Data and Time on the Internet:Timestamps', http://www.ieft.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-impp-datetime-04-txt
  5. 'CPIM Presence Information Data Format', http://www.ieft.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-impp-cpim-pidf- OO.txt
  6. AIM, http://www.aol.com/aim/homenew.adp
  7. A.J Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, 'Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems and her mplementation, Journal, on Crytology, PP. 209-224, Autumn, 1993
  8. ECC Toturial, http://www.certicom.com/resources/ecctoturial/ecc_toturial.html, 2001
  9. S. Kent. et. al., 'Security architecture for the Internet Protocol', RFC 2401, IETF. 1998.11
  10. S. Kent, R. Atkinson, 'IP Authentication Header', RFC 2402, November 1998
  11. S. Kent, R. Atkinson, 'IP Encapsulating Security Payload(ESP)', RFC 2406, November 1998
  12. C. Madson, R. Glenn, 'The Use of HMAC-MD5 within ESP and AH', RFC 2403, November 1998
  13. C. Madson, R. Glenn, 'The Use of HMAC-SHA-1 within ESP and AH', RFC 2404, November 1998
  14. Insoo Lee, 'Analysis on Elliptic Curve Public Cryptosystems', KISA, December, 1998