Nuclear Engineering and Technology

Korean Nuclear Society (한국원자력학회)
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The Operators' Non-compliance Behavior to Conduct Emergency Operating Procedures - Comparing with the Complexity of the Procedural Steps

  • Published : 2003.10.01
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Abstract

According to the results of related studies, one of the typical factors related to procedure related human errors is the complexity of procedures. This means that comparing the change of the operators' behavior with respect to the complexity of procedures may be meaningful in clarifying the reasons for the operators' non-compliance behavior. In this study, to obtain data related to the operators' non-compliance behavior, emergency training records were collected using a full scope simulator. And three types of the operators' behavior (such as strict adherence, skipping redundant actions and modifying action sequences) observed from the collected emergency training records were compared with the complexity of the procedural steps. As the results, two remarkable relationships are obtained. They are: 1) the operators seem to frequently adopt non-compliance behavior to conduct the procedural steps that have an intermediate procedural complexity, 2) the operators seems to accommodate their non-compliance behavior to the complexity of the procedural steps. Therefore, it is expected that these relationships can be used as meaningful clues not only to scrutinize the reason for non-compliance behavior but also to suggest appropriate remedies for the reduction of non-compliance behavior that can result in procedure related human error.

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